ASIA-JAPAN
RESEARCH INSTITUTE
RITSUMEIKAN UNIVERSITY

Asia and Japan: Perspectives of History

A Symposium Record

Editors
Gyongsu MUN and Yasushi KOSUGI

Asia-Japan Research Institute
Ritsumeikan University

AJI BOOKS

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Asia and Japan: Perspectives of History

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Note:
Authors' names in this publication are ordered according to their preference and their surnames are capitalized.

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Editors' Preface

It is our pleasure to launch the AJI Books series with this symposium record. Asia-Japan Research Institute (AJI) at Ritsumeikan University was established in December 2015 in order to promote "Asia-Japan Research" in Ritsumeikan University. The University identifies itself proudly as an Asia Pacific university which aims at realizing multi-cultural co-living through international mutual understanding, as clearly stated in the Ritsumeikan Charter of 2006.

The University has been pursuing the values of peace and democracy for many decades and is striving to promote these goals in the Asia-Pacific as well as in the world through education and research.

The 21st century is often described as the "Asian century". With all its positive connotations, we would like to deepen our understanding and studies on and in Asia. The naming of our research field, "Asia-Japan Research", is an attempt to indicate what we aspire to. It is not Asian and Japanese Studies or Research on Asia and Japan. By connecting Asia and Japan with (-) we avoid expressing Asia and Japan as different entities, since Japan is part of Asia. So, it indicates Asian Studies or research on Asia, while Japan is firmly situated in Asia and can also be a subject of such studies. However, basing our educational and academic activities in Japan, we would like to highlight the role of Japan in this research, without losing the sense of Asia as a whole.

The Institute has conducted interdisciplinary and international joint research projects with the ideas of "symbiosis", "reconciliation" and "co-creation" under the

concepts of “understanding Asia deeply and profoundly” and creating a “Gateway to Asia” in our campus.

The international symposium recorded in this volume seeks to examine the achievements and the issues of historical perceptions of Japan and Asia, and tries to explore a new broader perspective of history.

Turning to the issue of “Asia and Japan”, we are immediately reminded of the complexity and historicity of this region since the arrival of modernity.

In recent years, we have been observing structural changes to Asia, or what we may call the “Asian World”, influenced by such phenomena as globalization, the rise of China, and the conflicts between Japan and South Korea over perceptions of history. At this juncture, we are once again faced with the question, “What does Asia mean to Japan?”

Presenting “Asia and Japan” itself suggests the problems inherent in the history of this region after the arrival of modernity. As the Japanese word “Datsua”, that is, Going out of Asia [toward the West] symbolizes, in the process of forming the modern Japanese nation, Asia was discriminatively defined as “barbaric” from the viewpoint of both modern civilization based on the Western model and the recreation of Japan’s own tradition. As suggested by the presentation of Professor Alexis Dudden, Japan’s non-Asian nature remained unchanged during the period of the war of aggression, when the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” and “Five Races Under One Union” were emphasized.

The disastrous experience of World War II could have served as an opportunity for Japan to rethink its past and to be reborn as a member of Asia. However, despite the shock of

Japan's defeat in World War II, Japan's critical self-recognition as an "aggressor and perpetrator" in Asia, has not been widely shared in Japanese society. Japan actually rehabilitated itself after the end of World War II in the framework of the Cold War between the East and the West, and has come a long way away from the trend of the Asian world toward decolonization.

However, in the 1970s, when the Japanese economy expanded widely to East Asia, the relationship between Japan and Asia, including its history, had to be reexamined. Japan was confronted with the issue of its "wrongdoing" in the past such as in the "Japan-China Joint Statement" (1972), which expressed remorse for the war of aggression; the "Fukuda Doctrine" (1974), which renounced Japan's ever becoming a military power again and advocated "heart-to-heart contact"; and the "textbook issue" also occurred in the 1980s.

The changes in Japan's international status in the post-Cold War era and globalization have accelerated this problem of the recognition of history. In a foreign policy speech in Singapore in 1991, then Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki vowed to "reflect harshly" on Japan's invasion of Asia. The review of history included the "Kono Statement (Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono)" (1993), which officially confirmed the "military involvement" of women who were forced into prostitution for Japanese soldiers during World War II in the former colonies and occupied territories, and the "Murayama Statement (Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan)" (1995), in which "colonial rule and aggression" was recollected critically in a blunt tone. However, it was not until half a century after the end of World War II that the Japanese people began to reflect on their colonial rule and to realize that they had been the perpetrators.

On the other hand, these changes have caused a backlash in the perception of history, which confronted them with a sense of crisis. “Reflection on the past” is seen as a denial of the very “modernity” of Japan, and a sense of crisis that could shake the identity of the Japanese is beginning to stir the undercurrents of Japanese society. The acceptance of others rooted in globalization is always intertwined with the opposition to others and produces a tangled current. In the prolonged economic slump, which has been described as the “Lost 20 Years”, Japanese people have been tormented by a sense of impasse, and the old-fashioned nationalism of nation, tradition and patriotism is reviving. In this world of online distribution where the number of plays is the basis of profits, “pleasing” discourses are more widely accepted as historical truth than the actual facts of history. As Professor Norihisa Yamashita proposes, such post-truth politics has penetrated the offline world, and so-called historical revisionism has become the mainstream of Japanese historical understanding.

In this way, Japan in the post-Cold War era, where globalization has progressed, is increasingly seen as an arena in which the tide toward settlement of the past and the backflow regarding the historical image of “Asia and Japan” are conflicting with each other over the perceptions of history. Japan’s relations with other Asian countries, including South Korea and China, are also affected by the wide gap between such contradictory perceptions.

The COVID-19 crisis which has spread the sense of emergency in 2020, and is still on-going at the time of the publication of this volume, has also had enormous effects on human lives on all continents. Asia and Japan are also

experiencing unforeseen critical conditions. However, when we are facing a crisis, it is important to pause and reflect on the past, so that we can form clearer visions for the future.

The international symposium recorded in this volume certainly offers food for thought. The entire discussion on what the new perspective of history can be is intended to provide a way beyond the conflict of historical perceptions.

We are also very grateful to Prof. Anthony Brewer for his participation in the symposium and dedicated editorial support for the record.

It is our sincere hope that this concise volume will contribute in a small way toward a better perception of history and the future of Asia.

October 2020

Gyongsu MUN
Yasushi KOSUGI

Participants' Profiles

Keynote Speech 1

Professor Alexis DUDDEN

Alexis Dudden is professor of history at the University of Connecticut, where she teaches modern Japanese, Korean, and international history. She publishes regularly in print and online media and is completing a book project tentatively called, *The Opening and Closing of Japan, 1850-2020*. Dr. Dudden received her BA from Columbia University in 1991 and her Ph.D. in history from the University of Chicago in 1998. Since 1985, she has lived and studied for extended periods of time in Japan and South Korea.

Discussant: Professor Kozue AKIBAYASHI

Kozue Akibayashi is a professor at the Graduate School of Global Studies at Doshisha University. She received her Ed.D in education from Columbia University. Her research and activism have been on

feminist analysis of peace and security, demilitarization and decolonization of security. She is an active member of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the oldest women's international peace organization that began in 1915. She was elected as International President at WILPF's 100th Anniversary Congress in 2015 and served until August 2018.

Keynote Speech 2

Professor Norihisa YAMASHITA

Norihisa Yamashita is a professor at the College of Global Liberal Arts at Ritsumeikan University. Some of his areas of research include historical sociology, world-system analysis, and comparative civilization. His most recent publication is *Historical Literacy in the Age of Post-Globalization* (in Japanese). This is one of the achievements of a very aspirational research project "The 'Great Divergence' and the 'Great Convergence' " in which he aimed to create

a new history textbook that breaks away from a Eurocentric world history.

Discussant 1: Doctor Miwa HIRONO

Miwa Hirono is an associate professor at the College of Global Liberal Arts at Ritsumeikan University. She is an expert on China's international relations and has published widely on peacekeeping operations. Other areas of research include disaster management, cultures of humanitarianism in East Asia, China's role in conflict-affected regions, and peacebuilding.

Discussant 2: Professor Hiroyuki TOSA

Hiroyuki Tosa is a professor at the Graduate School of Global Cooperation Studies at Kobe University. He is an expert on international relations and political sociology. His recent works include *Anarchical Governance* (in Japanese) and "The Pitfalls in the Project of Overcoming Western Modernity: Rethinking the Lineage of the Japanese Historical Revisionism".

Session 1

Keynote Speech

The Afterlife of History and the Importance of Seeing Japan from the Sea

Professor Alexis DUDDEN



1. Introduction

I want to begin by saying that my remarks are based on an understanding that Japan, like many countries, especially mine (USA) is deeply divided today. The book I am writing now, *The Opening and*

Closing of Japan, 1850-2020, examines this phenomenon, and, although I cannot say what the Meiji moment felt like in 1850, I believe it is fair to say that Reiwa Japan 2020, is as equally divided as Meiji was, if not more so. This moment is a manifestation of deep divisions *within* societies more than one of national group versus another and approaching the moment this way allows for a far more complicated portrait of identity to emerge.

Decades ago, my favorite historian of modern Japan, Amino Yoshihiko, urged seeing Japan from the sea. For years, I didn't try to understand what he meant, staying instead on land. Increasingly, however, I have come to realize the significance of Amino sensei's observation - and, oddly, it was the LDP's 2012 draft for a new constitution that made me begin to understand. I'll come back to this.

Ten years ago, I was lucky to live for a year in Niigata with my then 4-year-old son and to stare every day at the harsh and beautiful Sea of Japan/East Sea (in Niigata, this ocean is called the Sea of Japan, but later in my talk let me explain why I believe the dual-naming debate is an avenue for engagement). For a year, I stared at the Sea of Japan from Niigata and was struck by how empty it appears, at least on its surface and even the sky above it, given the sea's rich resources and potential for regional exchange. I discussed this emptiness with former Niigata Governor Hirayama Ikuo (formerly Bank of Japan) who made clear why decades of economic and cultural schemes planned for this region remained challenged: "When investment groups want to make a policy proposal, they have to go through five different desks at the Foreign Ministry (in Tokyo): Russia, China, South Korea, North Korea, and the United States. You can imagine what happens."

2. LDP's April 2012 Draft Constitution

Which brings me to the LDP's April 2012 draft constitution which, to the best of my knowledge has not been changed since it was issued; it is just not in the foreground right now because it is so extreme. This document is not a revision of the constitution; rather, it is an entirely new constitution, and some of its striking features include the redefinition of the emperor, the role of women, an obligation to honor national symbols, and a preamble that denies the universalisms definitional to Japan's current constitution. In short, it is *the* document of a divided Japan today. On top of all this, and entirely different from the current constitution and from the Meiji constitution, for the first time in Japanese history, this draft for a future Japanese nation would constitutionally define Japanese territory (領土 *ryodo*) by obliging citizens to defend it.

- Japanese people would now be "obliged" to:
- "...defend our country and territorial land"
- "...defending this beautiful territory and natural environment..."
- (Territorial integrity, etc.)
- Article 9-3. In order to defend its sovereignty and independence, the State shall cooperate with the people to maintain its territorial land, waters and airspace, and to secure their resources.

What is claimed as “Japanese territory” which would oblige Japanese citizen defense already compels American military protection as defined in the terms of the US-Japan Security Treaty:

Article 5 obligates US forces to defend Japanese territory and territorial waters in the event of an armed attack. So, these recent maps made me wonder what the point of claiming territory that only Japan claims as sovereign Japanese territory.

This map is the officially claimed space of Japan right now even though it is aspirational at best and confrontational at worst.

Japan's 2014 Assertion of "Inherency" over the smallest fragments of an Empire it failed to hold onto means that the government of Japan views these islands as integral to Japan's national being. For historians, the notion also introduces the idea that these spaces have always and forever been Japanese, which, in the case of these islands, could not be further from the history involved. Finally, it is only since 2014 that the Japanese government has linked one territorial dispute to another through this policy. Any attempt by a Japanese diplomat to negotiate with a Chinese diplomat over the dispute in the East China Sea would risk losing Japan's claims to Korea, let alone negotiations with Russia, because China, Taiwan, Korea, and Russia are tied together in the same policy vision for Japan.

3. World View from Japan

In turn, all of this draws attention to the particular worldview that undergirds this view within Japan. The notion of territory articulated in these governmental proposals at once denies Japanese history and requires the international community's agreement to such a worldview. It is not "anti-Japanese" to draw attention to these trends; they are Japanese trends, yet they are but one vision for Japan's future; the one



that seeks to erase the history of the Japanese empire in modern East Asia through claims to islands that are but mere shards of the formerly vast imperial, territorial and oceanic space.

This new view of "Japanese territory" from the sea is actually a view from land and would stake Japanese identity on small pieces of land that again only Japan recognizes sovereignty over, yet the approach is not at all unique to Japan: it is a rigid, hard borders approach,

of a piece with Donald Trump's wall along the US-Mexico border or this recent proposal for a floating wall shoring off Greece from refugees.

At the same time, more fluid understandings of Japan's future based on more open-ended understandings of Japan's past equally exist, those which see "borderlines" not "borders" but "borderlines" - in the sea around Japan with which to define a vision for Japan open to productive and peaceful engagement with its neighbors.

1) East China Sea

Currently, the East China Sea seems to have disappeared. Not literally of course, yet only a few years ago around the World War One centennial commemorations, talking heads named the body of water between China and Japan as a likely spot for the outbreak of World War III. Several islands in the East China Sea disputed among China, Taiwan, and Japan had become a magnet for risky seaborne maneuvers, and the air defense identification zones above them had dangerous overlaps. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe intimated that his country and China resembled Germany and France 100 years earlier, and Henry Kissinger wagered that a Tokyo-Beijing clash in these waters would be a catalyst for greater conflict to come.

