

Chapter 2

On the Mediatization of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1921–1928

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1. Introduction

The focus of this chapter is on the so-called Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of Information, the “Gaimushō Jōhōbu” in Japanese, which was a propaganda and information management institution for the Ministry that existed between 1920 and 1940. In my doctoral research, I asked the question of whether this institution was a significant institutional addition to the ministry’s structure in the 1920s or not.

The reason I asked this question is because existing literature generally sees the structure of this department as having been compromised and lacking in impact on Japan’s foreign relations in the 1920s. To an extent, there is truth to this characterization: the Department of Information did not have all that extensive of an institutional jurisdiction within the Ministry at large. However, I argue in this chapter that this department’s creation in 1920 was nonetheless an important institutional step forward for the MOFA’s propaganda, information-management and public diplomacy-capabilities.

2. Theoretical Framework

To support my argument, I will use the so-called “framework of the mediatization of diplomacy” by a researcher named James Pamment (2014, 2015). The basic argument of this framework is that in order for a

diplomatic institution to be able to send out an effective and convincing diplomatic messaging or improve its capability to do so, it needs to evolve and grow three major aspects of its institutional structure.

Pamment calls them the “dimensions of the mediatization of diplomacy.” Summarized briefly, the first of them is the “internalization” dimension, which involves starting and maintaining a “hub of media expertise” centrally within the diplomatic institution. The idea is that this hub gives advice to other parts of the institution and centrally steers the diplomatic messaging of the institution as a whole.

The second dimension is the “semiotic dimension,” which refers to the idea that the aforementioned “hub of media experts” will do analysis of foreign media spheres and will try to identify the logics by which it perceives these media to function. Then, it bases its communication policies on these findings.

The third dimension is the so-called “building blocks of information” aspect, which means that this “hub of media experts” gives out “building blocks of information,” basic elements of the messaging, to the various exponents of the diplomatic institution, such as foreign delegations. These building blocks are then to be used as the basis for diplomatic messaging by the various international spokes of the diplomatic institution.

This final aspect is important because Pamment’s framework operates under the assumption that diplomatic messaging needs to be consistent in content in order to be effective. The consistency aspect is said to be more important than its being adapted to the very specific context about which messaging is being sent out.

If these three theoretical dimensions were found to apply to the case of the Department, it would show that the Department fits into a longer and stereotypical progression of the growth of the propaganda and diplomatic messaging capabilities of such institutions. This would then, in turn, support the notion that the Department’s creation in the

1920s, as well as its activities and the institutional process of learning about engaging with foreign media, were all necessary steppingstones towards the more powerful communication management institutions of the Japanese state which came into being in the 1930s and during the Second World War. If that is true, then it follows that the department was, in fact, more significant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' structure than its humble image among the extant literature would imply. That is my fundamental argument in this chapter.

3. The Work of the Department of Information

I would like to concentrate on three important diplomatic events in this chapter. These are respectively the Washington Conference (1921–1922), the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1924 in the United States, and the Ji'nan Incident (May 1928). However, rather than exhaustively describing these events themselves, I instead wish to focus on the aspects of the growth of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that were either exemplified or facilitated by the Department of Information in each of these cases. I will refer to these aspects as the three “vectors of growth.”

(1) Background to the Washington Conference

The first of these vectors is seen in the Washington conference. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been actively trying to create more effective and systematic propaganda and public diplomacy messaging structures since the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). It had already begun to pay attention to the impact of foreign communications on Japan's international image in the 1890s, but its efforts on this front became more pronounced during the Russo-Japanese war.

The most important initiative the Ministry undertook was probably the creation of two news agencies, Kokusai News Agency and Tōhō News Agency, which were both created in 1914. However, ministry officials in the 1910s, in general, considered these agencies to have been failures. The Seimukyoku, the Bureau of Governmental Affairs, in 1919 wrote a report saying that the news agencies were ineffective because there was a lack of institutional knowledge about foreign media within the Ministry, and that this lack of knowledge needed to be remedied if officials were going to create more powerful propaganda institutions.

