International Workshop for Young Africanists

Ritsumeikan University (Kinugasa Campus), Kyoto
December 21 (Sat.), 2019

[Co-Organizers]
Institute of International Relations and Area Studies and Graduate School of International Relations (Ritsumeikan University), Institute of African Studies (Hankuk University for Foreign Studies), Center for African Area Studies (Kyoto University), sponsored by Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
[Program]

9:30 - 10:00 Registration

10:00 - 10:10 Opening address
Takuo Iwata (RU) "A brief reflection on Asian Africanists Network"

10:10 - 10:20 Opening address
Prof. Yongkyu Chang (HUFS) "Fostering young Asian Africanist Networks"

10:20 - 11:00 Inaugural speech
Prof. Hyo-sook Kim (Kansai Gaidai University)
"Korea-Africa Relations: Implications for African Studies in Asia"

11:00 - 12:30 First session (Chair & Commentator: Dr. Ideue)

Speaker 1: Gina Aghnia Virginianity (RU)
"Approaching Africa - Comparative Study of Indonesia and Japan Foreign Policy towards Africa -"

Speaker 2: Yung Yun Paik (HUFS)
"The role of women in peacebuilding in Africa: seen through the case of the 1994 genocide and peacebuilding process in Rwanda"

12:30 - 13:30 Lunch

13:30 - 15:00 Second session (Chair & Commentator: Prof. Kim)

Speaker 3: Doo Young Choi (HUFS)
"Press Media perceptions and Economy in Kenya: An analysis of the correlation using quantitative data mining"

Speaker 4: Aboubacar Diallo (RU)
"A Synergy between Mining and Agriculture for a Sustainable Economic Development in Guinea"

15:00 - 15:20 Break

15:20 - 16:50 Third session (Chair & Commentator: Prof. Hwang)

Speaker 5: Xiangli Wang (RU)
"Trends and Characteristics of Inbound Tourism Market in Tanzania"

Speaker 6: Yoowon Kim (HUFS)
"Determinants of Participation in Regional Economic Integration of Regional Hegemon: Nigerian Case"

16:50 - 17:00 Closing address
Prof. Kyudeug Hwang (HUFS)
Korea-Africa Relations: Implications for African Studies in Asia

Hyo-sook Kim (Kansai Gaidai University)

Presenter's articles on Korea's ODA to Africa


Research questions

- Why does South Korea provide assistance to Africa?
- What factors determine its aid behavior?
  → from the major paradigms of international relations

*National interests or internalization of aid norms

Korea's ODA to Africa

National interests and South Korea’s aid to Africa

Realism

International politics is a struggle for power, and that foreign aid, (Hans Morgenthau, 1985: 86). Foreign aid is political in nature: in practice, most foreign aid is provided as bribes or for the purpose of prestige. (Morgenthau 1962: 301–9).

Foreign aid is thus a foreign policy tool of the donor state, and the donor provides aid in pursuit of its national interest (Hook, 1995)

*The United States: aid to Egypt and Israel to support its geopolitical interests in the Middle East (Alesina and Dollar, 2000)
*France: Strategic interests in France’s former colonies (Alesina and Dollar, 2000)

South Korea’s ODA policy is “a child of the Cold War” (Kim and Seddona, 2005: 153).
—South Korea’s foreign aid as a tool for survival and national security

South Korean ODA and National Interests

*South Korea’s ODA has been driven by its foreign policy (H. Kim 2013).
*ODA policy discourses in South Korea have been based on donor-centric strategies (T. Lee 2003).
*South Korean ODA has been implemented for economic cooperation than for development cooperation (H. Sohn and J. Choi).

*Economic interests are a significant determinant of South Korea’s overall aid allocation (J. Lee 2005; J. Koo and D. Kim 2011; E. Kim and J. Oh 2012)

**“competitive (Raposo, Kim, and Potter 2012)” and “rivalry (Iwata 2012)” relations or tension among them resulting from “the regional geopolitics (Watson 2014)”**
"The Role of Aid in South Korea's Relations with Africa During the Cold War." (2018)

1) historical relations during the Korean War;

2) the political/diplomatic competition with North Korea for international recognition and support regarding the Korean question in the United Nations;

3) economic cooperation through south-south cooperation.

"Korean Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Dynamism of Aid to Africa and Its Objectives." (2013)

The objectives of Korean ODA have been changed, reflecting strategies and goals of foreign policy.

- Around 1990: Establishment of aid structure coming down to the present
- 1) Developmental objective (supports for poverty reduction as a responsible member in international society)
- 2) Economic Objectives (Korea's market expansion and stable procurement of natural resources)

- 2005: ODA reform to join the DAC

- Beginning of aid to developing countries

* to gain international support in confrontation with the North and support for the Korean Problem in the United Nations
The aims of Korea's foreign policy toward the Third World | Priority of Africa in Korea's foreign policy
---|---
The Cold War Period | Relatively high
to obtain support for Seoul as the sole legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula
Post-Cold War Period | low
economic cooperation for the diversification of its export markets, development of its industrial structure, and securing of a stable supply of natural resources

President Roh Moo-hyun's visit to Africa → Revitalization of Korea's diplomacy toward Africa


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Aid norms and South Korea’s aid to Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberalists</th>
<th>Constructivists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*The idea that we should eliminate poverty and help people in need (Lumsdaine 1993)</td>
<td>*The reemergence of poverty reduction idea (Ogawa 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Concern for welfare of poor states (Hook and Rumsey 2015)</td>
<td>*MDGs as a super-norm and synonym for poverty reduction (Hulme and Fukuda-Parr 2009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Norms are important with regard to the institutionalization of aid

Present aid norm intends to help reduce poverty in developing countries

The spread (cascade) of that norm has brought about the convergence of donors' aid behaviors and boosted international cooperation in solving global poverty

*"standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations (Krasner 1982: 2)"*

*"standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (Finnemore 1996: 22)"*

the ways how the poverty reduction norm influences donors' aid behavior⇒(substantial) internalization
South Korean ODA and humanitarian concern

*The rise of humanitarianism and the growth of civil society have led to increased ODA in South Korea (Lumsdaine and Schopf (2007)).
*Humanitarian concern is also a influential determinant in South Korea’s aid allocation (M. Yoon and C. Moon 2014; E. Kim and J. Oh 2012).