2) South China Sea

Now, in the wake of centennial celebrations commemorating the end of the war that was supposed to end all wars, militarized activity in the separate but connecting South China Sea has dominated the intervening years. At the same time, the issues that made the East China Sea so volatile in 2014 have only deepened and intensified—and now intersect with the South China Sea conflict making clear that "security" as such has created a state of constant insecurity, with Okinawa and its people at the very center.

4. Okinawa

The **Ryukyu Islands** have long found themselves and their people central to questions of Japanese state-building, national identity and sovereign control. Matsushima Yasukatsu, a leading member of the contemporary movement for Ryukyuan independence from Japan, stresses that Tokyo's decision to "discriminate" indiscriminately against Ryukyu islanders during World War II - despite having forced them to become subjects of the Japanese empire - and to "sacrifice the islands" outright at war's end has made them and their history like a mirror that shows images backwards to contemporary Japan's efforts at nationalized control over them. Tokyo has repeatedly altered its claims vis-à-vis Okinawa and its people since 1945, which in turn makes the islands themselves appear to shift in meaning for Japan.

With **Okinawa**, contemporary words reveal so much because these islands have been inhabited for tens of thousands of years. About ten years ago, workers building the new airport on Ishigaki Island uncovered fragments of rib shards among other pieces of human bone thought to be about 24,000 years old, and local and national papers quickly declared them "the oldest Japanese remains." Today, of course, Ishigaki is Japanese territory, yet claiming these ancient skeletal remains as "Japanese" is another matter.

Okinawan islanders continued longstanding agricultural and fishing practices as their livelihood through the end of the devastating Asia-Pacific War (1931-45). In 1944, a Canadian man named E. Herbert Norman, one of the greatest historians of Japan, wrote a report for the Canadian government detailing features of life throughout the Japanese empire that he viewed as critical for the Allies' understanding of Japan for any meaningful and successful future postwar policy planning for Japan. Norman was a son of Christian missionaries and

raised in Japan, and at the time he wrote this report (November 1944) it was still possible to emphasize the rudimentary nature of Okinawan life and also to describe the islands themselves as relatively undeveloped, something unimaginable today now that the islands hold such a central and militarized place in America's post-1945 world order. Norman wrote:

> (The Ryukyu Islands') loss to Japan would not be of any serious economic consequence since the chief occupation of the islanders is fishing and Japan's best fishing grounds are in northern waters. (Norman 1944)



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世界地図を眺める子どもたち。大阪朝日新聞の１９３５年の連載「海洋ニッポン」の写真説明には「糸満人の世界分布図に感激の胸おどらす第二世たち」とある。記事は、糸満漁夫…

In the simplest terms, in 1944, it was impossible to foresee what has become of Okinawa and Okinawans' way of life today in the front line of the US-Japan security arrangement.

Also revealing were Norman's observations about who might control Okinawa after the war's end. It is worth remembering that China at the time was an Allied nation. One of my colleagues has located maps of ideas for dividing Japan into four regions after its eventual defeat instead of Korea, but Japan was seen as a potential area for American, British, Chinese, and Russian control, so that did not happen, yet in 1944 Norman was able to write that:

> Although these islands have been administratively part of Japan since 1879, and their inhabitants are perhaps closer to Japan than China in language and custom, the Chinese still have a case to argue that they should be, by right, Chinese.

Norman understood that although Japan had incorporated the islands into its empire during the early moments of its overseas

territorial expansion, after Japan's defeat China could make legitimate claim to the islands in terms of the region's lengthy *pre*-Japanese imperial history; additionally, Norman's notice indicates that the Allies' postwar settlement with Japan would not collapse if Tokyo were to forfeit claim to Okinawa together with Korea and Manchuria (the plan that was already in the works). The reality, therefore, in 1944 for Norman's analysis that the islands were economically and strategically of minimal consequence to Japan proper brings into relief how profoundly American occupation of the islands *after* 1945 has changed them and their people forever.

The United States would officially return Okinawa to Japanese administration and control in 1972, yet the overwhelming presence of American military personnel and weapons *continues* to render questionable the full dimensionality of this legal change. The statistics are well-known, yet always bear repeating; Okinawa comprises less than 1% of all Japanese territory, a scant 0.6%; yet 75% of the total number of US forces, civilian employees, and their dependents stationed in Japan live and work there; and all roughly 30,000 of them take up 20% of Okinawa's territory.

Governor Denny Tamaki opposes the new base at Henoko and especially Tokyo's disregard for Okinawan opposition, maintaining

that the Japanese government must express the will of his Japanese constituency to the United States (a foreign country).

Halting construction of the heliport planned for Henoko is a practical step with positive ramifications for efforts at peace in Korea and de-escalating potential clashes with China.

As is increasingly being made public, and has likely been known to the Alliance planners since 2014, the new base faces a structural problem in addition to the opposition of Okinawan people. There isn't enough soil in Okinawa to create the foundation for the heliports, so Japan is importing the dirt from the mainland. Tamaki and his supporters maintain that if this base is so important to the safety of Japan, then the Japanese government should authorize its construction on the mainland in the areas from which soil is being imported to Okinawa and dumped onto the coral reefs of Oura Bay.

The soil issue recalls a controversial incident from Okinawa's past that brings the security nexus full circle. In 1958, a year before Governor Denny Tamaki was born; a team from Okinawa was allowed

to participate in Japan's annual Koshien baseball tournament in the mainland for the first time since the end of the war. At the time, Okinawa was still under U.S. occupation. When the Okinawan team lost, they scooped up dirt from the mainland stadium to take home to Okinawa.

Citing the United States Plant Quarantine Act, American officials in Naha barred the team from bringing the "unclean" soil to Okinawa. For decades, Okinawans would continue to bear the burden and humiliation of being somehow less than Japanese.

The imposition of yet another US military base in Okinawa in the name of securing Japan - and Tokyo's tactic of throwing dirt at the problem - only reinforces Okinawan subordination.

By ending the construction of this base, the United States could begin to atone for its past conduct, take into consideration the democratic desires of Okinawans, and begin to think more broadly about peace in the East China Sea and beyond. And, as this slide shows the issue is now as much Japan versus US as Japan versus Japan. Which brings me to the next topic.

5. “People Doing”: Nature and Ogasawara

We do not really know why what we now call the Ogasawara Islands were uninhabited when sixteenth and seventeenth-century Spanish and Japanese seafarers first visited. However, from what we do know of the ancient stone tools and pottery shards discovered there in the twentieth-century, Pacific Ocean voyagers had long known about these islands and had left their mark on them at intervening moments in time.

No one was there in the 1820s when various American and British whaling captains arrived, a condition that paved the way for a historically-curious thirty years during the mid-nineteenth century when an American, an Englishman, and a Croatian declared sovereignty over the islands and ran them as their own country. Eventually - following some dicey incidents in the 1850s and 60s at the dawn of US-Japan relations involving ownership over them - in 1875 the newly established Meiji government in Tokyo claimed the islands as Japanese territory, making them the second overseas addition to the nascent Empire of Japan (between Hokkaido’s 1869 incorporation and before Okinawa’s 1879 annexation). With the key exception of a twenty-three-year hiatus after Japan lost World War II and the 48 million-year-old islands became American-occupied territory and reverted to their earlier name, the “Bonin Islands”, the Ogasawara Islands have remained under sovereign Japanese control unlike other imperial island additions that Japan contests with neighbors today (although some official US government maps still prefer the name “Bonin,” and the southernmost island in the chain, Iwo Jima/Ioto, is of questionable sovereignty since only Japanese and American military planes land there).

A total of 2,415 Japanese citizens live on the Ogasawara Islands today. Mapping these islands' place into modern Japanese history as well as their broader environmental possibilities is of a piece with a number of compelling studies are underway about the Fukushima crisis that draw attention to the modern/contemporary distinction between "life" and "lifestyle"/ "livelihood" (*inochi* versus *seikatsu*). Helpful in this regard is a reconsideration of the eighteenth-century philosopher, Ando Shoeki's, brilliant parsing of the Japanese word for nature -自然 (*shizen*) as "*hitori suru*" (literally "an individual doing/making"). Notably, Shoeki viewed a world with no distinction between human history and natural history precisely because he understood that such dichotomies generated the social ills surrounding him (as a physician in northern Japan, he came to understand and demonstrate among other things that famine was politically created and sustained - a highly advanced observation for the time and for world history).

The most visible debate on Ogasawara today is about whether or not to open a commercial airport on Chichijima. An equally important challenge is on resulting from the June 2011 establishment of the Ogasawara Islands as a UNESCO World Heritage Natural Site after which ongoing effort began by officials involved to revert some of the islands to what some describe as their "pre-people" state of being. Japanese citizens are not being removed, yet the first order of business for many in achieving this imaginary "pristine environment" is the culling of non-human invasive species ranging from a host of plants and fungus to goats, rats, and domesticated cats. The irony of this unfolding simultaneously with the ongoing March 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis is not lost. As one young mother of two explained to me while shopping at a small supermarket on Chichijima: "They want us to import tainted beef from the mainland while they kill our goats. Our goats are the cleanest meat in Japan!!"

The paradoxes inherent to Japan's twenty-first century attempt at a nationally organized, internationally-sanctioned, scientifically-engineered "pre-people environment" on the Ogasawara Islands are clear, heightening the significance of the basic contours of "peopling" them in the first place. Within the chronological frame of what we teach as modern Japanese history (roughly the demise of the Tokugawa system to the present, or, 1820-2020), the Ogasawara Islands reveal in real time at once globally and nationally significant histories: the violence inherent to establishing permanent human residency in settler colonies anywhere in the modern world and also one of the most visible multi-racial/multi-ethnic origin stories within the mythically homogenous Japanese nation-state.

Fast forward to the present and the 2011 UNESCO designation of the islands as a World Heritage Natural Site, and the impetus towards an imaginary "pre-people" past becomes important on multiple levels. For example, spaces devoid of modern humans and their necessary flora

and fauna such as onions and goats would enable erasure of the islands' historically blended beginning as well as a complete "Great Leap" through the disastrous chronicle of the end of the Japanese empire there in 1945 (American military strategists tricked the Japanese command stationed on Chichijima and Hahajima in the spring of 1945 by going instead west to Okinawa after the battle for Iwo Jima; in addition to the devastating record of starvation conditions for the over 30,000 Japanese troops and Korean slave-labor involved in building tunnels on these islands similar to those better known in Iwo Jima's Mount Surabachi, Chichijima holds the distinction confirmed at the war crimes tribunals of demonstrated instances of cannibalism of captured American pilots). An imaginary "pre-people environment" would also circumvent dealing with the record of nuclear weapons stationed there through the 1968 reversion (Okinawa was and is America's "first line" of defense; Ogaswara, the "second line" [its weapons are now on Guam]; waste materials remain). Perhaps most important to the present and future, however, the effort towards a "pre-people" space on the Ogasawara Islands sustains the Japanese state-directed ruse of the meaning of "environment" juxtaposed with the nation's most significant environmental history unfolding today and into the future: the Fukushima crisis.

6. Shimizu Ryoichi

Here I'd like to introduce the lifework of Shimizu Ryoichi and his family. Dismissible perhaps by some as a hippie surfer, Shimizu Ryoichi could be described instead as an astute businessman comfortable with living in nature. Following a childhood spent as a Japanese "high growth economics" kid with abundant consumer goods - yet an existence comparable to an American military kid in terms of

the numerous physical relocations necessary to sustain the father's "livelihood" (seikatsu) - Shimizu arrived on Chichijima in 1983 as a tourist and stayed. Considered the most knowledgeable sea kayaker and trekker on Chichijima (here what Amino Yoshihiko urged we understand as a "*hyakusho*" in Japanese history could be helpful - more than a "peasant" an individual who does "one hundred things" for survival), Shimizu has built his family's house and a profit-generating guest house from the materials on the land he purchased. It's solar-powered with composting toilets, and he calls the elaborate tree-house like structure by an Indonesian word of unknown etymology: "*Pelan*" (gathering place). He learned the word while on a surfing trip and

decided he wanted to bring people together from around the world with himself and his family in the middle of it. (Here, Amino's "*muen*" [unconnected place] resonates, too). *Pelan*'s stated aim is the globally meaningful, American Indian instruction to work for seven generations to build a better planet: "7 世代後に美しい地球を!"

It is simple, on the one hand, to see that the state would reduce Shimizu Ryoichi, his wife, Chika, and their two children at best to "alternative lifestyles" within Japan today or at worst "irrelevant." On the other hand, the Shimizu family fully participates in the nation: they pay taxes; their children attend the island school; they sing *Kimigayo* at sporting events. They define themselves as one hundred percent Japanese. At the same time, Shimizu family life endeavors for a Japan that currently does not make space for how they live nor how they envision the nation's future: through awareness and action in nature instead of erasure and avoidance. Their commitment to living life in nature in a sustainable manner connects them to a "peopled environment" and demonstrates the possibilities of what Shimizu's "*pelan*" can offer on a national level, too. Soon after the March 2011 crisis began, they posted notice on their guest house website that anyone afflicted by the triple disasters (noting both those affected by the earthquake and tsunami and also specifying those choosing to leave because of the nuclear plant meltdowns) would be welcome to live for free at the guest house for the first 30 days; should they wish to stay longer and to relocate to the Ogasawara Islands, they would be charged half the usual fee (generally about 4500 yen per night; 90000 per month). Today, the advertisement remains, although the terms have changed slightly (the fee is half price from the start but comes with a program to help transition to life on Chichijima). While the Shimizu family copes with efforts to cull the family goats and cats to force an imagined "pre-people environment" into existence (Chika has

confronted municipal officials sent from Tokyo by asking whether she could prepare some goat stew for them; the kids hide their cats), the dichotomies of human and natural history endure.