In general, existing literature about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' propaganda capabilities defines the Ministry's approach to foreign media as having been largely ad hoc and reactive before 1920. For instance, if a piece of anti-Japanese rhetoric appeared in foreign media, a foreign legation would try to suppress or delegitimize it of its own accord. Methods for this included bribing those who were espousing the anti-Japanese messaging or sending out counter-propaganda. However, there was little centralized guidance or centralized directive emanating out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on how to proactively and consistently promote Japan's cause with communication abroad. There were some cases where this did happen, but in general, the Japanese propaganda approach was very reactive and passive in nature.

However, during the First World War, a consciousness arose within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that propaganda should not just be reactive but should instead be proactive. The Ministry realized it should create a comprehensive blanket of pro-Japanese messaging that preemptively countered the anti-Japanese rhetoric that might potentially come out in the future. In other words, propaganda should take the form of a generalized pro-Japanese messaging, as opposed to merely being a reaction to individual pieces of criticism of Japan.

(2) Paris Peace Conference (1919)

The Paris Peace Conference took place in 1919, and Japan was initially one of the big five at the Conference. The Conference made clear that diplomats worldwide would need to embrace the tenets of the so-called “new diplomacy.” Engaging with the mass public and informing it on matters of international relations had by then become very important for diplomatic institutions. However, while the Japanese delegation to the Conference did have a small press office in Paris, hardly any photographic material of the delegates was distributed to the international press, and the Japanese largely avoided engaging with the foreign press. This press office would give out statements but there was very little content to them. This was one of the characteristics of the Japanese participation in the Paris Peace Conference.

(3) Washington Conference (1921)

In many ways, the Washington Conference in 1921–1922 was a continuation of the Paris Peace Conference. Prior to this conference, in 1920, the Japanese Cabinet had established the Department of Information within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was a chance for the Ministry to improve upon its lack of mass public-facing communication efforts at the Paris Peace Conference.

This department undertook various initiatives to support public diplomacy efforts at the conference. It worked with US newspapers and tried to get statements by Ministry officials onto their pages. It succeeded in doing so in the case of the newspaper *New York World*, for instance, getting a full statement by the head of the department of information printed. It also undertook other types of activities, such as sending Japanese civilians to the conference with the idea of projecting

a positive image of the Japanese citizenry to the outside world.

The department conducted a daily analysis of the US newspapers and monitored public opinion. Alongside this, it began editing and preparing drafts to be presented at daily press conferences in the ministry headquarters, aiming to influence newspaper correspondents in Tokyo to promote Japan's cause. These press conferences were often led by department officials, but sometimes also featured the foreign minister or other highly placed officials.

(4) Failing to Produce a Comprehensive Propaganda Strategy

The Department of Information was started in 1920 with the intent of having a central institution that centrally guided the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' propaganda and messaging strategies. It is, therefore, logical to expect that such a department would create an overarching propaganda plan for the Washington conference. However, I have not really found any evidence that the Department managed to produce such a full-fledged plan. One notable archival document I have found in this sense is a telegram from the Department to the consulates in China from September 1921, in which the Department ordered these consulates to start preparing as many propaganda drafts as they could in preparation for the conference.

This was two months before the Washington Conference. The China-based consulates were told to send out as many propaganda texts as possible throughout the conference. The Department noted in this telegram that this was to be an attempt to step away from the previous reactive propaganda approach and that the Ministry wished to be more preemptive in its communication by sending out a saturated blanket of proactive and pro-Japanese messaging.

However, the plan did not offer any detail beyond this, so it cannot be considered a fully realized propaganda plan telling every part of the

Ministry exactly what they needed to do for the Washington Conference.

(5) First Vector of Growth Experienced by the Department

Now, we come to what I call the first vector of growth exhibited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its public diplomacy communications. While the Department did not deliver a revolutionary new approach to public diplomacy at the Washington Conference for the Ministry, there was now a much stronger intention to focus on this aspect and try to engage with the international press, as compared to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The cumulative effect of these efforts was significant. The Department itself sought to prove as much by conducting an analysis of US newspapers' rhetoric on Japan at the Washington Conference.