The literature’s analytic bias toward accepting the realism paradigm assumption and the lack of quantitative study

⇒ what factors encouraged South Korea to incorporate aid norms and to increase aid to Africa?

The top fifteen recipient countries of South Korea’s aid to Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ghana</td>
<td>39.09 Angola</td>
<td>115.72 Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Angola</td>
<td>8.57 Kenya</td>
<td>41.71 Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. South Africa</td>
<td>3.06 Tanzania</td>
<td>38.86 Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ethiopia</td>
<td>2.99 Senegal</td>
<td>29.99 Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tanzania</td>
<td>1.76 Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>20.18 D. R. of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Cameroon</td>
<td>1.17 Madagascar</td>
<td>14.87 Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Uganda</td>
<td>0.81 Ethiopia</td>
<td>11.88 Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Senegal</td>
<td>0.68 Sudan</td>
<td>5.68 South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Kenya</td>
<td>0.66 Nigeria</td>
<td>4.07 Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Mauritania</td>
<td>0.55 Ghana</td>
<td>3.33 Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>0.49 D. R. of Congo</td>
<td>2.71 Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Nigeria</td>
<td>0.47 Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>2.4 Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Chad</td>
<td>0.46 Guinea</td>
<td>2.33 Madagascar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0.38 Cameroon</td>
<td>2.32 Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Sudan</td>
<td>0.36 Uganda</td>
<td>1.82 Kenya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“South Korea’s Aid to Africa and Compliance with International Norms.” (2017)

* What conditions have encouraged South Korea to incorporate the poverty reduction norm—into its aid behavior?

/System level and unit-level factors/

a. the match between foreign aid and foreign policy goals under a president-led policymaking structure;

b. the national status as a middle power in the world system;

c. the rise of public support and the growth of civil society

South Korea’s foreign policy

Foreign policy to improve South Korea’s national status in international society:

- 
  *Senjin Oegyo* (advanced diplomacy) in the Roh Moo-hyun administration;

- *Giyeo Oegyo* (contribution diplomacy) in the Lee Myong-bak administration;

- *Shinroe Oegyo* (trust-based diplomacy) in the present Park Geun-hye administration.
South Korea as a middle power

1) A middle power in terms of **material power**: great > middle > small power
   - Korea's GDP: US$1.51 trillion in 2017 (12th in the world)*1
   - Korea's population: 51.4 million in 2017 (27th in the world)*2

2) **A self-identified** middle power

   *the Kim Young-sam administration (segyehwa)*- the Roh Moo-hyun administration- the Lee Myung-bak administration (Global Korea)- the Park Geun-hye administration

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National identity as a developed country and national status as a middle power

Recognition by international community

Cooperation in solving global poverty, following the existing international norm and aid order

**Compliance with the poverty reduction norm and South Korea's national interests**

Substantial internalization of the poverty reduction norm and the achievement of the MDGs—changes in aid behavior
**Middle power statecraft**
as a key concept for analyzing Korea's diplomacy toward Africa


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middle power statecraft as a key concept for explaining Korea's diplomacy toward Africa

"The KOAF was launched based on President Roh Moo-hyun's vision that Korea, which became a middle power (junggyeon gukga) in the international society, should play a suitable role for Africa's development (MOFAT 2006a, 1)."

*At the opening ceremony of the first KOAF, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ban Ki-moon*

*The KOAF at the interstice of China and Japan's diplomacy toward Africa
— the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
— the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)*

### Korea’s diplomacy as a middle power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Middle power diplomacy</th>
<th>Korea’s diplomacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism</td>
<td>*hosted major international meetings and conferences such as the G20 Summit in 2010, Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, and the Convention on Biological Diversity in 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation within international organizations</td>
<td>*middle power activism in the field of development cooperation, acting as a bridge between developed and developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporter of ODA</td>
<td><em>development experience</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good citizen of international society (role model)</td>
<td><em>follower of the established international norms, rules, and standards</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism</td>
<td><em>a sense of obligation and responsibility for poverty reduction</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft power</td>
<td><em>ODA as a significant tool to strengthen soft power in partner countries</em></td>
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<td>Niche diplomacy</td>
<td><em>ODA and PKO</em></td>
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### basic data about the 1st - 4th KOAF

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<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>AU headquarter (Addis Ababa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Host organizations</td>
<td>MOFA of Korea, KIEP</td>
<td>AU, MOFA of Korea</td>
<td>AU, MOFA of Korea</td>
<td>AU, MOFA of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants from Africa*</td>
<td>5 countries (Benin, Congo, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania)</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
<td>1 country (Zambia)</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heads</td>
<td>5 countries (Benin, Congo, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania)</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
<td>1 country (Zambia)</td>
<td>n. a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers or vice-ministers</td>
<td>5 countries</td>
<td>15 countries</td>
<td>18 countries</td>
<td>14 countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Middle power as a structural constraint

→middle power diplomacy is an optimal policy choice for South Korea to secure its national interests in the diplomatic competition in Africa with two stronger powers in Asia.

→examination of Korea's strategies and behaviors in the KOAF from the perspective of middle power diplomacy

Limitations of South Korea's diplomacy toward Africa via the KOAF

1) rivalries with China and Japan and a lack of material capabilities
2) South Korea's inconsistent and indistinct foreign policy toward Africa;
3) circumstances in Africa including political instability and difficulties scheduling forums with other countries and regions
Rivalry with China and Japan

* a lack of its material powers compared with China and Japan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aid commitment to Africa pledged around 2006</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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</table>
| China | - doubling of aid to Africa  
| | - provision of US$3 billion preferential loans and US$2 billion preferential buyer credits to Africa (by 2009) |

Source: KIEP (2008, 25-26)

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Korea’s budget for the KOAF (million won)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>113</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(145+592)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Note: the Japanese government’s budget for fiscal year 2019 provided 1.2 billion yen (about 12 billion won) for the seventh TICAD in 2019 at Yokohama.