The recent human record on Ogasawara - and likely its distant one, too - demonstrates people choosing how to live in nature and how "to make" and "to do" their lives in nature. Today, its place in Japanese history and the Pacific Ocean offers unusual ways to broaden the discussion of who counts as Japanese and also reveals meaningful approaches Japanese citizens are taking to address the Fukushima radiological crisis. Premising the Ogasawara Islands in this fashion, however, demands a "peopled environment" in the past, present, and future that is welcomed rather than shunned by state-led directives.

7. The Anthropocene and the Sea with No Name

The final example I want to consider involves thinking about the anthropocene, or the "Great Acceleration", a new geological moment that measures human impact on the planet. That is, human activity is now part of the rock record. Ando Shoeki arguably did see humans violating nature, yet it would have been difficult even 300 years ago to predict how quickly we would begin to destroy ourselves. And yet here we are in a historical moment in which climate change is now seen as negatively destructive force as are nuclear weapons.

So I'll turn to the decades-long naming dispute at the International Hydrographic Organization centers on the body of water between Japan and Korea. Oceanographers refer to this sea as one of the northern Pacific Ocean's "marginal seas", and depending where you stand along its spiky coastline, it is variously known as the Sea of Japan, Korea's East Sea or simply the East Sea. I am not advocating one name in preference over another, and ideas for new names regularly appear. During the first decade of this century, for example, a Japanese woman thoughtfully suggested, 'The Blue Sea', while a former president of South Korea proposed the 'Sea of Friendship' or the 'Sea of Understanding'. Agreement on a new name is remote, however, leaving international news broadcasters such as CNN to explain regional military tensions taking place in 'waters off the Korean Peninsula'.

For millennia, a steady stream of human traffic has crossed over this sea's northern and southern openings, largely from the Asian continent moving eastwards to what is now called Japan. Thus, the name East Sea originated as a directional term (literally, 東海), with the first known written record of it carved into an early fifth-century stele commemorating the life of King Gwanggaeto the Great, the nineteenth monarch of Goguryeo, northernmost of Korea's ancient dynasties.

Although modern technologies have replaced earlier days of sail, intense north winds make this sea notoriously difficult to cross. Most ancient navigators headed along its coastlines to the few straits that offered a better chance of safe passage: the Korea or Tsushima Straits, the Kanmon Straits, the Tsugaru Straits, the Soya or La Pérouse Strait, and the Strait of Tartary. Very little river water discharges into this sea barely one percent of its volume - and today places called Russia, North Korea, South Korea and Japan contain its 978,000 square surface kilometers. Russia claims almost half of this sea's total 7,600-kilometer coastline even though Russian explorers were the last to show up in the region. The Russians' seventeenth-century designation for the sea, 'the Japan Sea', named the area to which they were heading and appears to have relied on or was coterminous with Matteo Ricci's 1602 map of the world that, for the first-time historians are aware of, designated this body of water in Chinese characters as '日本海' (Japan Sea).

Notably, the 'Japan' piece (日本) as understood in European translation derives from Marco Polo's famous thirteenth-century phonetic transliteration of China's name for the country: 'Ciapangu' (as

it appeared verbatim on Martin Behaim's astonishing 1492 globe). And we know from Amino Yoshihiko's work that we should understand 日本 from the sea itself:

> … (Writing and texts) came to Japan via the sea, which functioned as both a transportation route and an obstacle to intercourse.' The name 'Japan' (日本), Amino further explains, literally translates as the 'source of the sun . . . reflect(ing) a strong consciousness of the Tang empire on the Chinese mainland . . . (And, moreover, unusually) the name 日本 signifies a natural phenomenon or orientation and . . . is neither the name of the place of origin of the dynastic founders nor that of a dynasty or tribe.'

The word "Ciapangu" ultimately Europeanized as Giappone in Italian, Japon in French and Yaponskey in Russian, as it would thus appear to name the sea on seventeenth-century Russian maps: Японское море (Yaponskey More). There seems to be no evidence that any Japanese used the name Sea of Japan in print before the late eighteenth-century until the painter and illustrator Shiba Kokan printed it on his 1792 map of the world (the famous 'Chikyu Zenzu': 地球全図).

In 1928, when the International Hydrographic Organization agreed to Japan's request for the sole name, 'Sea of Japan', Korea could not object because it was under Japanese occupation. That said, the collection of early modern European maps that current international arbitration tribunal's favor seems equally divided between references to the Sea of Japan and East Sea/Korea's East Sea. Thus, Korean geographer Ryu Yeon-Taek explains that the Korean government today prefers a dual naming scheme for this sea until all parties involved –

including Russia and indigenous groups – settle on an alternative new name. Any Neolithic-era name that may have been in play among the indigenous Nivkh, Orok and Ainu people - whose few descendants still live along the thin stretches of water where mainland Russia breaks off towards Sakhalin Island - failed to make the grade of modern maps, although they treasure their ancestors' boots and clothes made of salmon skin hides. Fishing formed the basis of these communities' existence, and at least for the Ainu, a god of the sea that storytellers call Repun appears in drawings either as a whale or as a male figure with a harpoon. Legend relates tales of Repun's beneficence in fish catches when the hunt on land was meager, yet none of the storytelling groups seems to have had a specific name for the ocean that Repun makes bountiful, nor, however, did they have writing.

Exploring this sea's richness via spots along its coastlines and islands - rather than one nation at a time or time period after time period - helps create a sense of this oceanic history as a connective place for the region and beyond as well as its future possibilities.

To begin, this body of water's vital and unusually warm current is its most crucial thread. Over the course of the past fifteen to twenty million years that the Japanese main islands have been back-arc spreading from the Asian mainland and tectonically creating the physical space for this body of water to come into being, this famous ocean current also known as the Japan Current - has brought fish larvae, plankton and other food to the myriad creatures inhabiting this sea. In short, as the nineteenth-century English geographer and hydrographer Alexander George Findlay described, the Kuroshio is 'a remarkable stream'. At 46 degrees north latitude, Japan's life-giving Kuroshio Current even makes for pleasant swimming during summer months at the sea's northernmost reaches on the beaches of the lush, tiny island of Moneron, off the southern tip of Russia's Sakhalin Island. Moneron is the only landmass in the Straits of Tartary, and its astonishing diversity

makes it the Russian Federation's first national marine park. The island's name originates with the French navigator Jean Francois de La Perouse's 1787 visit to the region who named it after his expedition's chief engineer, Paul Merault Monneron (although the island is spelled without two 'n's'). The French name stands today even though the great Japanese cartographer, Mamiya Rinzo, and his colleagues visited and mapped it during their great 1808-09 expedition north through Sakhalin and eastern Siberia. Japanese called the island Kaibato until 1945, reworking the Ainu name Todomoshiri into Chinese characters - literally 'place of sea lions' in both Japanese and Ainu. In August 1945, the Soviets reverted to the French name when they subsumed control of it together with all of Sakhalin. Moneron's human population comes



and goes with the transient Ainu and vanished Japanese having given way to equally nomadic Russians, today arriving as eco-tourists to frolic with the island's resident sea lions that sunbathe on basalt boulders or browse among sea stars and anemones underneath the waves.

Forking in two at the tip of the Ryukyu Islands in the East China Sea, one trajectory of the Kuroshio heads north around Tsushima Island, splitting in two again into the Tsushima Current and the East Korea Warm Current, which together bring southern saline-charged nutrients across the sea to the Tsugaru Strait, between Hokkaido and Japan's primary island, Honshu.

There, the currents recombine and break free into the Pacific to rejoin the current's southern branch in the North Pacific gyre. Within that great whorl - the largest ecosystem on earth - the Kuroshio conveys its warmth to the southern islands of Alaska and the coastline of British Columbia before heading back again across the Pacific. Unfortunately, today this means that the current contributes to one of the planet's greatest challenges: the Great Pacific Garbage Patch, a man-made collection of insoluble plastic and chemical particulate gunk, most conservatively estimated to be the size of France, although likely larger than the United States.

The Kuroshio's warm northerly branch makes Vladivostok Russia's only ice-free Pacific port and home to the Russian Pacific fleet. Distressingly, throughout the Cold War Russia took enormous license with its control over these waters and dumped astonishing amounts of radioactive waste up through the 1990s, including two nuclear reactors off the coast of North Korea in 1978. Today, North Korea maintains several nuclear facilities along this ocean's coastline, while South Korea operates three. For its part, Japan operates the world's largest nuclear plant, the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa facility, south of Niigata, an area of Japan known in earlier times as Echigo, this coast's central port and critical to the country's early modern economy for rice, fish, timber and salt, among many other goods. Merchants along this coastline perfected a near shore trade route known as the 'Kitamaebune' (literally the 'northern bound ships'), which operated annually from the mid-seventeenth century through the advent of Western schooners in the region. Although the sails on these ships remained too weak in the face of this sea's ferocious northerly winds to accomplish more than one trip per year, the 'Kitamaebune' trade was integral to the calculus of the

world's first commodity exchange at Osaka (in 1800 Osaka rivaled Paris in manifold ways, especially in terms of market economy). Ships departed from Osaka's ports on Japan's southern face into the Inland Sea and headed west through the Kanmon Straits dividing Honshu and Kyushu, and from there cruised along Japan's northern coastline to what is today southern Hokkaido. This greatly added to the process of bringing the 'barbarian lands' (蝦夷) into Japanese consciousness, which in 1869 were renamed Hokkaido and colonized as the first piece of Japan's modern empire. Throughout such discordant human histories, the 360 currently known fish species in this sea do their best to thrive, with herring and sardines the most lucrative commodities, and giant octopus and squid holding the greatest mystery. In terms of what human activity is doing, however, this body of water has one of the most precipitous fish depletion rates currently being measured.

8. Conclusion

My remarks have tried to see Japan from the sea in order to interrogate Japanese society's relations to security, nature, and the environment in hopefully helpful and new ways. While certain political forces would try today to barricade Japan in the sea, opening up Japan's oceanic borderlines more productively engages Japan with Japan, with Asia, and with the world. It also is a more honest approach to Japanese history.

Discussion

Professor Kozue AKIBAYASHI's Remarks

I would like to thank Professor Mun and others for giving me this opportunity to talk about Professor Dudden's studies. I am sure others are grateful too. I'm fascinated by her illustration of history and I am overwhelmed to make comments. I would like to continue the privilege that I had earlier today when Professor Dudden and I traveled here together from Kyoto station. We had a short conversation starting with the episode when we missed each other last summer when we were enlisted on the Peace Boat together. The Peace Boat did the Japan cruise for the first time in thirty years; I was on the first half of the tour, and Professor Dudden was on the latter half of the tour. It gave us an opportunity to look at the ocean which surrounds Japan.

Through Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, a feminist peace activists' movement in Okinawa, my colleagues and I are trying to grow a global movement to achieve demilitarized security, and Professor Dudden is also familiar with this movement. These women and I have been doing this for the past twenty-some years and trying to figure out what research and activism can do together. This was part of the conversation earlier so I would like to ask this question from me to you, and I would like to give a bit of a background to these activities. OWAAMV will be celebrating its 25th anniversary this year. You might recall the incident of the 1995 sexual assault by US soldiers in Okinawa that many will probably be referring to later this year. That led to the island wide movement challenging what Professor Dudden described as 'insecurity created by the very territorial idea of security.' I have argued that these feminist peace activists spearheaded the movement to put forward fundamental criticism of security discourse

and policies. Their analyses come not only from the territorial issue but also the long history of sexual violence by US soldiers starting in 1945 in Okinawa.



Actually, the Japanese Empire Map study that you showed at the very beginning was the very same map of the scope of the locations of "comfort stations" used by the Japanese imperial military during the Asia-Pacific war.

When the Okinawa women formed their activity against military violence in 1945 their fundamental criticism was questioning the military and the belief in militarism and that, as some of the feminist international relations scholars have argued, is the basis that underlies the territorial security policy, the assumption that the military is what protects the territory on the borders. Okinawa Women Act Against

Military Violence are critical not only of the direct and more visible impacts of the military presence in Okinawa, but also have analyzed that the idea of militarized security has caused insecurity in the host communities of US military in Okinawa. There are gaps within Okinawa too, some people are safer and not affected as much as others are, and those, for example in Henoko and Futemma and other areas are the ones who are more affected. I think that the differences within Okinawa itself should be noted. It's not only Japan versus the United States and Japan versus Japan but we could also say Henoko versus Naha for example. There are layers, and by seeking out the layers of oppression and the burden we may be able to contribute to different perspectives of the history.

When Okinawan women felt disappointed at the Japanese mainland women's movements for their lack of understanding of the situation in Okinawa, they started to look for closer relationships with feminist peace activists in communities hosting US military in places other than Japan, especially the Philippines and South Korea because their colonial backgrounds are very similar to that of Okinawa. Moreover, the proximity of the US military activities and presence in their daily lives and the direct connection with sexual violence, including the sex industry as a part of the exploitation by soldiers, have led them to create a closer connection with the women's groups in those communities. Perhaps you know women's groups like *Durebang* in the US military camp towns in South Korea or women's groups in the Philippines as well. They are also trying to expand the scope of their policies on security to environmental destruction by the military presence and other issues. These international feminist peace network's activities have illuminated the colonial history that was shared by the communities in Guam and in Hawaii and overlapping with the military occupation in those areas as well as the annexation and the colonization of indigenous communities in Guam and Hawaii.