The conclusion of this report by the Department was that, especially towards the end of the conference in February, the perception of the Japanese delegation was relatively positive among the major nations and certainly was far more positive than it had been at the end of the Paris Peace Conference. Therefore, the appraisal by the Department of its own activities was that the Japanese Ministry had communicated with the foreign press and the mass public much more effectively than it had done in Paris.

The Department's holding of press conferences, working with foreign newspapers, and its orders to the Chinese legations to produce propaganda drafts may all be interpreted as expressions of the "internalization dimension" of the mediatization of diplomacy. In performing these actions, the Department was acting as a hub of media expertise that was trying to centrally steer the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' messaging. Its daily analysis of US public opinion, on the other hand, corresponds to the "semiotic dimension," because the Department

tried to shape its messaging on the basis of the public opinion that it perceived in these newspapers.

The first vector of growth, therefore, lay in the much-increased investment by the Ministry in such activities between the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference.

4. The US Immigration Act of 1924

On the July 1, 1924, a federal law went into effect in the US that had a small clause attached to it which almost entirely banned Japanese immigration to the US. This law would continue to exist for decades until the 1950s.

The matter of Japanese immigration to the US had been a point of contention between the two nations since the first years of the twentieth century. Japan had been trying to dissuade the US government from limiting Japanese immigration via various negotiations and initiatives. Despite this, in 1924, a law banning Japanese immigration was enacted. Both to Japanese officials and to the general population, this symbolized the perceived discrimination they underwent at the hands of the other major powers. The ability of Japanese citizens to emigrate freely was seen as a measure of the geopolitical standing of the Japanese Empire. Thus, it follows that it was important for Japan to defend this right in order to uphold its international image.

(1) Shidehara Kijūrō's Anti-Propaganda Stance

It was the Department of Information's mission to try to point out the discriminatory and unjust aspects of this law to the international public. However, there was an obstacle in the form of an extremely prominent Japanese diplomat, Shidehara Kijūrō, who had been

ambassador to the US and would become Japan's foreign minister in the summer of 1924. He strongly objected to directing pro-Japanese propaganda towards the US. In 1920, he had already staunchly opposed a proposal by the Department of Information's Second Division to start a new news agency that would focus on sending propaganda to the US.

Shidehara, who was still the Japanese ambassador to the US at that time, strongly advised against starting such an agency, stating that the US State Department was very sensitive to any foreign messaging which was perceived as influencing domestic American public opinion. He categorically stated that if any communication was to be sent by the Department to the US, it should only amount to un-editorialized data or photos.

The head of the Second Division of the Department, Matsuoka Yōsuke, who had proposed the establishment of this news agency, was very critical of Shidehara's objections. He claimed that Shidehara's plan for propaganda was effectively to have no propaganda at all, which was a problem for Matsuoka because he was in charge of performing propaganda towards the US. However, Shidehara's stance was ultimately followed, and the Department would refrain from sending overly blatant propaganda to the US during the 1920s.

Four years later, the crisis in US-Japan relations surrounding the anti-immigration act would follow, and the Department now had to find ways to get around the limitation that it should not send blatant propaganda to the US. It tried to adapt itself in two ways. The first was that instead of news propaganda and news articles that contained propaganda, it focused on supporting oral propaganda lectures. The second was that they tried to make their public diplomacy publications more assertive from 1924 onwards.

(2) The Department's Work in Response to the Immigration Crisis



For several years Mr. M. T. Yamamoto, as representative of Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, has been dividing his time between America, Europe, and the Orient. He is speaking frankly to promote a better understanding between American people and the people of Japan. He has lived in America long enough to have a thorough knowledge of American Institutions and American Ideals.

Recently Mr. Yamamoto took an extensive trip to England, France, and Germany. Last year he visited Siberia, China, and Japan. He is thoroughly equipped to deal with the live, burning problems of the day.

Figure 1. News report of Yamamoto Minosaku

Source: Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan [Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 'Yamamoto Minosaku Raishin' [Incoming Letter from Yamamoto Minosaku], Yamamoto Minosaku to Komura Kin'ichi, March 26, 1926. JACAR Ref.: B03040731200, p. 133.