*as of October 2017

Source: Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee (Unification, Foreign Affairs, and Trade Committee or Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Unification Committee) of the National Assembly of the ROK. (each year). Oegyo tongil (tongil oegyo tongsan, or oegyo tongsang tongil) uwonhoe sogwan gyeolsan yeol simsa bogoseo [a preliminary review report on the final accounts under the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee (Unification, Foreign Affairs, and Trade Committee or Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Unification Committee)]; Oegyo tongil (tongil oegyo tongsan, or oegyo tongsang tongil) uwonhoe sogwan ilhan hoege seip - sechul yesanen, yeol simsa bogoseo [a preliminary examination report on general account revenue and expenditure budget bills under Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee (Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee, Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Unification Committees)], All from http://rikms.assembly.go.kr/bill/BillSearchSimple.do (accessed January 20, 2019)
Invitation of African heads for the 1st KOAF

The invitation of African leaders

Africa

China
POCAC on 4-5 November 2006

Korea
KOAF on 8 November 2006

The invitation of African leaders

Criticism that the government took advantage of China’s diplomacy towards Africa (Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee of the National Assembly of the ROK 2006, 203; 2007, 128-129)

Inconsistency and indistinctiveness
the expansion of subjects at the KOAF

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<th>1st</th>
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<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Economic cooperation</td>
<td>*Korea’s Initiative for Africa’s Development</td>
<td>*Development cooperation</td>
<td>*Sustainable peace and stability in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The share of Korea’s development experience</td>
<td>*Green Growth</td>
<td>*Trade and investment</td>
<td>*Economic development in Africa (peace and security, economy and society, human resources development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*the improvement of mutually beneficial relations</td>
<td>*Korea-Africa cooperation for Common prosperity and the achievement of the MDGs</td>
<td>*Peace and security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(1) The LCGG initiative and Korea as a pioneer in the global environment arena

1) Domestically - introduction of various environmental programs and projects
   - the establishment of the legal institution through enactment of the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth in 2010

2) Internationally - the establishment of the headquarters of the Global Green Growth Institute
   - and the Global Climate Fund in South Korea in 2010
   (Han H. 2015, 737–742; O’Donnell 2015)

*Korea’s global leadership in a specific policy area (Han H. 2015; Kim S. 2016)

→niche diplomacy *concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns rather than trying to cover the entire policy spectrum (Easley & Park 2018, 247).*
(2) Inconsistent and indistinct policies since the third forum

1) more emphasis on initiatives and aid programs such as Better Life for Girls, Korea Aid, and Saemaul Undong ODA in the fourth KOAF
   →the KOAF as a place for embodying each administration’s foreign policy and legacy?

2) the expansion of the KOAF agenda to security issues
   →PKO deployment for Korea’s niche diplomacy? (Lee S. 2012, 18)
   →the de-focus of Korea’s specific areas in the KOAF

3) the fragmented structure of the Korea-Africa forum

   - the KOAF
   - the Korea–Africa Economic Cooperation (KOAFEC)
   - the Korea–Africa Industry Cooperation Forum (KOAFIC)
   →more focus on economic relations than the KOAF

*The second KOAF set:

the KOAFEC and KOAFIC as “complementary frameworks that can strengthen trade and economic cooperation (MOFAT 2009a, 4)” led by the KOAF?

*In 2012, the Korean government held the third KOAF’s major conference on October 17 in cooperation with the KOAFIC on October 15 and the KOAFEC on October 16.
<Circumstances in Africa>

The 1st KOAF 2006
at the AU headquarters in 2014
Scheduling difficulties with the AU

The 2nd KOAF 2009
in Burkina Faso in 2014
Demonstration and the Ebola outbreak

The 3rd KOAF 2012
at the AU headquarters in 2015

The 4th KOAF 2016
at the AU headquarters in 2016
Scheduling difficulties with the AU

The 5th KOAF in 2021?

In 2013–2015, the AU held forums with countries and regions, including the United States, China, India, Turkey, South America, and Middle Eastern nations, but only small meetings with South Korea (Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee of the National Assembly of the ROK 2016, 67; Special Member of Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee of the National Assembly of the ROK 2015, 87).

Implications for African studies in Asia:
Subjects for the future research

1. Contribution to the theories of international relations or foreign policy analysis

2. African perspectives toward South Korea
References-1


References-2

References-3


References-4

- MOFA. (2006a, November 6). Jejiga han-geupjik haecom gaepjeu pyeolgywa (chupa jinyo): janggywaenim [Jejiga han-geupjik haecom gaepjeu pyeolgywa (chupa jinyo): janggywaenim] [the results of the first Korea-Africa Forum (additional materials): opening remarks by the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the first Korea-Africa Forum] [Press release]. http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/00dmg_4/0603/View.do?seq=20080908soshiF%26amp;code%3D%26amp;sessId%3D%26amp;word%3D%26amp;str%3D%26amp;multi_int_seq=0%26amp;itm_seq _t=0%26amp;tm_seq_2=0%26amp;company_cd=0%26amp;company_nm=4&page=3 (accessed October 26, 2016)
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References-6


Thank you!
"APPROACHING AFRICA: COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDONESIA AND JAPAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA"

Gina Aghnia Virginianty
Graduate School of International Relations
Ritsumeikan University

PRESENTATION OUTLINE

- Research Background
- Research Objective
- Research Questions
- Methodology
- Asia–Africa Cooperation
- Indonesia Foreign Policy
- Japan Foreign Policy
- Provisional Conclusion
- Bibliography
OBJECTIVE

To compare Indonesia and Japan's foreign policy towards Africa in order to find common interest that could be the basis of cooperation between the two countries to further reinforce its relationship with African countries.

Address the possibility of cooperation, such as implementation of Triangular Cooperation to the African countries that was previously agreed and the possibility of reinvigorating the 'New Asian African Strategic Partnership'.

To identify Indonesia's past, current, and future foreign policy towards Africa, particularly the regional cooperation aspect which has yet to be explored deeply by academic researches. This is to fill in the gap of Indonesia–Africa studies which is considered as an understudied area comparing to other Asian countries relation study with Africa.

BACKGROUND
REGIONAL COOPERATION

The Asia Africa Conference in 1955
- Connected the Asian and African countries together, under common values of non-alignment and self-determination, and has inspired the independence of many new countries.

The New Asian African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) in 2005
- Renewed the longstanding solidarity in order to create and maintain peace, stability, and prosperity for the peoples.