I would argue that there have been activities on the ground, particularly from my areas of expertise, feminine peace movements, working for creating or sharing a new perspective of history in the region. Significantly, a group from this International Network of Women Against Militarism has joined a more specific action. That was a vision of closing the Demilitarized Zone on the Korean Peninsula by first crossing the DMZ, starting in 2015. The action is called Women Cross DMZ. We were a group of about thirty feminist peace activists from sixteen countries, South Koreans could not take part because they could not cross, nor *Zainichi* Koreans because that was too risky for them.

This international group of women from different areas wanted to internationalize this issue of the Korean War that is still going on. Professor Dudden briefly mentioned the US occupation and the Allied Forces' plan that resulted in the division of the Korean Peninsula and argued that it's not so much a problem between North and South as a problem of the international community, namely the neglect of responsibility of the international community to end the Korean War. The effort of Women Cross DMZ has also been continuing precisely because we share such a view. We are facing probably a better situation now than in 2015 when the tension on the Korean Peninsula was much higher, but our movement is still struggling to eliminate the DMZ. In 2015 we actually did cross the DMZ from the North side to the South side. We wanted to cross at Panmunjom because that would be very symbolic, but we figured that it was too much. Well, we tried. We negotiated with the North Korean Government and the South Korean Government and the UN Command, meaning the United States and the UN. We tried all these channels, but we couldn't cross in the Panmunjom area and instead we crossed at the Kaesong area. This year is the fifth anniversary of the crossing of Women Cross DMZ, and we are trying to do it again, maybe to cross the other way, from the South

side to the North side. However, this Coronavirus situation is something that we didn't expect, and it could be a difficult obstacle to our purpose.

These are actual activists' activities we are doing. Also, we are trying to address the national history narrative and as a part of that we are collecting the direct experiences of women being colonized or being militarized. We are utilizing these oral histories to formulate our own narrative of the history of the region and share a common experience of the history. We are not only sharing but trying to build solidarity to effect change, to decolonize, and maybe, to remove the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula, and also bring about gender equality because we believe that DMZ or US military occupation, the insecurity created by security, also has a commonly underlying sexism and misogyny in its structure.

So I am ending my comment here and I already placed my first question so as a committed historian, could I ask you to maybe to give us some suggestions in the way you were talking about languages that can be understood by the regular people or policy makers?

Thank you very much.

Professor DUDDEN's Response

Thank you for your really thoughtful and challenging comments. I would define myself as a pacifist realist. I'm sitting next to a very active humanist and I would describe us all as humanists, and the first question I would like to answer is: "Do you want to have hope?" which I do appreciate and to which I would reply that I have to have hope. I am a historian, and I don't get paid enough not to have hope. It is all I have, but also I am a teacher and a mother, and I don't mean to glamorize motherhood as the answer, rather, I am responsible for a fourteen-year-old and if I don't have hope why should I encourage him? I get chills when I say that but that is why I continue to be honest with myself and so I have to come up with something that I think I am doing to make the planet better. I don't know what it is yet, but I want to address what (both) of you said, and I want to say that you both have very interesting points of convergence on your expression of camouflaging international law and I think that's great. The camouflaging of Henoko in the sense that both of these tricks of the state, in particular the deploying of troops without following international law as you rightly say absolutely occludes, makes everybody blind to the violence endemic to international law. Putting Henoko offshore, even if it's not going to happen, is a complete distraction from the violence of daily life for Okinawan women and girls, as highlighted by the 1995 rape to begin with. The idea that to atone for that rape we would build another new base, but one that we wouldn't be able to see - which is part and parcel of these offshore disputes where we can test each other's resolve without having to see them - that the violence builds on land behind them both.

If I could begin, I would like to address things individually today. I have two specific answers for each of you. But I will propose to you

that in 2020, with the anniversary of the rape, I wasn't thinking in those terms, thank you for reminding me, and maybe I should be thinking of the seventy-fifth anniversary, we have this year. Already Vladimir Putin is throwing the biggest party in May to celebrate the end of W.W.II, but we all know when we sit in the Asia Pacific region that in fact, the war has three more months to go and they were the exceptionally violent ones that began the nuclear age. I would also propose that we think of 2020 not as the end of W.W.II, but as the seventy-fifth anniversary of the US occupation of Japan, and I think that it does not make me a radical leftist to use this language, but for many years it would have defined me as a radical leftist. Here I'm thinking how D. H. Norman in 1944 did not see what Okinawa would become today, and in my research there is not a single US military planner in 1945 who saw the US occupation lasting for seventy-five years, and if we start using that language in everyday life maybe we can draw attention to something.

I know John Dower tried very recently to draw attention to Japan and Manchuria, in comparison to America and Iraq, and because the US is not yet ready to call itself an empire, in spite of everything that is wrong with the US, the book got trashed and it shouldn't have gotten trashed, it's an excellent book; but we just need to start saying that the United States has never stopped trying to occupy Japan militarily. If we want to figure out how to have agency and independence and autonomy as Japanese people that's a separate discussion, but the United States' military occupation of Japan for seventy-five years makes this the longest. It's about a third of my country's history, in terms of chronology, and when you put those numbers out there it is rather alarming. It's the permanent basing, the permanent industrial/military complex that's probably more keenly felt in Okinawa than anywhere else on the planet.

Increasingly, Guam with very similar colonial relations and post-colonial histories is heading in the same direction, and this brings me to an essay which I believe Wada Haruki has recently published. He gave a talk in Seoul in November in which he said: "We cannot keep calling the San Francisco Treaty a peace treaty. It is not a peace treaty; it is the creation of a permanent state of war in East Asia."

So words do matter, and when you ask what I can do actively, I wish I had your courage sometimes; I mean I'm not sure I would have the courage to do what you do all the time. I try, but the courage that I would have as an activist is through words, and this is what all of us in this room are privileged to have; I mean Donald Trump may be after mine and maybe after yours but we still have freedom of speech, and I don't mean to sound like a silly child when I say that. We have freedom of speech, but we know how rare that is, and so it is incumbent on all of us to use it.

I really appreciate your discussion of the need to talk about the history of international law instead of simply accusing nations of violating it, the US being the largest violator of that bar none. With the territorial disputes it certainly helps in the current discussions of treaties about slave labor or slavery issues. In both instances we can discuss how international law itself has changed, particularly with people, less so with territory. I think that what we're seeing is a sort of reterritorialization of sovereignty but I will definitely try to engage with your language and, to quote you, this is camouflaging how international law is itself a history and it is generative and changing.

So, thank you very much for that point, and what I will do is try to write more proactively, and I think the Ogasawara case is a good example.

Benjamin Savory



Let's to go back to Nathaniel Savory's son. I didn't talk about the peopling as much as I would have liked to today but what I wanted to emphasize is mythical homogeneous model nation-state of Japan. Of course it began as a multi-ethnic multi-racial, multi-cultural society about 38,000 years ago, and it's always forever been multi-ethnic ever since the origins of Japan.

On Ogasawara we can see it in modern times. We can see it in modern times because Maria de los Santos y Castro is Benjamin Savory's mother who was Nathanial Savory's forced wife; and I am not using this term lightly because the way that there were people on the Ogasawara islands after Nathaniel Savory showed up in 1830 was an instance of forced sexual slavery. I'm not using the terms "state sponsored" or "militarized", but in 1830 Nathanial Savory and his two friends on the island of Hawaii kidnapped 13 girls. They were Filipina, Samoan, and Hawaiian, and I found the documents. They took 13 girls and women from Hawaii to the Ogasawara for the express purpose of building a population. Two of the girls escaped on whaling ships back to Hawaii, several of them went insane and ran into the woods and created ghost stories that still live on the Ogasawaras; so when you hear

the wind at night it's one of those girls. The others decided for whatever reason to stay with these men and they had more children.

So, to answer, the beginning of the violence in Ogasawara connects itself to the violence in Okinawa and other militarized spots but it's also the colonial history around the empire. In that sense sometimes historical research can be connected to activism to deepen what activists in the present are trying to show is going on. I think it does help to connect our work and so thank you very much.

My one final question is one that the wonderful professor Norma Field always asks: How much are you personally prepared to pay in a capitalist society? What are we as professors prepared to give up for what we do? And she's really clear on this point. Are you prepared to give up your house? Are you prepared to give up your car in order to be the activist you believe yourself to be? I'm not questioning you personally; I'm directing this to myself. Am I willing to give up being here? I can be honest and say: "I don't think so"; but I am also not willing to hide behind this privilege and that's why I think it's okay to be called names on the internet, and to stand up against things in writing. This counts as activism increasingly now that this new form of communication called the internet has taken over. I think there are things that we can do to turn what we know into a broader form of activism, but then we still have to rely on your physical labor, on your actual physical crossing of the DMZ and breaking down that border, for which I am incredibly grateful. I think we all are doing this together, so this does connect us. I also appreciate your mentioning of the language of camouflage and hiding it.

Thank you both so much.

Questions and Comments

Moderator: Thank you. Now it's time for questions and comments from the floor on the keynote speech or the discussion we have had.

Questioner 1: From the viewpoints of seeking co-existence and reconciliation in Asia, what kind of factors exist behind the divide according to your interpretation?

Professor Dudden: In a word, money.

Questioner **1**: Well that's closely related to the second session.

Professor Dudden: Well let me give an example. I think it is also related as you said to the second session. I think in the 1990s the sort of the beginnings of the extremes of wealth and power that came from globalizing economies or actually from multi-national corporations which come in the wake of the collapse of the so to say bipolar order have given very similar dislocations around the world and we are seeing in so many societies so many populist surges. However, I think each society manifests what it's going to target differently, and on this point, I admire the work of Professor Nakano Koichi and I have learned a lot from him.

When Prime Minister Abe returned to office, the first thing he did was announce that he was going to target the Kono statement and I really didn't understand why he would pick that because as a historian, militarized sexual slavery, the comfort women are one balance of historical product and the Nanjing Massacre is another. So, I thought; why are you picking that one and not that one? It just didn't make sense, and I naïvely thought it's because Korea is easy and China is scary, this

is what I was thinking, so I asked Professor Koichi: "Is it because Korea is smaller and weaker?" And He replied, "No. Abe wants to get rid of the Asahi Shimbun". And you can agree or disagree but that's what made me begin to reflect, and the consistent tearing apart of the free press in Japan under the Abe administration has been very remarkable. It is definitely happening in the US now but it's interesting that this is what Abe in his second term went for first. Pierre Bordeaux, the wonderful French sociologist said that censorship is most powerful not when people are not allowed to say something but when everybody ends up saying the same thing. That's what we've been seeing in Japan.

What do I think caused all of this? I am enough of a historical Marxist to believe that it's the economy. There were dislocations and how are we going to deal with these social dislocations? I think each society is picking a different object and I think that one thing that was unforeseen in Japan's moment has been the Fukushima meltdowns. I have no way of proving it, but I do not think it's an accident that the territorial disputes and especially the militarization of the territorial disputes really began to ratchet up after Fukushima. Anything to turn the public's view away from the nuclear reactors is valuable to the governing power, and so in the mix, the groups that were questioning Fukushima needed to be silenced quickly, and so that's what I see. How that manifests in other societies is different but it's for similar reasons. I wish I had a better economics answer, and I'm thinking of Joseph Stieglitz's *Globalization and its Discontents* and works like that. We are seeing the 1% growing wealthier in Japan, as we see the 1% growing wealthier everywhere, and watching populist surges that are being left behind while they think they are being brought along, and that's the similarity I see from France to Turkey to Japan to the United States.

Questioner 1: Would you like to interpret the situation? Maybe this bad situation began since around 1995 with the collapse of the "casino

economies" and in addition the most important thing is that around 1995 is the time that Abe and the right-wing politicians tried to make a plan to promote a backlash against those kinds of things. Maybe it's based upon the hatred created by radical nationalism, as in the historical narrative of the Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference) in 1997?

Professor Dudden: Yes, I completely agree with you that they are the surface effects, absolutely.

Questioner 1: So around mid-1995 the right-wing got the hegemony and now we are faced with a terrible situation.

Professor Dudden: Yes. I completely agree.

Questioner 1: I have a comment about seeing Japan from the sea. It is a beautiful concept, like the open waters, or like a cosmopolitan idea of space; but on the other hand, expressing these ideas is a little bit dangerous. For example, the Americans are realists who emphasize the sea. They found Japan as a sea power which contains land powers. Now China may also be seeing Japan from the sea as another kind of view.

Professor Dudden: Yes, and no. I am a sailor, and I find that a lot of people who write about the ocean have never actually been on water and so they think it's very easy to have these borders and these borderlines which is completely impossible when you are on the water, and so it's always amusing to me. But I don't disagree with you. The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea has in many respects created a lot of these problems not only through exclusive economic zones but also the continental shelf regimes. It's totally legal to extend the nation-state 350 miles into the ocean, that's the pink map of Japan, and one way of thinking about it is if you are in this room and you are

planning to have grandchildren, by the time your grandchildren are our ages there will be no blue on a globe. It will all be pink or yellow or green to match the nation-state that's claiming it, because that's the trend in international law. So, I definitely see a track into an oceanic pursuit on the one hand and on the other hand the ocean is the last space on the planet over which to claim national dominance. How that national claim is being claimed is still being mediated.