Figure 1 shows Yamamoto Minosaku, a Japanese person who went around the US giving pro-Japanese lectures. He was supported financially in this by the Department, and the latter provided him with materials with which to assemble his lectures. In 1924, these lamented the US Immigration Act and the discrimination of the Japanese people that it institutionalized.

Regarding its focus on publications, the Department published all kinds of bulletins and one-off edited volumes, as well as collections of the Ministry's statements throughout the 1920s. Before 1924, the main publication was a magazine called *Kokusai Jijō*, and there was also a collection of ministry statements called *Gaimushō Kōhyōshū*.

However, these early publications were rather restrained in their formats. They consisted largely of enumerations of dry statistics and

featured very little editorializing. Before 1924, *Gaimushō Kōhyōshū* contained only public diplomatic documents and actively avoided having content that was related to unresolved or sensitive diplomatic issues.

1) On the “The Establishment of the Immigration Act of 1924...” Volumes

However, with the arrival of the immigration crisis, this tone changed, because the Ministry needed to not only convince the Japanese domestic public that it had done all it could to stop this law from becoming a reality, but also to convince the US public that this law was unjust and should be repealed. The Ministry, therefore, very rapidly produced a two-volume set of books called *The Establishment of the Immigration Act of 1924 and The Process of US-Japanese Negotiations Related to This Matter*, both in English and Japanese.

The Department, which had been publishing diplomatic document collections in the years prior, played a key role in this process, selecting the documents and producing the books. The volumes were produced in just two months to have their publication coincide with the enactment of the law in July 1924, and it was decided that the English version of this should be used as propaganda materials by the foreign legations.

These books most notably contained confidential correspondence between Ambassador to the US Hanihara Masanao and Secretary of State Charles Hughes, in which the latter agreed that the clause banning Japanese immigration to the US was unjust and should be prevented from being enacted. The very swift and assertive publication of these volumes was considered a victory within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it was decided by the Shidehara-led Ministry that publications in this format would become a pillar of the Ministry’s public diplomacy strategy going forward. This represented a major shift in approach to these Department publications.

2) On the Diplomatic Magazine *Kaigai Jihō*

One can see this same increased tendency in assertiveness in the department's bi-monthly diplomatic bulletin called *Kaigai Jihō*, which was published from 1924 until 1926. Having carefully studied the department's three diplomatic bulletins, *Kokusai Jijō* (1920–1926), *Kaigai Jihō* (1924–1926), and *Kokusai Jihō* (1926–1929), I found that *Kaigai Jihō* was far more assertive and editorialized in tone than the other two publications. As an example of this, in June 1925, *Kaigai Jihō* contained an alleged article by a certain Frank Wolf, translated by the Department of Information. I have been unable to confirm whether this Frank Wolf was a real person or not, but he was described by the article credit as being a journalist of the “international news service” working in China.

The article stated that Wolf had claimed that the anti-Japanese immigration clause in this law was nothing more than a ploy by conniving warmongers within the US who wished to start a US-Japanese war in order to profit from the economic production that would be necessary to support such a war. It is quite noteworthy to find such a radical article in an official Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic bulletin. This article is an example of the type of more assertive messaging that could be found in these Department-published magazines after the immigration crisis happened.

5. The Second Vector of Growth Experienced by the Department

The second vector of growth is found in the Department's response to the limitation of being unable to send blatant news propaganda to the US. As a form of adaptation, it, therefore, increased its investment in more indirect propaganda lectures by civilians in the US. The Department also pushed forward the Ministry's public diplomacy

approach in general by putting out more assertive and tendentious publications in 1924. These publications may be considered to have served as the “building blocks of information” helping to structure the messaging of the foreign legations. It was specifically noted by the Ministry that the English and French translations of the documents it published in relation to the 1924 immigration crisis should be used as the basic ingredients (the building blocks) for the diplomatic messaging of the foreign legations. In this way, they corresponded with the concept of “building blocks” as proposed by James Pamment.