Asia – Africa Forum
- Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) – 1993
- Forum of China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
- India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS)
- Korea Africa Forum (KAF)
- Indonesia Africa Forum (IAF) – 2018
RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Why does the Government of Indonesia and Japan consider Africa as their strategic partner?
   a) What are the Similarities and Differences of their foreign policies towards Africa?
   b) What are the common interests of both countries in strengthening their relationship with African countries?

2. How can both countries make use of their common interest to cooperate in order to boost their ties with African countries? What cooperation mechanisms can be implemented?
METHODOLOGY

This research will use the following methodology to answer the research questions listed above:

- Data collection of secondary sources, including official documents and press release by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, academic literature, and articles.
- Semi-structured Interviews with Indonesian and Japanese Foreign Ministry officials.
- Historical Method. The research will present Indonesia and Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa after the Asia Africa Conference 1955 up to recent event in order to examine whether there are any shifts in the policies.
- Comparative Analysis Method. Through this method, the scattered and non-systematic information will be systemized and theorized in order to identify the similarities and differences of the policies.
- International Relations Theory and Concept: Regional Cooperation, South–South Triangular Cooperation
ASIA-AFRICA COOPERATION INTERNATIONAL FORUM

ASIA-AFRICA COOPERATION REGIONAL COOPERATION FRAMEWORK

- Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (Japan)
- ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook (ASEAN)
- Belt Road Initiative (China)
- Asia and Africa Growth Corridor (India-Japan)
INDONESIA – AFRICA RELATION

- "Unleashing for Potentials" and "Connecting Prosperity"
- Indonesia – Africa Diplomatic Relations
  - Indonesia have been maintaining a friendly bilateral relationship with African Countries since the Bandung Conference.
  - Indonesia have diplomatic relation with 53 African Countries
    - 16 Embassies and 1 Consular Office. Planning to open in Cameroon
- Indonesia FP towards Africa
  - There weren’t any dedicated foreign policy towards Africa as a region for 60 years, apart from Asia–Africa Conference.
  - Under the Presidency of Joko Widodo (2014–incumbent), the Government of Indonesia showed that Africa is one of their top priority Foreign Policy Agenda.
  - Indonesia have held "Indonesia – Africa Forum" in 2018 as a Platform to enhance economic cooperation. As a follow up, Indonesia also convened "Indonesia – Africa Maritime Dialogue" and "Indonesia – Africa Infrastructure Dialogue".

Indonesia Africa Forum

- Attended by 233 Participants from Africa and 344 Participants from Indonesia
- Business Deals worth USD $586,86 million (Infrastructures, financing, mines, arms, textiles, machines, export-import commodities)

Indonesia Africa Infrastructure Forum

- Attended by more than 700 Participants from Africa and Indonesia Government and Private Entities
- Enforcement of Indonesia’s Diplomacy Infrastructure
- Business deals worth US$822 million.
- First PTA with African Country, Djibouti
- With concrete cooperation, Indonesia and the African countries no longer trapped in the romance of the 1955 Asian–African Conference and are ready to move forward.
INTERVIEW

- H.E. Desta Percaya, Director General of Asia, Pacific and Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia
- Tumpal Simadjuntak, Director for African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia
- Nelson Simorangkir, Deputy Director of Center for Policy Analysis and Development on Asia, Pacific, and Africa Region, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia
- Kunihiko Amatsu, Research Institute, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
JAPAN – AFRICA RELATION

➢ Africa – The Biggest Frontier of the 21st Century

➢ Japan – Africa Diplomatic relation
  o Japan – South Africa (1937)
    ▪ 1st Diplomatic relation w/ African Country. Main Trading partner in the continent.
  o Japan has diplomatic relation with 54 African countries.
    ▪ 35 Embassies and 1 Consular Office (19 Countries Accredited)

➢ Japan’s Approach towards Africa
  o Quality Growth
    ▪ Inclusiveness, sustainability, and resilience
  o Human Security
    ▪ Capacity Building focusing on each individual in Africa

---

TOKYO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

➢ A Summit-Level conference initiated in 1993. (Co-organized by UN, World Bank, UNDP, African Union Commission)

➢ Held every 5 year till TICAD V (2013) and every 3 year since TICAD VI (2016). Convened alternately in Japan and Africa since TICAD VI.

➢ Characteristic:
  □ Pioneer of development forum on Africa
  □ Inclusiveness and Openness
  □ Realization of principles such as ownership of Africa and partnership with International community on African development
  □ Steady implementation of measures announced and follow-up

➢ TICAD Outcomes has been used as a guideline of Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa

TICAD7 – Yokohama, 28–30 August 2019

➢ Economic transformation and improvements in business environment and institution through private investment and innovation

➢ Promotion of resilient and sustainable society for human security

➢ Peace and stability (support for Africa’s own proactive efforts)
## COMPARATIVE STUDY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JAPAN</th>
<th>INDONESIA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Forum</strong></td>
<td>Tokyo International Conference on African Development</td>
<td>Indonesia Africa Forum</td>
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<td><strong>Participant</strong></td>
<td>54 African Countries, Development Partner Countries, and International Org.</td>
<td>53 African Countries (Exclusive to Indonesian and African Participants)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Timeframe</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Highest Level</strong></td>
<td>Head of State/Government</td>
<td>Minister</td>
</tr>
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</table>
| **Institutional Mechanism / Sub-forum** | TICAD Ministerial Meeting  
TICAD Senior Officials’ Meeting  
Japan–Africa Business Forum (Africa Corps Diplomatic) | Institutional Mechanism has yet to be formalized  
Sub-tema Fora:  
Indonesia–Africa Infrastructure Dialogue (2019) |

## COMPARATIVE STUDY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JAPAN</th>
<th>INDONESIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Pillars**            | 1. Accelerating economic transformation and improving business environment through innovation and private sector engagement.  
2. Deepening sustainable and resilient society  
3. Strengthening peace and stability | N/A                                                                      |
| **Key Areas**          | Economic Diversification and Industrialization; Improving Business Environment; Debt Transparency and Sustainability; Quality Infrastructure; Agriculture; Blue Economy; Health; Education; Environment; Disaster Risk Management; Rule of Law; Good | Economic Diplomacy; Infrastructure development; Financing Facility Initiatives; Digital Transformation; Strategic Industry Cooperation; Connectivity; Digital Economy; Agriculture; Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs); South-South and |
PROVISIONAL CONCLUSION (II)

- Japan and Indonesia's has a different regional cooperation approach where Japan's TICAD has a proper institutional Mechanism, whereas Indonesia has yet to assign IAF as the core institution. On the positive outlook, Japan's best practices on maintaining their commitment towards Africa by the convening of TICAD for the past 20 years can serve as a guidance for Indonesia. However, Indonesia FP is also interesting to observe as the informal approach is rarely implemented.