If we take the hard border approach to the ocean, which Donald Trump is doing by this Indo-Pacific notion and all of the posturing in the South China Sea, we are setting the United States up for a coming war with China. I mean China is developing a blue water navy, all of the language of this is set to have W.W.III. It's a very similar part of the world, the Pacific Ocean again and the Chinese are following Japan in 1915 now, picking little islands and the United States has its little islands and the parallels are all there.

At the same time the activism is also there to push back. In very compelling ways, largely fueled by climate change because the islands are sinking, the fish are disappearing, and increasingly there are legal mechanisms to defend against that and so it's a question of how to switch the discourse away from complete national, nation-state, rapacious empire building.

In my book I'm trying to say that the twenty-first century is an age of ocean empires, but very different from the sixteenth century of Spain and Portugal. This is nation-states claiming the open ocean as territory. If that can be pushed back or mediated before a territorial dominance of the seas that surely is where climate change comes in, because the water rising is the push back, the actual physicality of the ocean is pushback. I do have hope, I have to have hope that through understanding the ocean from the perspective of a refugee is how we have to move forward, because if you've got people trying to escape a

war zone only to get to the Aegean Sea and come up against a wall in the sea what does that mean?

Is this really the future of the planet? Because that does mean that we are destroying ourselves! So again, it's not an answer but I do think there are two approaches that can be taken to the ocean, one is a fluid borderline and the other is the rigid approach.

Questioner 2: Thank you very much, that was fascinating. I really like the idea that we take an honest approach to history. I agree with that, but at the same time I would like to ask: What would you say if I say that are you romanticizing history? Are you beautifying history? There ought to be some sort of negative heritage of "fluid Japan" in the past that didn't really come out. I'm from a political science background, and I felt that your talk is so fascinating and so interdisciplinary that it should have a lot of implications for policies. So, what would be the policy implications of your discussion? How can we use this history as a lesson to form a hopeful future? Can you elaborate a bit more about

what kind of hopeful future you're hoping for based on the historical discussion?

Professor Dudden: On the one hand it's fine if I romanticize history but I don't want to beautify it. That is to say I believe that the only value history has is to show a moment where a choice was made, because history is always about a decision, and if we can learn from a decision that went terribly wrong, then maybe we don't have to make that (wrong) decision again, and we can think of countless examples.

Let's take an example from American history. When the African slave trade ended in the early nineteenth century, it was technically possible for the United States to have ended the practice of slavery then, but instead, even though slavery as in the transatlantic importation of bodies was illegal, it got worse, because the practice was kept legal, and so from the moment that it became illegal to import Africans slave, owners started peopling their plantations by raping the slaves. They turned the plantations into body producing factories of totally free (as in monetary free) labor to the extent that before the American civil war in the 1860s the value of all African American slaves in the United States was greater than the value of all American manufacturing and production because it was free labor, which is just an astonishing statistic. Fifty years earlier had the decision been made to end slavery, the United States today might have a very different understanding of justice and equality. Instead we have huge human rights problems related entirely to the post moment, those 50 years.

So, what I'm saying is that I don't mean to romanticize history, but I believe you have to examine that past in order to open up the possibility of a different future. Perhaps that's romantic but it's not beautiful. That would address the history of rape and pillage and violence and it would address the history of lynching and terror and say this is not acceptable.

In terms of a policy description for what I'm working on, I think it's already on the books. I mean I'm not against there being a United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, but there has to be enforceability, because this beautiful body of law does absolutely nothing except for the opposite of what's intended. It was created so that we did not destroy the world's oceans. The man who created it, Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo, gave the most beautiful speech at the United Nations about how the oceans are the womb of life and that's why we have salt tears because we as human creatures come from the ocean - it was a really beautiful speech. He gave this speech precisely because he saw oil companies and fishing companies tearing apart the oceans and depleting all of the resources. He died a very unhappy man in 1997 due to the advent of the exclusive economic zone, because the point of the plan was sharing, but it's become complete private property. If we go to some of the provisions in the law, the joint development agreement for example, which China and Japan used until 2009 in the East China Sea, until maybe historical impulses or jockeying with each other for power came into being. Then immediately the Senkaku/Diaoyutai gets described as a resource war but it's not a resource war; there is very little liquid natural gas and oil in the East China Sea. In fact, I think somebody's run the numbers - if you take all of the fossil fuel out of the East China Sea it will electrify Beijing for one week. That is not worth going to war over. I mean it's just not enough, so it's not a resource war. Also, there are very few fish left in the East China Sea, so if you're a fisherman in Okinawa you have to go fight in the Philippines for survival.

However, if we go back to what the law says there are codes on piracy and theft, but there's no enforcement for it, because of the private possibility, and that's the thing about capitalism - is it possible at this stage to imagine completely overturning capitalism? Or are we really talking about lessening the extremes? So, I guess my policy prescription

is, let's all re-read the international laws, the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, and let's figure out how to police it. Konishi Hiroyuki has a really interesting policy proposal for Japan for the Jieitai (Self-defense force). He says: Okay, Japan has a Jieitai, we know we have a military force, but do we have to fight America's wars? Why don't we use our Jieitai to become the world's first major humanitarian crisis response team? Why don't we make the Japanese military responsible for climate change problems so that Japan is called into the Philippines, so that Japan is called into China, as a positive force? We know from the last series of typhoons that a militarized response is needed to counter climate change catastrophe. Why can't Japan's marine self-defense force become the police that actually enforces UNCOS instead of falling prey to the United States? They say: "Oh well you'll get more, you'll get more", and we'll destroy the planet that way so I'm just saying it's already there on the books, we just need to act together instead of from selfish greed.

Questioner 3: You were saying that if you get part of the law it's not very helpful, but the rest of the law is actually very helpful.

Professor Dudden: The easy addition of open ocean as territory and the nationalization of the continental shelf are really bad, so we could get rid of those, but the other initial thing that Arvid Pardo proposed was that because the ocean was a common state, the profit from anything taken out should be used to eradicate poverty on land. That totally did not happen, and if it had the IMF or the World Bank would look very different today. That is why he said we can control this so that there is enough to go around. A land-locked state like Mongolia, doesn't have any rights to the ocean. They have to lease their fishing rights from North Korea, even to be allowed in the sea. The ocean has enormous potential for everyone as long as we don't say the ocean is

mine, not yours. The number one rule of being on a boat is you help another boat in distress. It doesn't matter what the flag is; otherwise, you're dead.

Questioner 4: I understood that, from the Professor Dudden's expressions, we have a current situation where the strong men who support the dominant political forces are too powerful in comparison to the weak opposing political forces. The different voices empower the strong man. It's a very challenging situation right now, so please explain what you mean by differences of policy to open a more possible future.

Professor Dudden: If you look at this sketch of Japan's claimed territorial waters this is all technically exclusive Japanese space – that's upheld by law. However, what is not, but is being claimed here are the South Kuril Islands (Hopporyodo), the Dokdo/Takeshima and Senkaku/Diaoyutai, which technically doesn't exist. This part Ogaswara, does. Okinotori is not really an island, it shouldn't quite be there, it's Japanese, it's Japan's rock, but so there are some parts of this map that don't exist. So I'm not trying to take any territory away from Japan, I don't mean it that way, but here, here, and here are possibilities for a negotiation, and first of all these are tiny spaces compared to the rest of what Japan gets. Ogasawara is 100% Japanese, so it gets a huge amount of the Pacific and with Minamitori-shima a huge amount of the Pacific. With that space Japan is technically the world's sixth or seventh largest nation - which is currently India- so that amount of ocean going to Japan makes Japan huge. Meanwhile, those little dots that Japan is claiming because of its history problems doesn't actually add a whole lot.

Instead, we could go back to joint-ownership. I admit that I'm living a pipe dream; this is crazy talk. No one's going to share. Is

Russia's going to share? No way, but they did share in the past. Since 1945 they shared, and it's only since 2014 when this really hardline policy connected each of these points together for the first time both as foreign and domestic policy that they stopped sharing. This decision by Japan has meant that there's no ability to go and create a second agreement here, in which we can propose that maybe the Chinese fishermen can be there, and the Russian fishermen can be there, because now it's all one policy that defines the Japanese State so that and if you give anything you give up all of it. So, I'm just suggesting.

When I was in Kyoto, Minshuto took out a full-page ad in the Asahi newspaper, and probably every other paper for the election and it used the word 'Borderline'. It said we will protect Japan's borderline and it wasn't saying Japan is weak and may be taken over, but we have to have this border, or we will cease to exist, and Japanese citizens must defend this territory. However, instead of claiming this, we could say that these are points of convergence, because Japanese modern history happened first on these little islands, then on the larger land area. But these claims do not make sense in terms of how those islands became Japanese territory in the first place. On a 1905 map for example: Where was Sakhalin? To say that Karafuto (South Sakhalin) should be claimed if Takeshima is claimed, just does not make historical sense. So, these are places that you know for a more possible acceptance of Japan in Asia.

Hatoyama Yukio's vision which was not ready to happen but saw Japan back in Asia is the conversation that increasingly needs to happen again. I believe that through pulling back on this map, we could, without giving up the safety, not the security but the safety of being Japanese in Japan, there could be progress.

I am not asking Koreans to give up Dokdo. That would be suicide, it's just not going to happen, but at the same time to have to always take such a militarized approach only sustains the legacy of empire rather

than overcomes it. And the United States must leave Okinawa. All I am asking is that we be honest about how things happened in the first place, instead of camouflaging it and pretending that it's always been Japanese territory. Hold on to this point.

I'll end with this point; the United States does a terrible job on Ioto. Now, if you are a Japanese and if your parents or grandparents are buried on the South Kuril Islands (Hopporyodo) which are Russian territory or at least administered by Russia, and you want to make *hakamairi* (pay respects at one's ancestors graves) you can do so. However, the United States government doesn't allow Japanese to do *hakamairi* on Ioto, and that is bad US policy, because if you need to connect territorially, it's not because you need to wave a flag, it's because you need to pay your respects to your ancestors, and so I think there are points of convergence that could be made into policy if history were actually looked at honestly.

Thank you for your attention.

Moderator: This discussion session has been really fascinating and I have understood a good deal. I am not so knowledgeable in this area as I specialized in the western part of Asia, but as an ordinary Japanese citizen I share your concerns. Well, I think we all have more comments, and this discussion could continue but time is up so let's conclude this session by thanking our presenters and all of you for participating.

Thank you very much.

Session 2

Keynote Speech

The Evaporation of History: History Communication in the Age of the Post-truth and the Posthuman

Professor Norihisa YAMASHITA

1. Introduction

Many commentaries and analyses about the use or abuse of history have already been accumulated during the recent rise of right-wing/nationalist discourse in Japan. In the vertical perspective, this can be located in the history of "Issues of Historical Perceptions" between Japan and other East Asian countries traced back to 1980s, especially through the "History Textbook Controversy" and the "Comfort Women Issue". However, in the horizontal perspective, it can be interpreted as one of many instances of "the campaign against established knowledge" in the transformation of the public sphere boosted by digital media.

Not a few Japanese historians have been deeply concerned with the rising popularity of right-wing revisionism/denialism and have been trying to refute those discourses abusing history basically by showing the academically established views. However, their efforts seem largely unsuccessful, or rather counter-effective in reducing the popularity of the revisionist/denialist discourses. This problem shares, it can be argued, the same structure as what the Science and Technology Studies

characterized as the "deficit model", the limit of enlightenment by the experts which aims to fill the "deficit" in scientific knowledge among the lay people. To the extent that this analogy is relevant, what would be called "History Communication", a peculiar kind of Science Communication between the academic historians and the public, appears to be demanded. The problem is how we should appropriately communicate history given that while it shares the same structure of tension between expertise and democracy; history is classified under humanities unlike disciplines of natural science.

In my presentation, I will try to locate the problem at the intersection of post-truth politics[1] in the contemporary society and the posthuman[2] turn in the humanistic academia. History Communication has to take an even narrower path than Science Communication, through which, I would suggest, the conventional conceptualization of history may transform, if not lose, its demarcation both in terms of who writes and what makes the history.

[1] A *political* culture in which debate is framed largely by appeals to emotion disconnected from the details of policy, and by the repeated assertion of talking points to which factual rebuttals are ignored.

[2] Posthuman is a concept originating in the fields of science fiction, and philosophy that literally means a person or entity that exists in a state beyond being human.

2. The Long Swing to the Right

The following list of abuses of history in Japan indicates that this issue has not suddenly sprung out of nowhere but has emerged over a longer time and goes much deeper.

1982 History Textbook Controversy (歴史教科書検定問題)

1985 PM Nakasone's official visit to Yasukuni Shrine

1987 Sekihoutai (赤報隊) Terrorism Attack on Asahi Shimbunsha (朝日新聞社)

1989 "The Japan that can say No" published

1991 Kim Hak-sun (金学順)'s first testimony as the victim of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery

1992 "Gomanism" Manifesto (『ゴーマニズム宣言』)

1995 "Marco Polo" incident (holocaust denialism)

1996 Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (新しい歴史教科書をつくる会)

1997 Parliamentary Group on History Textbook Affairs (教科書議連)

1997 Japan Conference (日本会議)

1999 Shintaro Ishihara elected as Governor of Tokyo Metropolis

2001 PM Koizumi's official visit to Yasukuni Shrine

c.2005 Dokdo/Takeshima Controversy, Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Controversy

c.2000-2005 "netto uyoku" （「ネット右翼」） began to be circulated

2006 Abe Shinzo Cabinet (first)

2006 Zaitokukai （在特会）

2006 The Eternal Zero (『永遠のゼロ』)

2008 Toru Hashimoto elected as Governor of Osaka

2012 Japan Restoration Party (日本維新の会)

2012 Abe Shinzo Cabinet (second)

(1) Global Parallels

This trend is not just something peculiar to Japan; its context is shared globally. We can see many illustrations of the so-called "Retreat of Liberal Democracy" all over the world for example, and we can observe tides of populism almost everywhere, such as the Alt-right (Dark Enlightenment) in US, Brexit, the Radical Rights in Europe, the FN in France, the AfD in Germany, the PVV in Poland, and Lega Nord in Italy as well as the return of authoritarian regimes such as in Hungary, Brazil, Turkey, almost everywhere. In fact, Japanese Prime Minister Abe himself is a front runner of this trend, and the issue at hand is this long and wide context of this dilemma which is shared globally today.