(1) Background to the Ji'nan Incident




Figure 2. Japanese fortification in Ji'nan

Source: Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan [Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ‘Tenshin / 7 Sainan Jiken ni kan suru Senden Dentan Sōfu no Ken’ [Tianjin / 7 On the Matter of the Sending of a Propaganda Pamphlet on the Ji'nan Incident], Katō Sotomatsu to Tanaka Gi'ichi, October 2, 1928. JACAR Ref.: B02030067200, p. 130.

The Ji'nan Incident was a battle that took place between the Japanese Shandong Expeditionary Force and the Chinese National Revolutionary Army, during the Northern Expedition in May 1928. The official explanation by the Tanaka Gi'ichi Cabinet for the presence of the Japanese forces in Shandong was that they had been sent to Ji'nan in order to protect Japanese lives and Japanese property in the region. Inevitably, these forces encountered the Chinese National Revolutionary Army while passing through the city.

This led to a battle known as the Ji'nan Incident, in which Japan was ultimately victorious on May 11, 1928. Following their victory, the Japanese occupied Ji'nan until around the end of April of 1929.

The question of which side had been the one to start this battle became the object of significant propaganda by both sides. "Was it the Chinese soldiers who had started the fighting? Or was it the Japanese?" That was the major question. You would expect that the Department of Information would undertake a propaganda campaign to try to put out the message that it had been the Chinese side that started the fighting. However, very curiously, the Department of Information did almost nothing during the Ji'nan incident.

Why, then, is it relevant to discuss this incident in relation to the Department? It is because the officials' reason for remaining idle is actually quite significant.

(2) Investments into MOFA-controlled News Agencies

In order to understand why the Department did nothing during the Ji'nan incident, one must look back further in time. In the early 1910s, the idea of the so-called "National News Agency" was introduced among Japanese foreign policymakers. This was the concept of a theoretical international news agency that would send abroad news that

supported the state's positions and interests. However, at the same time, this Agency was editorially independent from it. The idea was that this journalistic independence would give the news agency credibility in the eyes of other nations or other international news agencies. Therefore, it could be made to function as an effective propaganda tool. The idea that the Japanese state should build this type of institution took hold very strongly among Ministry officials in the 1910s.

Hence, the Kokusai and Tōhō News Agencies were created in 1914, with the idea of shaping them into such “national news agencies” for Japan. However, as I mentioned earlier, neither of these institutions was very successful at breaking into its respective international news market in the 1910s, and by 1919, the Ministry concluded that this was due to a lack of knowledge about the international news industry among its officials.

In 1920, the Department of Information was created, and one of the key missions of this department was to take control of both the Tōhō and Kokusai News Agencies and try to expand and invest in them, making them into stronger propaganda tools. For this, they also brought in outside experts. Date Gen'ichirō and Iwanaga Yūkichi became the respective managers of Tōhō and Kokusai. The Department of Information worked with Iwanaga in 1925–1926 to turn Kokusai into a news agency cooperative called Rengō, which eventually also absorbed Tōhō. Thus, in 1926, the newly formed news agency Rengō (Nihon Shinbun Rengōsha) was created to act as the national news agency for Japan.

(3) Tōhō Agency's Work During the Ji'nan Incident

By the time the Ji'nan Incident broke out in May 1928, significant investments had been made into Tōhō and Rengō by the Department,

and this gave the news agencies a strong network within East Asia as well as more advantageous relations with news agencies from other news spheres, such as Reuters.




Figure 3. Radio newsclip from Tōhō Agency

Source: Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan [Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Honpō Kakkokan Musen Denshin Renraku Riyō Zakken / Nichi, Ran-ryō Higashi Indo no Bu [On the Matter of Wireless Transmission of Information Between Japan and Various Countries Miscellanea on Communication / The Section on Japan and the Dutch East Indies]: 'Bunkatsu 3' (Section 3), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 18, 1928. JACAR Ref.: B10074944800, p. 246

The Ji'nan Incident broke out on May 3, 1928. On that same day, the lone Chinese wireless station in Ji'nan was promptly destroyed by the Japanese, who themselves maintained control of another wireless station.