- Japan and Indonesia are committed to connect Africa with the Asia-Pacific Region.

  In TICAD7, Japan put forward the concept of Free and Open Indo-Pacific and it was noted in the Yokohama Declaration 2019. Meanwhile, Indonesia have stated that they are ready to become a bridge for Africa and ASEAN, as well as future cooperation with RCEP countries.

PROVISIONAL CONCLUSION (II)

- Japan and Indonesia highly placed the need to built positive image of Africa in order to strengthen the cooperation, particularly between the Businesspeople.

- Initial finding from the comparative study shows that Indonesia and Japan have common interest in the area of Infrastructure Development, Trade and Investment (Business) and Agriculture.

- Possible cooperation scheme:
  - Triangular Cooperation to the African countries > Indonesia has expressed its interest
  - Synergizing Regional Cooperation Frameworks to include Africa region
  - A joint Business Forum with Africa
    - Govt. of Indonesia held Asia-Africa Business Summit at the sideline of Asia-Africa Conference 2015 and Indonesia-Africa Business Forum at the sideline of Indonesia-Africa Forum 2018.
### BIBLIOGRAPHY


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### BIBLIOGRAPHY

THANK YOU
The role of women in peacebuilding in Africa: 
seen through the case of the 1994 genocide and peacebuilding process in Rwanda

PAIK Yung Yun
PhD Candidate, HUFS GSIS
Programme Specialist, Korean National Commission for UNESCO

21 December, 2019 / Ritsumeikan University

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1.1 Research problem and aim
1.2 Research focus
1.3 Criteria for case study selection

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III. Conceptual Framework: gender and peacebuilding in Africa
3.1 Interactivity of conflict and post-conflict environment
3.2 "Femininity" as an alternative for peacebuilding
3.3 Opportunities for women
3.4 Barriers to women

IV. Case study: Rwanda
4.1 Victimization of women during the Genocide
4.2 The role of women in social reconciliation
4.3 The role of women in social reconstruction
4.4 Limitations

V. Conclusion

I. Introduction

1.1 Research problem and aim

- What women can do for peacebuilding in post-conflict African countries?

- Hypothesis:
  1) Socio-political structures of conflict and post-conflict environments are constantly changing.
  2) Structure and agency of peacebuilding are mutually and socially constructed.
  3) Peacebuilding processes in African countries are male-oriented.
  4) Women are key role players in peacebuilding in post-conflict societies.

1.2 Research focus
This research focuses on the **processes of identity construction** that lead to the **variability** of agent and structure.

Thus, focusing on the process of construction of 'socio-political identity of women'.

- The goal is to grasp how changes in identity matter, by tracing recognition and role of women through cases in which they become agents of peacebuilding.

- The criteria is to select evidence that honors the simultaneity of mutual constitution without simply conflating structure and agency.

1.3 Criteria for case study selection

II. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Mainstream IR theories

- In their treatment of the State as the primary actor in world politics, mainstream IR scholars often implicitly **deny the variability of identity** by treating sovereignty as a defining feature of states in a system based on anarchy.

Mainstream IR Theories

→ Do not seriously consider the role of individuals or civil societies in International Relations.

→ No room for deliberation on women's role as actual and powerful agents in peacebuilding process.

2.2 Constructivism

Constructivism

- Constructivists challenge the static nature of these assumptions by recognizing that people have the potential to destabilize even deeply institutionalized meanings, such as sovereignty.


Constructivism

- In keeping with an ontology of mutual constitution of agents and structures, constructivists view identities as social relationships that change over time and across contexts.

- Because they are relationships, identities are not immutable characteristics of individuals or groups; people produce and reproduce them, rather than being born with them.


Constructivism

- Ideas and concepts borrowed from sociology.

- Individuals and groups are not only shaped by their world but can also change it.

- Agency and structure are co-constituted.

2.3 Feminist Constructivism
Feminist Constructivism

- Commonalities between constructivism and feminism
- Differences between constructivism and feminism: different ways of defining 'power'
- Feminist Constructivism
  - study the processes whereby ideas about gender influence global politics and vice versa

Limitation of Feminist Constructivism

- Any social change risks instituting new forms of dominance and inequality.
- May generalize women as solely 'victims' of violence (when women can and do engage in violent acts, and/or may actively support other women and men who carry out such acts in the context of ethno-national conflicts).

III. Conceptual Framework:
   gender and peacebuilding in Africa

3.1 'masculinity'

3.1 'Masculinity' of conflict and post-conflict environment

- Direct links between violence and conflict with the way that man-hoods or masculinities are construed.
- Hyper-Masculinity
- Existing perception on the 'masculinity' of conflict is socially constructed idea, and is subject to change.

3.1 'Masculinity' of conflict and post-conflict environment

- Gender Apartheid
  - institutionalized segregation based on gender
  - authoritarian political, social and economic culture based on 'male' supremacy
  - prevalent on both temporal and spatial aspects (universal phenomenon)
    * temporal: present before, during and after the conflict
    * spatial: exists in every society in the world
  → still a 'social construct'
3.2 'femininity'

3.2 'Femininity' as an alternative for new peacebuilding

- Klotz and Lynch
  - Because core categorizations can also marginalize certain actors, alternative concepts and methods can highlight other actors.

- Widened concept of peace includes gender-related structural violence, and the role of women in peacebuilding.

- Women have 'reconstructive power' of social structure.

3.3 'opportunity'

African traditional perspectives on women and peace

3.3 Opportunities for women: African perspectives on women's role

- Women are often seen as the transmitters of cultural values to their progeny and future generations.