(2) Academic Fronts of History

In this longer and deeper and wider context, what have the Japanese historians been doing? There are multiple fronts but I would like to concentrate on just two of them.

1) First Front

This includes the following:

a) Criticism against the "National History" in Japan and all over the world. This is a constant theme in Japanese historiography. The most frequently cited work on this topic is Yoshihiko Amino

(網野善彦), “Social History (社会史) the lineage of social history in Japanese historiography” which emphasizes the internal heterogeneity in Japanese history. Japan is not a monolithic single national society; it contains much more diverse internal heterogeneity.

b) The lineage of Regional/Maritime History (地域史／海域史): Shosuke Murai (村井章介) and many other historians in Japanese history who emphasize the openness of Japanese history or the contextuality in the wider regional settings. Shosuke Murai jointly edited the six-volume work on Japanese history in Asia published from 1992 to 1993 that describes the layered external contexts and cross-border relationships between Japan and Asia.

c) The theme of Post colonialism: “Deconstruction of Nationality” (酒井/伊豫谷/ド・バリー) by Naoki Sakai et al. published in Japan in 1996. The theme is Japan as a colonial empire from the second half of the 1990s, a quite lively issue in Japanese historiography.

2) Second Front.

As a global trend the Linguistic Turning in historical studies is quite conspicuous in Japanese historiography too. It is a skepticism against the historical facts which has had quite a wide and deep negative impact on the popular appreciation of Japanese history.

(3) Limits of Enlightenment

As a starting point, what I want to emphasize is the limits of Enlightenment. The "Long swing to the Right" is quite conspicuous; many historians are deeply concerned and they have been engaged in pushing back against this swing to the right for four decades.

However, the result is just as you can see today - a big failure for the efforts of the historians. Perhaps one reason for this failure is that the weapon of the historian has been appropriated by the enemy. I have termed this the appropriation of the logic of the cultural left by revisionism/denialism.

1) "Alternative" Perspectives of History

From the late 1980s or the 1990s on, the new generation of historians came up with a series of "alternative" perspectives of history again and again, and that cultivated a sense that any kind of historical perspective is fine; a sense that anything goes in a postmodern sense was cultivated through these historians' endeavors.

This transformed the debate from the "Battle of Facts" to the "Battle of Interpretations". It's not about facts anymore, it's just a matter of interpretations, so there is this overall skepticism against the historical facts and the linguistic terms have a strong tendency to fuel this trend.

In a wider social context, the market moralism of neoliberalism is spreading wider and wider, and historical works have become more and more considered as "history as commodity", so that it is the history which sells that is taken to be "history". This particular trend is propagated by the revisionists and denialists.

2) Counter-Attacks by Concerned Historians Against Revisionism/Denialism

The Japanese historians tried to push back against the tide of revisionism/denialism, but it has become quite a biased and unfair game.

There is a huge asymmetry between the academic historians and the popular writers of revisionist/denialist versions of history. This is because historians bear the burden of following the due process in historical academia while the popular revisionists and denialists just produce whatever they want to say.

The outcome is a huge disparity between academic historians and popular writers of revisionist and denialist versions of history which has resulted in the failure of historians to reach a wider readership.

This is a general explanation of what we are seeing today and it's not only the case with history. There is a link with the concept known as the "Deficit Model" in science and technology studies.

3. The Deficit Model

(1) Public Skepticism

The so-called deficit model has arisen from public skepticism or hostility to science and technology, which has resulted in a lack of understanding among the populace, due to a lack of information.

Up until the 1980s most science and technology experts believed in the deficit model and when they encountered public resistance in accepting some kind of scientific truth or technological merit, they tried to enlighten the populace. In other words, they tried to propagate the correct information in order to enlighten the people, to persuade them to accept the scientific truth or technological rationality.

This attempt at enlightenment was always believed to be the remedy within the deficit model, but in practice it never worked. A well-known instance would be the outbreak of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy commonly known as “mad cow disease” in Britain. The scientists tried to persuade the general public that the beef in their supermarkets was actually safe to eat, but nobody would believe them.

So now in the field of scientific studies there has been a radical shift from the deficit model to a more participatory model in which the scientific truth or technological rationality has to be released through joint participation by representatives of both the experts’ side and the lay people’s side. So that’s what happened in the field of science and technology, and now the experts emphasize the value of Science and Technology Communication and so civic engagement with technology assessment has become very important.

These attempts have resulted in the “Science café”; an environment where the moderators, facilitators and scientific experts are trying to communicate with the lay people. The “consensus conference” has also

become an important political device to create agreement between the powers, the experts, and the lay people.

(2) Trans-science Model

The term "trans-science" was coined by Alvin M. Weinberg, the nuclear physicist, in the early 1970s. This term can be defined as a domain of "questions that can be stated in scientific terms but that are in principle beyond the proficiency of science to answer".

(3) History Communication

As this deficit in science communication is analogous to the deficit in history communication, so I believe the "trans-science" model can be applied by a kind of analogy so that historians can endeavor to enlighten the populace to counter revisionism/denialism. In other words, historians should shift to a more participatory approach when disseminating knowledge to non-experts.

We might call this "trans-history" as a variation of trans-science, and in this way we can think about a more democratized process in the sense of audience participation in the reading and writing of history.

Trans-history, as an offspring of trans-science, is already being practiced, even in Japan, and in Sendai some historians have formed a history café that provides a meeting place for historians and lay people. So it's already happening, and in recent years there have been many publications about public history which invite known experts to write history so there is a convergence of readers and writers in the field of history in parallel with science communication which we would call "history communication".

(4) School Textbooks

One of the most conspicuous events about the swing to the right is the so-called *schoolkai* textbook and there has been much civic

engagement in textbook selection after the *schoolkai* textbooks were authorized, but there is still the process of actually implementing those textbooks and there are several local initiatives which counter the actual use of those textbooks. There are many significant implications in school textbook production, and this is an ongoing discussion. The Japan/China or the Japan/South Korea joint history research committees have made efforts at negotiation but these take place only within the experts' community so it's not really history communication - but in some sense it's a more democratic process of reading and writing history so these are just lesser examples of this practice.

However, the analogy between science and history models ends here. We can't just apply the science communication model to history because the political structure is quite different.

4. Different Politics

There are two dimensions of differences in politics, the "post-truth" front and "posthuman" front. The first point is relatively simple to explain but the second point is more complicated. Let me begin by explaining the first. The second, the "posthuman" front is a nested problem of trans-history within history as such.

(1) "Post-truth" Front

Let me begin by saying that the power relation between historians as experts and lay people is not really similar to the relation between scientific or technological experts and the people.

In the case of trans-science, as you can see in the diagram below there is an overlap between trans-science and the field of public decision making, and in this trans-science field, the demos, the populace, has to be invited.



The scientific and technological experts and the public decision makers are in alliance and in power, so the power relationship is vertical here. There is a circle between the science and the public decision-

makers and the demos are excluded so it's quite a democratizing process when the demos are invited to be in the field of trans-science. That is why we can say that science communication in the domain of trans-science is basically democratized.

In the case of trans-history the structure is the same. There is the field of the academic historians, and there is the field of trans-history, and in the place of the public decision-makers there are the hegemony transformers. Now in most cases many historians are making counter hegemony against the hegemony formers so the power relation is actually horizontal, and now what is happening is that the hegemony transformers are inviting the demos to suppress history. So, the power relation is quite different, and if we simply repeat the same tactics of inviting the demos into the domain of trans-history it is just fueling the ties of popular revisionism. Due to this difference in power relations, the strategy of history communication as an analogy of science communication doesn't really work. So, what can we do?

(2) Defense of Humanities

The political difference between trans-science and trans-history is intertwined with the problem of the "usefulness" of humanities. In the case of trans-science, science is aligned with public decision making because science is useful for making money, reinforcing an order, and so on.

Actually, the discipline of history used to be useful in the 19th century. When the nation-states were being formed historians were employed to legitimize the history of the nation-states, so history was useful, but it is already a while since this record became the target of historical criticism and as I have pointed out the sheer academic interests of the academic historians are actually pitted against the national history, so now that former usefulness has gone. Actually, the vector is opposite and so today, for the hegemony formers, history is

not useful and that is why the power relations are different and actually there is no plus/minus balance between the experts in history and the hegemonists. Of course, there are a few conspicuous exceptions like those historians who sell through the media in alliance with the political powers.

So, the difference between science communication and history communication lies in the different power relationships between the two and that is intertwined with or contextualized by the problem of the usefulness of humanities and as history is a human science it is now considered as not useful by hegemonists.

So, we can conclude here that what is necessary is to retain the real substantive usefulness of history and maybe the conceptualization of an alternative form of solidarity as a mission of trans-history.

I think that this tentative, interim conclusion in this presentation is somehow shared with the first presentation today when Professor Dudden talked about hope and beautifully presented the three alternative imaginations of nation to cultivate another form, a different form of solidarity from the territorial sovereign national state type.

This is one tentative interim conclusion, but the discussion doesn't stop here because we have the more challenging issue about the posthuman front.

(3) Posthuman Front

Already in the first presentation we have heard the word "Anthropocene", as a new geological moment that measures human impact on the planet, dissolving the dichotomy between nature and society and nature and human, and actually that is the theme of the posthuman turn in humanity, so the impact of the posthuman turn in humanistic disciplines is quite ambiguous, and I will try to think it through in a very basic way to simplify the argument.

1) Humanizing Non-Human

There are two opposing impacts of the posthuman turn. One is relatively positive; it is the expansion of democracy into the non-human agencies, the humanizing of non-humans. Conventionally, modern history assumes that humans are the only subject of history, that humans make history and that non-humans are just materials to be used, to be exploited, by the humans in making history. Actually, the effect of human substance is much more limited, and we are just adapting to the environment and being nudged, pressed and guided by the surrounding substance. Therefore, we should be incorporating all these non-human agencies which contribute to making history, so the posthuman turn actually opens our eyes to those non-human agencies that participate in the making of history.

2) Erasing Historical Fault Lines

This expansion of democracy into non-human agencies is active in humanizing non-humans and opens our perspective when we write or read history, but on the other hand there's another deduction of the impact of the posthuman turn in humanistic disciplines, especially in history, that is the erasing of historical fault lines within humanity. When we talk about the posthuman turn or especially when we are talking about the Anthropocene, we take humanity as a whole, as a kind of single monolithic agent and we erase the fault lines within humanity. As a result, when we speak about the humanity's responsibility over the environment we erase the uneven responsibility that different humans have for example in the case of carbon emissions. Some people may say this is a human responsibility on the planet as a whole, but different groups of people have different responsibilities in the historical record.

In this way, the posthuman turn tends to erase the historical fault lines between the North and South, the East and West, all those historical fault lines within humanity, and these two trends are taking

place at the same time, which means that the ontological distinctions between humans and non-humans are blurred. We must be careful, because if we erase all the historical fault lines in humanity, we may end up dehumanizing humans.

5. The Dissolution of History

There are two opposite deductions from the impact incurred by the posthuman turn in humanistic disciplines and this dichotomous impact repeats itself, so when it is applied to the different fronts of knowledge production or even politics, there are cascades of ramifications. So, if there are two fronts, and in each front this dichotomy repeats itself, it has cascading ramifications.

(1) The Pressure of Naturalism

One of these fronts is related to the pressure of naturalism. The posthuman turn is being informed by the natural science disciplines. While most historians focus on the uniqueness of the particularities in each individual society's experience of history, it has been pointed out that the wider perspective of history is being lost. The resulting gap is now being filled not by historians, but by geologists and evolutionary biologists, natural scientists such as Jared Diamond, author of many popular science books like *The World until Yesterday*, and Yuval Noah Harari, author of *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind*, who wrote not as a historian but utilizing the recent findings of the evolutionary biology as a result of the pressure of naturalism.

The pressure of naturalism helps historians to incorporate the wider (non-human) agencies and an emerging trend is the success of ecological history that is ecological history in a wider sense. I do not mean the ecological history of the earlier period focused on by Marie MacNee, but rather for example the perspective of maritime history, the history from the sea. Actually, Professor Dudden's earlier presentation was a kind of practice of ecological history because it incorporated the non-human agency in multiple layers, the animals and the geological settings and all those different non-human agencies, and came up with three different types of alternative historical imagination. I think that

this is a positive acceptance of the post-human impact on history, but it also entails the dissolution of the (human) history into the longer evolutionary process and erases the human agency. Talking about the application of biology to the politics of hope, and historical imagination as an alternative invites many questions about the Romanticism and conservative humanism and these are all related issues.

If we surrender to the pressure of naturalism and totally erase the human agency, relativizing the position of humanity among the other non-human beings, we will actually devolve history into biology, bringing us to the point of the dissolution of human history into the longer evolutionary process, and then we may end up with extremely dangerous political consequences like the Holocaust.