This meant that in the first days of the conflict, the news that was coming out of that region was exclusively from Japanese side. In addition, the Tōhō News Agency, which was working in China, had more highly-developed structures, better facilities, and a greater network within East Asia than its counterpart Chinese news agencies. This

allowed Tōhō to saturate the global news channels with the Japanese version of what had happened, saying that the Japanese side had not been the one to start the fighting and that the Chinese side was at fault for causing the incident.

The Department subsequently made an analysis of public opinion among the various major powers and concluded in May of 1928 that, aside from the Soviet Union and China, the press of the various major powers was much more willing to believe that it had been the Chinese side that was at fault for the Ji'nan incident, because the National Revolutionary Army was seen as undisciplined, and because the Nan'jing incident had happened the year before. In that earlier incident, the National Revolutionary Army had also been perceived as being wantonly violent against foreigners. As such, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had generally succeeded in instilling the belief among the international community that the incident had not been Japan's fault.

(4) The First Glimpse of the “National News Agency”

For these reasons, the Department of Information would not have needed to undertake any specific action to combat the perceptions of the incident among the major powers. Furthermore, the Japanese army at this time was independently performing its own propaganda as well. As Tōhō News Agency succeeded in dominating the narrative in those key first days of the incident, it is reasonable to conclude that if the Department had tried to add to this with its own proactive propaganda campaign, it would just have muddied its own message. It seems that the Department wisely kept silent on this matter.

It may be argued that, in this case, the Tōhō News Agency acted like the “national news agency.” It presented the Japanese state's message, but it did so without needing direct instruction or interference from the

Department. It was acting out its purpose on its own.

Furthermore, the Ji'nan Incident would create an impetus for the Ministry to invest even more in these news agencies, giving them stronger wireless equipment, adding more correspondents, and upgrading their branch office facilities. This allowed Rengō to enlarge its market share and become an even stronger player in East Asia in the 1930s. This would then in turn prepare the path towards the creation of Dōmei News Agency in 1936, the most powerful interwar Japanese state news agency.

6. The Third Vector of Growth Experienced by the Department

The third vector of growth is a longer-term one: it consists of the investments that were made by the Ministry and subsequently by the Department of Information into the news agencies, first in the 1910s when these news agencies were started, and then in the 1920s when there was continuous investment and expansion of these news agencies. By that point, the Department of Information had taken responsibility for these news agencies in a centralized way in order to guide them directly out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo.

This then allowed the Ministry to accumulate greater knowledge of how to deal with the global news industry. So, this centralization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' propaganda strategies into the Department was now paying off in the context of the Ji'nan Incident.

7. Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the aspects of the growth of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that were either exemplified or facilitated by

the Department of Information. I have called them the three “vectors of growth.”

The first of these was the progression from the Paris Peace Conference to the Washington Conference, during which the Ministry went from paying almost no attention to the public diplomacy aspect of a conference to proactively investing in one.

Then, in 1924, the second vector manifested via the increased assertiveness of the Department’s publications, and then finally, during the Ji’nan Incident, the third vector was found in the growth of the news agencies, which were controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and which came into their own more and more in the 1920s, thanks to the centralization of their management within the Department of Information.

James Pamment (2014) says that, in a general sense, the process of “mediatization of diplomacy” first arose in the 1910s as diplomatic institutions began to create press offices and tried to centralize and professionalize their propaganda and public diplomacy outputs.

While Pamment was not particularly thinking about the Department of Information in Japan when making this assertion, I think the Department’s case actually directly supports his thesis.

From an institutional perspective, the creation of the Department was, in this way, a necessary addition to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although the Department of Information was relatively limited in its reach in the 1920s, its acquisition of institutional knowledge about how to manage news agencies and how to deal with the international news industry in a centralized way would have been important fundamentals in the path towards the more powerful and more centralized Japanese propaganda institutions of the 1930s and 1940s.

In conclusion, I would say that the Department of Information was a significant addition to the institutional structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which contradicts the image of the Department that has

existed in extant scholarship, as a weak or limited institution for the interwar Japanese state's public diplomacy and propaganda efforts.

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Chapter 2. On the Mediatization of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1921–1928

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