- Use of artistic expressions such as song, dance and folk tales.

Source:
'Women and Peace in Africa: case studies on traditional conflict resolution practices', UNESCO, 2003
3.3 Opportunities for women: African perspectives on women’s role

- Act as intermediaries in conflict situations, facilitating communication and peace negotiations.
- Used as ‘bridge building blocks’ between hostile communities through ‘inter-community marriage’


Global perspectives on women and peace

3.3 Opportunities for women: from victims to active agents

- Participation of women at all levels is key to the operational effectiveness, success and sustainability of peace processes and peacebuilding efforts.
- Presence of more women at the peace table ("Global Study on the Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325")
- UNSC Resolution 1325

3.4 Barriers to women

- Exogenous factors: from outside of women
  - reoccurrence of discriminative social structure
  - rise of violent extremism
  - lack of funds
- Endogenous factors: from within women
  - women as perpetrators and/or accomplices
  - lack of capacity
4. Case study: Rwanda

4.1 Victimization of women during the Genocide

- Many conflicts bring additional or greatly intensified forms of violence and sexual acts perpetrated upon women.
- In conflicted societies, women are the target of sex-based violence that is closely related to the methods and means of warfare used by combatants.
  - At least 250,000 (500,000) women were raped during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
  - Purposely infected Tutsi women with HIV/AIDS

4.2 The role of women in social reconciliation

4.2 Women’s role in social reconciliation

- *Gacaca tribunals*
  - A traditional Rwandan community-based conflict resolution system
  - Women’s participation as presidents of the courts contributed to better performance.
  - Women’s ability to listening carefully and empathizing to others, and courage to speak the truth in public.

4.3 The role of women in social reconstruction
4.3 Women's role in social reconstruction

• Education
  - Rehabilitation of an appropriate and equitable education system is itself one of the major pillars of the post-conflict state reconstruction.
  - More important in Rwanda, as school system was severely damaged as a result of the 1994 genocide, (mothers education to children)

• Self-help among women
  - the case of 'AVEGA'

4.3 Women's role in social reconstruction

• ARFEM (Association Rwandaise des Femmes des Médias)
  - set out to contribute to national reconstruction by broadcasting messages of peace and reconciliation
  - launched a programme for women on Radio Rwanda (December, 1997)

* source: Sources UNESCO, No 123-May 2000

4.3 Women's role in social reconstruction

• ARFEM (Association Rwandaise des Femmes des Médias)
  - conducted a campaign on war rapes
  - took women members of parliament to visit centres for rape victims of the war
  → war rape became category 1 of war crime instead of category 4

* source: Sources UNESCO, No 123-May 2000
4.4 Limitations of women’s Participation in Peacebuilding

- The major challenges:
  - lack of education, limited skills
  - widespread poverty
  - constant insecurity and GBV
  - limited participation in decision-making
  - gender stereotypes
  - negative aspect of ‘traditional’ culture

※ Mutumba et al.

4.4 Limitations of women’s Participation in Peacebuilding

- Limitations of Gacaca mechanism:
  - may institutionalize patterns of discrimination against women
  - unofficial cultural practice of shaming women who are victims of rape
  - rape as a sin of adultery, blaming the victims
  - women more than 60% less likely to testify to the events of rape because of the intimate nature of the crime and the associated stigma

※ Althusser and Hall
4.4 Limitations of women's Participation in Peacebuilding

- Manipulation of *ethnic identities*: one of the main causes of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide
- Manipulation of *gender identities*: one of the main challenges for women's participation in peacebuilding

V. Conclusion

Conclusion

- Conflict creates both opportunities and setbacks for women.
- Key priorities:
  - Expanding women's opportunities at all levels
  - Addressing ongoing inequalities of access to education and political participation
  - Ensuring gender-sensitive measures are put in place
  - Supporting wider dialogue and peace education

Conclusion

- Women's participation in the peacebuilding process cannot and should not be regarded as 'remedy for all diseases' in post-conflict African societies.
- Nor should it be regarded as a traditional 'feminist activism'.
- However, it is undeniable that women's alternative power can and should complement the ongoing efforts for peacebuilding in many African countries (as well as in other post-conflict societies all around the world).

Thank you.

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Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography

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https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wpo/

Press media perceptions and economy in Kenya
An analysis of the correlation using quantitative data mining

21 December, 2019

Doo Young CHOI
Graduate School of International Studies, HUFS

Research Question

RQ1: How does strictly economic news related to the real-world economy?

RQ2: Sentiments on the economy, how economic news relates to collective economic behaviour?

RQ3: Does economic news influence 'state in society' perspectives of economic behaviour?

IN KENYA
What is sentiment?

**Sentiment** is

"a thought, opinion, or idea based on a feeling about a situation"

"a way of thinking about something."

Source: Cambridge Dictionary

---

What is sentiment?

**Economic news**
News topics, tone, consonance, and volume of general news outlets with the highest reach in Kenya

**Economic sentiment**
Evaluations and expectations for the economic situation of the Kenyan press media (Daily Nation)

**Economic behavior**
Indicators of the aggregate economic situation
- Stock Market (NSE 20)
- Exchange rates
- Real GDP
- Others
**Limitation**

*Limited correction of press media*

The research has taken as a validity check of the future research proceeds decision. Thus, numbers of press media are limited to Daily Nation and for the further study, "Standard news" and other press medias.

---

**Outline**

1. Origins of press media perceptions and economy
2. Theories of sentiment and economics
3. How Kenyan press media talks about their economy
4. Does it sentiment really matter?
5. Conclusion
1. Origins of press media perceptions and economy

John Maynard Keynes: *animal spirits* (1936)

Instincts, proclivities and emotions that ostensibly influence and guide human behaviour

Economists have left the 'animal spirits' to the devil for four generations.
(Berlin 2015)

---

2. Theories of sentiment and economics

Frame Theory: Audience presented media articles (called "the frame") and influences of audience process that information.
(Goffman 1974)

Socio-political meaning and co-relationship between the fact and truth
(Neuman and others 1992)

Narrative Economics: Re-excavation on 'animal spirits,'

Computative Social Science ?, Big Data?, Statistics?
3. How Kenyan press media talks about their economy

3. How Kenyan press media talks about their economy


3. How Kenyan press media talks about their economy

Example of Co-occurrence Network

The most negative sentiment (2001)

The least negative sentiment (2013)

Source: Daily Nation, Kenya

4. Does it sentiment really matter?

Image Source: Author's Notes
4. Does it sentiment really matter?