(2) Writing History from Within

On the second front, the writing of history as an internal measurement, current history is basically dissolving the writer and reader of history and also dissolving the distinction between what is right history and what is written in history. In other words, the position of the writer cannot be found in any place transcendent from the history as such.

If a historian can write history only from within the history itself, writing history can be legitimized only as an internal measurement without any transcendental viewpoint of history. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it can imply the possibility of the radical practice of trans-history, that is that all kinds of agencies are making and writing history at the same time.

Hypothetically, any kind of beings, not only human beings can participate in making and writing history. Of course, this is just a logical extreme but to judge what we are doing we need some logical extreme point from which to measure our reality. But at the opposite extreme

there is a risk of the dissolution of history into an incessant series of emergence.

Professor Dudden mentioned Eric Norman's comment about the status of Okinawa Ryukyu, and history has many critical moments over which the world is completely differently made and remade. If there is no transcendent viewpoint of history and historians can only write history from within the historical events, the historian is contained at the moment that he or she is writing the history. From this perspective we can say that History is re/contained in the present at every moment because there is no transcendental viewpoint. My argument is that if we are totally surrendered to the posthuman turn the posthuman fact is that we may end up with the Evaporation of History as we know it.

Of course, as historians we should counter this tendency and I think that through Professor Dudden's remarks in the first session I have a sense of the real dichotomy between the elaboration of history and the politics of hope.

Thank you very much for listening.

Discussion

Doctor Miwa HIRONO's Remarks

Moderator: Thank you very much Professor Yamashita for a very enthusiastic presentation, and for making the connections between the first session and the second session. Without further ado I would like to turn to Doctor Miwa Hirono from the College of Global Liberal Arts.

Doctor Hirono: Thank you very much Professor Yamashita for your interesting and thought-provoking presentation. The issue you have presented today is both broad and complex, and in my opinion what you are describing here is the abuse of history. Your juxtaposing of history and science was noteworthy, and the diagram that you used illustrated some similarities between them.

In this age of populism, in trans-science, today's populist leaders are trying to create their own science about climate change. Meanwhile, the negative impacts of climate change are appearing, and these impacts are the result of public decision-makers trying to coopt or utilize science for their own benefit, which is very similar to what you have been talking about in trans-history. Therefore, in today's context of popularism the diagram you showed and the similarity between the two is even more salient.

One of the most important points in your presentation is your concept of trans-science and trans-history. You are making the argument that trans-history is taking over from history and you're also trying to promote the idea of an alternative form of solidarity, so I think you are right to focus on this concept of "trans". I would like to comment on the concept of "trans" which you have taken from trans-science and applied to history.

Trans-history as a space for participation, a space for democratization in the form of science cafes, history cafes, and consensus conferences is really interesting, but when you talk about democracy and participation, the concept itself varies a lot. Einstein wrote an article in 1969 in the field of development and he categorized responsive participation as having nine levels, starting from information dissemination. At the very top of the ladder there is empowerment, and in between there is the dubious practice of asking a question when you already know the answer in order because you are trying to guide people to a certain answer. So, from the top to the bottom of the spectrum there is a huge array of different ways of participating in the creation of knowledge.

The first question I have is about this concept of "trans" history. When you're advocating this alternative force of solidarity, what kind of participation are you talking about? Certainly, you are not talking about information dissemination; it's more a deficit model. So, to what extent can we talk about empowerment as participation, and participation as empowerment, when we talk about trans-history? In other words, to what extent can this trans-history space be a bottom-up process in the real sense that it brings power?

Let's look at the example of civic engagement in social history or the history of the environment of the people who are participating in the creation of history. What about something people don't feel so close to, like the history of Space or the history of the World? To give you an example, anyone can talk about the history of their grandfather, and participate in the creation of knowledge around their grandfather, but without possessing the historical expertise it's very difficult to meaningfully participate in the creation of knowledge about the history of the World. So, my first question is, "To what extent can this trans-space you describe be truly empowering to people, not just something that seems to be democratizing?" That's the concept side of the question.

This leads us to a really huge question about the role of the university. The university is filled with experts, so when we talk about the creation of knowledge, "What is the role of the university?" And even before that question, "What is the role of democracy in the creation of knowledge?" In your abstract you mentioned this tension between expertise and democracy. This is a very interesting and yet controversial point. Having expertise is great, and each of us in this room has expertise of some particular area, but how can it be democratic? Are democracy and expertise always opposites? How can these two co-exist?

My second question is about the method. "How do you actually do it?" The history cafe and the *school-kai*, this "trans" state that you mentioned were extremely interesting.

When I received the kind invitation from Prof. Mun to participate in this discussion, I asked him what I should say today. He said I should talk about my own view of history. To illustrate this, I would like to introduce an interesting episode that I recently experienced.

Last November I went to a conference in the Philippines for the first time and I wanted to learn about the history of the Japanese occupation, so I went to Corregidor Island where America and Japan fought. At the end of the war 6,000 Japanese soldiers committed suicide in the Malinta Tunnel. I participated in a guided tour. We took a ferry to the island and rode a bus to the tunnel where the Japanese people committed suicide and died. The guided tour I joined was conducted in English, but there were many Japanese tourists who were with a Japanese speaking guide. My guide didn't realize that I was Japanese, as I was speaking English. He must have thought that all his customers were not Japanese, so he started to tell some jokes about Kamikaze and all those things that in Japanese society seem to be taboo.

Then he said something quite revealing: "Look we have one history, but two interpretations of history; we are giving you this tour, but those

Japanese over there are hearing a different version of history. That guy has to talk about Japanese war heroes". It was really interesting because Japanese people probably come to this place trying to study the history, but in this business model, they want Japanese who participate in this tour to hear good stories about Japan and the sacrifice that Japan had to make, not necessarily about the sacrifice of the Filipinos.

The reason I'm mentioning this is that if this is public education, if this is an example of the "trans-state", what exactly are we talking about? In this day and age, the business aspect is always there, so people want to sell the history that people want to hear. I don't know who started this war story business in the Philippines, dividing people into different types of tour, but when I was looking at your slides and listening to your presentation I thought, "What really is trans-history? It's certainly very different from the point about solidarity, because it's dividing people." Unfortunately, at the end of the day we live in this world of business and I think the business aspect is important in this history discussion.

I'd like to mention another really interesting point. It's not really related to your issue but another shocking thing I saw was lots of pictures of what happened on Corregidor Island. One of the pictures was of Japanese soldiers throwing a baby in the air and then killing it by stabbing it with a bayonet. I was horrified and told a Filipino man that what I had learned in my history textbooks about this episode was really different from actually being there and seeing all those atrocities. He said, "Oh you're Japanese aren't you?" and I said, "Yes", so he explained: "O well you don't have to worry about that because the guide who is doing that is actually Korean". I was shocked and thought. "What is he assuming?" I was quite alarmed and so I exclaimed, "What do you mean 'don't worry'"? The people who are doing that are Japanese soldiers, so why do you make a distinction?" He couldn't really conceptualize what I was expressing so he just walked on ahead.

The point I am illustrating here is that this kind of business-focused rendition of history is going on and so in that reality, “What can we do to ensure the acceptable dissemination of trans-history?”

The second point is regarding the method. How do we do this? We can talk about usefulness to humanity and solidarity, but the business aspect is always there, and many people only listen to what they want to hear, so in that reality, “What is a good method that you would advocate?”

My final point is that I work on China, and so when I heard your phrase “campaign against established knowledge”, which was the starting point of your discussion, I thought about China. Your diagram showing history versus hegemony formation in the context of authoritarian states like China is very useful, but in that kind of context it’s difficult for experts to say what they really want to say. Your discussion is based on the assumption that we live in a democratic society, but as you rightly said we are seeing the return of authoritarianism, we see a lot of authoritarian states who do create history so, “What does that mean for this diagram?”

Another trend we are seeing is the rise of religious extremism, and during your discussion on posthuman thought I was thinking that their idea of human nature is radically different from secular people, so maybe that might be another trend to consider. It’s already becoming a complicated subject, but to find satisfactory answers we need to go beyond the typical democratic society and think about different contexts such as authoritarian states and places where religious extremism is taking place.

I apologize for my wide-ranging comments but there are many aspects to this topic. I’m looking forward to your answers to my questions.

Professor Hiroyuki TOSA's Remarks

Moderator: Thank you for your comments and questions. The next discussant is Professor Hiroyuki Tosa of Kobe University.

Professor Tosa: Thank you for your exciting stimulating discussion. First of all, I'm curious and interested in the way in which Professor Yamashita tried to introduce the deficit model into history communication. First of all, let me comment about his diagram. Relating to the first speaker, Professor Dudden's point about the dividing line, maybe the demos is not really homogeneous in the context of Japanese. As you know there is some controversy about our historical past, and recently I read a very interesting book titled *Historical Sociologies of the Right-Wing from 1990 to 2000*, by Ito Masaki. Now according to him, there are two kinds among the lay people, one is the regional civic citizen *shimin*, and the other is the *shomin*, which is the right-wing people. Around 1995 the *shomin* formed a network with right-wing politicians like Abe and Aso and their people, and the *shimin* were manipulated like pawns by propaganda. This kind of thinking can lead to sexism, racial discrimination, and so on.

Actually, there is a huge discrepancy, between the two opposing wings, and it seems to be closely related to how we appropriate the logic of the cultural references. We should pay attention to the way the lay people sometimes apply the historical positivist message to counter civic historical education. Take the example of Yoshida Shoin[3]; that's one way in which the right-wing sometimes selectively applies the historical positivist method arbitrarily. Perhaps we should pay more

[3] Yoshida Shōin (September 20, 1830 - November 21, 1859), was one of Japan's most distinguished intellectuals of the Tokugawa shogunate. He influenced the Meiji Restoration.

attention to that kind of thing. In addition, there can be a structural transformation of the lay peoples' historical understanding. Maybe some of you remember the Tamogami controversy[4] around 2007-2008 that pushed the Comintern conspiracy theory[5]. It was so called faked history, but some right-wing lay people began to believe in such faked history. That kind of thing also can be noticed even in the past times. Another example is climate denial. People tend to deny the facts if it feels uncomfortable because it doesn't fit their own belief system. Take the case for example of the Evangelists, they still deny Darwinism. So, in this sense maybe we cannot use this scenario of trans-science and trans-history.

My point is that the real problem is how to persuade the people who reject the past because of their own beliefs. Democratizing, as you mentioned might continue to produce some solutions, but sometimes the democratizing process, on the contrary contributes to negative outcomes such as the climate denialists and the historical revisionists. An outcome of the democratic process in the cyberspace is that it can contribute to that kind of democratizing process.

So how do we overcome these difficulties? That's a big question. That's the first question, and maybe those kinds of things are closely related to the future, the present and the past. Today the younger generation has lost their future, and history has become a battlefield for political studies, even for the right-wing. We can notice a similar situation in Japanese society. Actually, history is the main battlefield.

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[4] Toshio Tamogami, a member of Nippon Kaigi, argued on October 31, 2008 that "it is a false accusation to say (Japan) was an aggressor nation" during World War II and that it was rather drawn into the war.

[5] Tamogami argued that Japan was drawn into the Sino-Japanese War by the Chinese Nationalists who were manipulated by the Soviet-controlled agency known as the *Comintern*.

So, to observe the infield we must start with the main field, the *Shusenjo*[6] in the physical landscape.

That's my first comment and the second comment or question is the empiric polemical and complex point about post human. Actually, we cannot see the divide, and the majority still cling to so-called centrism - maybe 99%, but some, like the increasing number of young climate activists are trying to push for anti- or post-anthropocentrism. It is still very difficult to expand anthropocentrism because most of the religions, including Islam, Christianity, and most of the religious doctrines situate the human being as the sole master of this universe, so how can we persuade these people to accept the post-anthropocentric idea or argument? It's very difficult.

I have another question or comment. Some students of science are trying to apply or to co-opt environmental history, as global history, world history, like Jason Moore for example. Maybe it seems to be possible to expound the non-human in global history but the theoretical problem is how to overcome the problem of the dissolution of dualism. Theoretically, we must dissolve the dualism between nature and culture but after the dissolution of nature and culture it is quite impossible to apply some social science methodology. For example, some orthodox Marxist scholars pointed out that weakness, so you are just throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

There is no analytical clarity. At the individual level it's possible, as for example in the case of famous scholars such as Timothy Morton, one of the object-oriented ontological philosophers, who is interested in Buddhism. The teaching of Dogen philosophy is located in the dissolution of purity. Well, a Zen master can learn the dissolution of purity, but how can the majority of the people accept the argument? Yes, it is also very difficult. That's my comment and my question.

[6] *Shusenjo* meaning "main battlefield" is a film by Miki Dezaki on the comfort women issue.

Professor YAMASHITA's Response

Moderator: Professor Yamashita, would you like to respond?

Professor Yamashita: Quite frankly it's beyond my capacity to answer all your questions in the best way but I'll try. To answer the first question from Doctor Hirono about participation, I'm referring to the political theory of democracy when I'm talking about trans-science, and participation is conceptualized as opposed to parliamentary democracy and what is important for participatory democracy is deliberation. So trans-science and trans-history are just labels for the domains, they're not the method or practices, just domains. In the field of trans-science, and I believe also in the domain of trans-history, there is participation which introduces deliberation. This is a guideline for better practice in the domain of trans-history or trans-science. What is important in deliberation is not just to communicate; the value of deliberation is changing the preference of each participant. Participants understood the parochial nature of their own fixed preferences and found that they had been transformed, something was different, a new subject with a different set of preferences.

This partly answers the second question about the people who only listen to what they want to hear and also the business aspect, but we have to keep market moralism away from the domain of trans-science and trans-history to make the deliberation robust, and because in market moralism the preference of the consumer has to be consistent. Here again the main benefit in the domain of trans-science and trans-history was expected to be deliberation through which each participant could experience a transformation of his or her own preferences and for that the market moralism of neoliberalism has to be kept away from that domain. That is how I would briefly answer that question.

Regarding the third question about that diagram and the authoritarian regime, the argument about trans-science assumes some sort of liberal democracy so we need some additional twist if we are to apply this argument to an authoritarian regime and at this moment I don't know what to do. However, Professor Tosa pointed out that there is no essential difference between trans-science and distributive history but I think the issue is not the distinction between science and history, because the scientific expert in the field of ecology resembles the history model rather than the science model this model rather than this model (pointing to diagram shown on page 64), because they are considered as not useful for capital or for power. So, the substantial dividing line is not between science and history as such but their usefulness from the viewpoint of the political power. I think this may partly answer the philosophy of the third question and Professor Tosa's first question, but as to the persistence of anthropocentrism, Professor Tosa's second point, I am not sure how a monotheistic civilization reacts to the posthuman turn, but the posthuman thrust in humanistic discipline does not only come from the awareness of the ecological crisis but also from the technological advancement.

We are becoming more and more like cyborgs. For example, I can't write any article without a keyboard. Of course, I am not a cyborg with a keyboard grafted in, but in my opinion human beings are essentially cyborgs from the 21st century if you think about the essence of a human in past time. In that sense some people take anthropocentrism as an ideology, or some kind of theme but I personally do not think that the persistence of anthropocentrism is such a solid thing. The more important point about the second question is the analytical powerlessness of epistemological monotheism. I am actually translating Jason Moore's book at the moment. Monotheism, which denies the ontological distinction between nature and society, does not deny the expert modes of knowledge production in each kind of thing.

It just tells us to follow the network of each being, human or non-human and to stick to the internal measurement. But the truth of the internal measurement can be various. The mainstream Marxists often accused Jason Moore and other monotheists of political thought by obscuring the analytical expert, but I'm defending Jason Moore's point.

Questions and Comments

Moderator: Now the floor is open. Any other comments from anyone?

Questioner 1: It seems that within the room there's a bit of tension over how to relate history to the Anthropocene, because one of the issues with the Anthropocene is that once we think about the Anthropos, we can't depoliticize all the issues and also we tend to forget about the uneven responsibility that people must think about given the uneven sense of the agency disparity. Men tend to have more agency than women in different races so the moment we select men there's a feature. On the other hand, when we try to stick to the humanist notion of history, we end up politicizing because everything is political.

In terms of the deliberation that you mentioned about how to guide the masses it seems to me that you are hinging on this enlightenment notion of gradually offering even access. But the moment you said there's good direction and bad direction that seems to already presuppose that there's the right kind of talking about history and the wrong kind. This denies the masses ability to democratically engage with historical understanding and knowledge because you're presupposing good knowledge and bad knowledge. I'm thinking of Hannah Arendt's article about truth and politics where she says the truth is anti-political because if there's only one truth it's not subject to deliberation. That becomes a matter of a divide between the philosophers with their solitary thinking and the demos, the masses which need to be enlightened. So, in short, I'm not really convinced about your idea of deliberation and what it really means to democratize history.

Professor Yamashita: Let me explain that when I use the words "good" and "bad" my hypothesis is about defending the value of humanities as

a whole. When I use the word "bad" I'm implying that in this direction we are destroying the humanities and we are denying or totally erasing away the humanities if we follow that logic to the extreme. And when I use the word "good" it implies the opposite, so it's just a shorthand for my dissertation on the dichotomy on each side of the argument.

Basically, I'm pointing out the quite heavy and powerful trends of the elaboration of history but I am not saying that it leads history to be ambivalent. Against that trend of the erasing of history, we need to find a way to retain the place of humanity. That's the message behind my presentation and an explanation of my usage of "good" and "bad" directions.

Professor Dudden: Thank you for your presentation. I completely agree. We all have a lot of work to do if we don't want to romanticize or shall I say beautify history, and also recognize that history does have a value. And maybe it doesn't. Even if you evaporate something there's always something that matters in the evaporated crystal, isn't there? (This is why Fukushima's water should not be evaporated.) But I like very much Doctor Hirono and Professor Tosa's comments too, especially when Doctor Hirono talked about the trans-space as a place of empowerment, and Tosa-sensei introduced the film *Shusenjo*, Miki Dezaki's masterpiece. He's not quite the demos that we're talking about, because he used knowledge but it wasn't an accredited knowledge, which is why to make the film *Shusenjo* he was able to get those very extreme views on film as a form of communication and achieved what he achieved.

I wish we could all make film because it's a very successful medium for conveying debate, for conveying ideas and maybe the world is shifted. For many people their phone is how much their going to read, which brings me to the problem of the social value of the university professor and the place of the university. Those of you who

are students are accruing value in society by the more degrees that you are obtaining right?

However, there is the open wild free space of the unregulated internet which has its own. I think Tessa Morris-Suzuki already in 2004 called it the "gladiatorial space", because you could say anything and kill anybody and it didn't really matter; but still to this day if you want your voice to be heard about the topic of history you have to be a university accredited historian valued by an already valued print media. You know what we are talking about here. To get a really big point about history across from the Asahi Shimbun or the New York Times you have to be a university professor of history, or you have to have published a really successful history book.

So, if we're trying to encourage a broader space, where do we target it? How do we make the history cafe not something that's just a lot of fun in Sendai? And I'm not putting it down because I think it's a great idea, but it reminds me of the cartoon Peanuts. Lucy the black-haired girl was playing the psychiatrist, and she set up her psychiatrist stand and charged a few cents and that was hilarious. But how do we have the history cafe? Or the psychiatrist's cafe? But at the same time, it has the same weight as the Asahi Shimbun historian who's accredited by Ritsumeikan?

Professor Yamashita: Well my presentation today is grossly schematized and there's a long gradation of public engagement in making a live history. Even in this diagram I do not erase the domain of history proper. It's the darker blue oval, and actually the way to trans-history is becoming heavier and heavier, and at this moment, in the current circumstances it seems that trans-history is overwhelming history proper, but I'm not saying the history proper disappears. There's a trend to deliberation which implies the disappearance of that dark oval (Diagram on page 64) of the history domain but I am not saying that the

dark oval disappears. If there's no expertise, there is no meaning to exchanging views about history. I emphasize the value of deliberation through which each participant has to change. That means the different participants have to have the different strengths and the academic historical expertise is one of the strengths which can be appreciated, and which can be utilized to enhance the transforming power of deliberation. So when I'm saying that trans-history is already history and that there is a trend of the evolution history, I am not saying that history is disappearing, and I'm not saying that the historic thesis is becoming useless - actually it's useful but it has to find the place to be appreciated as useful, that's what I am saying.

Questioner 2: Thank you very much. I am not a student of this area, so I have too much to digest from your delicious meals. I always describe a researcher as a cook who makes ingredients to cook or produce some kind of meal. I feel from Professor Yamashita's presentation a sensation that we need to consider our responsibility for history in general. I found this diagram very interesting, not because it connects science with history, but rather because it doesn't. It's just putting them in contrast. Now, I want to go back one step before this to history and science in the first place. History could be called a truth, while if we look to science or if we look to what was considered to be science one-hundred years ago, there are too many things that were considered to be truth and they have been proven to be wrong. However, for history we have the ultimate truth always, because it's history, so nothing can be changed.

Then, we have a very difficult problem to deal with. We are dealing with too many layers like the people who are telling the history and the people who are receiving the history. My question here concerns the people who are telling the history, because most of the time history has been written by people from the perspective of the strong people, not

the people who were conquered by them, at least in the past. Now through technology and social media anyone can contribute to writing history. In the past, history was more or less the history of the victors. How can we deal with this issue? My second question is how to deal with the facts of history today in examples such as Professor Tosa already mentioned where history has been misused or abused by radical religious groups? Most of the radical religious groups support what they are doing by their interpretation of history. How do we deal with this issue?

Professor Yamashita: Actually, overcoming the history written by the powerful and victorious has been the long and persistent concern of modern history as a scientific discipline. They have been trying to overcome the triumphalism, to overcome this weak interpretation of history.

One corner in which history legitimized itself as a scientific discipline is what the Kantian philosophers call ideographic epistemology as opposed to nomothetic epistemology which is the epistemology in which the mission of science is confined to the governing law, and idiographic epistemology legitimizes the scientific activity in locating the uniqueness of each event. In the latter 19th century, history defined itself to be an idiographic scientific discipline and they tried to figure out a systematized method to identify and locate the uniqueness of the fact. That gave historic activity an affinity with the particularistic approach to the history, and that partly ended up with the naturalist thrust against history, and I'm not directly answering your question but to better conduct history in the domain of trans-history, I think we need to open up the historical discipline from the containment of idiographic epistemology and to incorporate the wider perspective from the nomothetic approaches to history, with which to counter the posthuman turn on humanistic disciplines.

So, my answer is twofold. One is making the modern discipline of history a process of overcoming history written by the powerful, but then we will end up confining history to idiographic epistemology, and that makes history relatively vulnerable to the posthuman thrust so in that sense we need to open up the epistemology for historical reconsideration. That's my tentative answer.

Professor Kosugi: Well, I'd like to ask a question to both keynote speakers. Regarding the doctrine of enlightenment and the subject of history as commodity, skepticism about the endeavors of historians goes with any kind of interpretation which pleases the people. That's the basic trend of nationalism, remaking history as national. On the other hand the global history discourses as I understand from today's speeches have a dehumanizing element, making it global, making a demarcation between the human and nonhuman worlds, and when the global history discourses started I had a hope that it would deconstruct world history which I felt was basically made by the triumphant powers. Some of this was achieved but the mainstream is not in that direction. So now we are caught between the evaporation of history, between the globalizing dehumanizing tendency, and the renationalizing tendency. Apparently, discourses of history within national boundaries have a usefulness or value as a commodity.

Now when Professor Dudden showed her slide showing the map of the shape of our country, it was the first time I had seen it and I found it quite shocking. That kind of idea about talking about the shape of the country's history ignores what happened on the other side of the border. In this place where we are engaged in Asia-Japan Research, we often think of Asian history as a kind of common history which Asian countries can share. I am sure that they are not in complete agreement but there are things which we can share and by having a common perspective of history as a group of nations we may reconstruct the

hegemonic world history so that we believe it serves more globally. However, between the split in these two different tendencies, more nationalizing again, or dehumanizing globalizing, can we have such a vision, as a hope for our research endeavors?

Professor Dudden: I really like how Professor Kosugi has said that the shape of Japan ignores the other side of the border. I think when we look at a number of trends; you could mention the local level, like Okinawa, to look at the local view in the Imperial outpost, rather just the metropolis and the colony. For example, to do the history of India from a port city back to the British Empire, rather than what the British Empire brought to the port city. I do think there are a number of encouraging trends in this regard. Professor Yamashita mentioned the value of history in the nineteenth century in creating the concept of the nation-state and we have spent the last hundred years trying to tear that down. We're trying to revalue history in order to denationalize the nation-state to make it more encompassing.

Here I think of the question: Why do so many voices that have been erased want to be included in national history? I encounter this when I speak with former sex slaves, former victims; these are people who do not want to be left out of Japanese history. So, the map that Watanabe Miwa and the people's museum created of all of the comfort stations is an effort to be part of Japan's history, and it's that the more complex it gets the more tension there is. As an American I will later send an email of a new initiative by a lawyer named Brian Stevenson, who has a new project on lynching. A new museum opened last year, and he has a feature film right now in the US called "Just Mercy", and this is an effort to give names to those bodies that were lynched and say this is American history. He's not trying to say that this is African American history, but that this is American history and I think it's making the face of the nation much more problematic. Again, as historians, we're doing

what we can, because you're absolutely right to say that the forces of darkness are really powerful.

Professor Tosa ended with the comment "We want to have hope". But how do we have hope? It is very difficult right now. We know what we're up against and my president decided just yesterday that my country doesn't even need a justice department. He's just announced that he is a dictator and it's okay!

Am I powerless against this? No! My weapon is pretty weak right now, but I will try. I know that I sound silly, and rather like a politician, but we have to be as active as we can within the limits of what we can do. We have pretty good constitutions so we've got to fight for those and I think that's where there's a lot of work for all of us to do, That's all I have to say except that I think bringing the other side of the border into the national history is precisely what my responsibility is.

Professor Yamashita: Well against Professor Tosa I argued the skepticism about the persistence of anthropocentrism but on the other hand I'm suspecting that we still think about solidarity based on spatial imagination. There's also the concept of networks and long-distance nationalism, although they are novel concepts, but we are still quite bound by the spatial foundation when we are thinking about solidarity. Professor Kosugi's picture is divided between the global history and the national/renationalized history, but perhaps we should find a third way because this dichotomy is deeply embedded in the spatial imagination of solidarity. So, in that sense, I really appreciate Professor Dudden's presentation today because her version of a maritime perspective may have potential for reforming our land-based spatial imagination when we are thinking about solidarity. There is a different logic, a different dynamism about forming and reforming solidarity in the ocean, so in that sense Professor Kosugi's final question, coming full circle to the first presentation is a good point to wrap up this discussion.

Moderator: Thank you very much. You have certainly wrapped up with a good point and I think this is the end of the second session.

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