· Monthly Indicators

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>R-squared</th>
<th>P-values</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya NSE 20 (Stock Market)</td>
<td>0.2887</td>
<td>2e-16 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exchange rates / USD</td>
<td>0.04941</td>
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<td>Inflation rates</td>
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Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 1

Image Source: Annual Reports

4. Does it sentiment really matter?

· Annual Indicators

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<th>P-values</th>
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<td>Real private consumption</td>
<td>0.3732</td>
<td>0.00422**</td>
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<td>Real domestic demand</td>
<td>0.4306</td>
<td>0.00168**</td>
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<td>Real agriculture</td>
<td>0.3903</td>
<td>0.00192**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real industry</td>
<td>0.5171</td>
<td>0.000353***</td>
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<td>Real manufacturing</td>
<td>0.4012</td>
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<td>Real services</td>
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</tr>
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Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 1

Image Source: Annual Reports
4. Conclusion

- How does closely economic news related to the real-world economy?
  - There are significant relations between Stock market in short-term (month).
- Does economic news influence 'state in society' perspectives of economic behavior?
  - There are significant relations between real GDP and Industrial indicators

Bibliography


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A SYNERGY BETWEEN MINING AND AGRICULTURE FOR A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GUINEA

ABOUBACAR DIALLO

TABLE OF CONTENT

- CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
  1.1. Background
  1.2. Literature Review
  1.3. Research Objectives
  1.4. Research Questions
  1.5. Methodology

- CHAPTER II: The Mining Sector
  2.1. Mineral Endowments
  2.2. Legal Framework
  2.3. Impacts of Mining

- CHAPTER III: The Agricultural Sector
  3.1. The importance of agriculture
  3.2. Potentials and Challenges
  3.3. Agricultural Products

- CHAPTER IV: Infrastructure
  4.1. Transportation
  4.2. Energy

- V: CONCLUSION

- REFERENCES
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND:

- Strong endowments of natural resources, energy opportunities, arable land, and abundant rainfall

- Guinea has increasingly looked to foreign investment to stimulate economic growth

- Underdevelopment has limited its exposure to international trade

- FDI in Guinea is largely driven by the mining sector

- The future of Guinea is in Agriculture, not extractives

1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW

- EXISTING LITERATURE:

  - Debate on the contribution of the mining industry:
  
  - Most scholars focused on either positive or negative impacts of the mining industry

  - The idea of synergizing the extractive and agricultural sectors of Guinea has been neglected in the debate

  - This research contributes to this debate by bringing in the agricultural sector which is one of the key drivers to employment and economic growth in Guinea.
1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

- The Research focuses on the management of the extractive and agricultural sectors, and the linkages for poverty reduction and economic diversification in Guinea with the following objectives:
  - Investigate the relationship between natural resources endowments and overall economic growth of Guinea.
  - Promote a synergy between the mineral and agricultural sectors of Guinea for a more sustainable economic development.
  - Identify the obstacles that are hindering agricultural investment in Guinea.
  - Provide suggestions to help mitigate the impacts of resource curse or Dutch disease.

1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- How to use the expertise from mining sector to help poor agricultural and rural communities emerge from poverty in Guinea?

- Why does agricultural investment lag in Guinea?
1.5. RESEARCH METHOD & JUSTIFICATION

- Qualitative Research Method and Secondary data (2010 – 2020)
- The United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) model
- UNGC: Human rights, labor, environment, and corruption (Santos & Thorns, 2018).
- This model is a "practical yet comprehensive tool to help companies evolve their sustainability efforts. The model draws on widely accepted and understood management practices and is designed to maximize corporate sustainability performance" (Deloitte, 2010).

CHAPTER II: THE MINING SECTOR

2.1. Mineral resources endowments
- Bauxite (aluminum ore): 40 billion tons
- Iron ore: 20 billion tons
- Gold: 700 tons
- Diamond: 40 million carats

- Contribution to the economy:
  - 25% of GDP, 80% Export, and 10,000 jobs
  (World Bank, 2018)

- 2.2. Legal Framework:
  - Mining Code; APIP; EITI; SOGUPAMI
  - Mining companies: CBG, SMB, and others
  - 2.3. Impacts of mining: pollution, corruption, displacement
Chapter III: THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR

- 3.1. A key driver of employment and economic growth:
  - 20% GDP, 10% export, 57% rural household income, 70% employment (World Bank, 2018)

- 3.2. Potentials & Challenges

  - 3.2.1. Tremendous agricultural potential:
    a) Tropical climate,
    b) arable land,
    c) ample rainfall,
    d) water resources

- 3.2.2. Challenges:
  a) Limited agricultural input
  b) Supply chain
  c) Infrastructure
  d) Low access to finance

- 3.3. Agricultural products:
  a) rice, coffee, cocoa, banana,
  b) pineapple, mango, avocado,
  c) cotton, palm oil, rubber, and
  d) livestock farming (cows, sheep, goats, pigs)

- Role of the Private sector:
  a) Financial inclusion
  b) Renewable energy
  c) Health care
  d) Education
  e) Water and sanitation
CHAPTER IV: INFRASTRUCTURE

▲ TRANSPORTATION AND ENERGY

▲ 4.1. TRANSPORTATION
- Roads: only 30% of the Guinean roads are paved
- Railways: 1,086 km; four railways including one passenger rail transport system.
- Ports: Conakry and Kamsar

▲ 4.2. ENERGY
▲ HYDROPOWER POTENTIALS:
- Rainfall and sunny weather for renewable energy
- KALETA 240 MW
- SOUPITI 450 MW

CONCLUSION

▲ Mining sector: 25% GDP, 80% exports, 10,000 employment (World Bank, 2018)

▲ Agricultural sector: 20% GDP, 57% income, 70% employment (World Bank, 2018)

▲ Interdependence between the mineral and agricultural sectors: Food and fertilizers

▲ Same need: land, water, workforce, infrastructure

▲ A strategic collaboration between the two sectors to mitigate the impact of resource curse

▲ Economic diversification for a sustainable economic development.
REFERENCES


REFERENCES


THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR ATTENTION
Trends and Characteristics of Inbound Tourism Market in Tanzania

WANG Xiangli
Graduate School of International Relations
Ritsumeikan University

Outline
1. Research Background
2. Research Objective
3. Research Questions
4. Methodology
5. Findings
6. Conclusion
7. Bibliography
Research Background

Features: labor-intensive and resources-intensive industry
Importance: GDP 18%; Employment 1,300,000 jobs;

Tourism Market in History

Colonialism era (1884-1961): primitive status
  • Westerns-oriented industry
  • Negative public opinion

State building era (1961-1967): modernization
  • East African Union Community
  • 1964 the United Republic of Tanzania

Socialism era (1967-1986): African socialism
  • Arusha Declaration
  • 1973 drought; 1974 Uganda-Tanzania War

Post independence era (1985-now): Structure adjustment programs
  • 1991 National Tourism Policy/ 1993 Tanzania Tourist Board
Research Objectives

1. To focus on examining features and characteristics of Tanzania’s inbound tourism
2. To evaluate the performance of tourism sector in the post-independence era
3. To compare tourism market in Tanzania with Kenya and neighboring countries
4. To summarize key challenges facing Tanzanian tourism market
5. To discover connections between Chinese tourism operators and Tanzania tourism market operators

Research Questions

1. What are features of tourism products and service in Tanzania?
2. Is Tanzania tourism market performing well or not?
3. What are difficulties of developing current inbound tourism in Tanzania?
4. What attracts or hinders Chinese arrivals?
Research Methodologies

1. Data collection: book materials, journals and websites, including MNRT, WTTC and NBS
2. Chronological research: national tourism policy and its shifts
3. Comparative study: Kenya and other neighboring countries’ performance
4. Unstructured interview: resources from Chinese Tanzania-oriented operators

Features

1. Low density
2. High quality
3. High price
Performance

Figure 1: Trend in the Total Number of Arrivals in Tanzania: 1960-2009
Comparative Performance

Challenges

1. Infrastructure: flights, railways, roads are not satisfied by tourists

2. Management: local employees are lack of training

3. Development of source markets: incapacity of entering international source markets
Conclusion

1. Increasing number of arrivals and revenue
2. Not as attractive as neighboring countries
3. Challenges as sustainability and promotion

A Way Forward

• Source market analysis

• Future trend prediction

Chart 2.1: Top 15 source markets for the URT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>India</td>
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A Way Forward

Interview with Chinese tourism operators in China

Methods: unstructured interviews

Purpose:

To acquire the evaluation from Tanzania-oriented Chinese operators
To understand promotion strategies employed in market promotion
To find out how Chinese operators avoid risks and win revenues

Bibliography


A Bright Tourism in Tanzania!
INTRODUCTION

- The factors that induce regional hegemons to participate in regional economic integration.

- The active participation of individual countries in the region: regional hegemons' participation.

- Political importance, economic size, and capability of military mobilization.
INTRODUCTION

- CFTA (Continental Free Trade Area) has been recently created to explore the way of continental integration.

- Nigeria, on the other hand, has been passive in establishing the current CFTA.

- This paper compares and analyzes the factors that Nigeria's hesitation for the establishment of CFTA, and her motivation for joining the organizations in the 1) political 2) economic and 3) normative aspects.

NIGERIA AS A REGIONAL HEGEMON

- Regional power state is a state whose power reaches and remains in its region.

- Regional powers define the structure of any regional security complex and their power capabilities might be considerable, but they are restricted to the regional context (Noite, 2010).

- Regional power state, however, has specialty for its regional politics; hence, it has greater responsibility than other neighboring countries and bigger bargaining power at the global level as a representative of its region.
NIGERIA AS A REGIONAL HEGEMON

- Regional powers usually combine leadership and power over resources.
- Four criteria for being a regional power state that internal dynamics, willingness, capacity, and acceptance (Schoeman, 2013).
- Regional power is defined as a region's ability to influence decisions in its favor (Bourne, 2003).
- Detlef Nolte (2010) synthesized the definitions of regional power as below:
  1) Regional power state is defined as a state, which articulates the pretension (self-conception) of a leading position in a region
  2) which displays the material (military, economic, demographic), organizational (political) and ideological resources for regional power projection
  3) which truly has great influence in regional affairs (activities and results).

NIGERIA AS A REGIONAL HEGEMON

- "Just as ... President Monroe proclaimed the American hemisphere free from the military incursions of European empire builders and adventures, so also do we ... in Nigeria and in Africa insist that African affairs be left to Africa to settle. (Shehu Shagari, Nigeria's president from 1979 to 1983)"

- We have to be recognized as a regional power in West Africa. This is our region and we have a right to go to war. (Olu Sanu, Nigeria's former ambassador to Washington)"
CFTA (CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA)

- AU Summit (2018)
- CFTA (May 30, 2019 ~)
- African Economic Community (AEC)
- Agenda 2063

NIGERIAN CASE

- "As Africa's largest economy and most populous country, we are committed to ensuring that all trade agreements we sign are beneficial to the long-term prosperity of the continent."

- "We are therefore widening and deepening domestic consultations on the CFTA, to ensure that all concerns are respectfully addressed. Any African Free trade agreement must fairly and equitably represent the interests of Nigeria, and indeed, her African brothers and sisters. (Muhammad Buhari, 2018)"
NIgerian Case

- "There is a renewed, extremely dangerous and radioactive neo-liberal policy initiative being driven by the Ministry of Trade and Investment that seeks to open our seaports, airports and other businesses to unbridled foreign interference never before witnessed in the history of the country."

- "We find it confounding that at a time nations, including the United States are resorting to protectionism in defence of their local businesses and protection of jobs, we have the audacity to want to fling open our doors, windows and roof tops. (Nigeria Labour Congress, 2018)"

Determinants

- Political motivation: Nigeria as a Paymaster

- Economic expectation: GDP growth

- Normative aspect: Legitimacy Concern (Hulse, 2016)
REFERENCES

- David Naile (2010), "How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics", Review of International Studies, 36

THANK YOU ☺️