ASIA-JAPAN
RESEARCH INSTITUTE
RITSUMEIKAN UNIVERSITY

Mobility, Acquiring New Homes, and Transformation of Life: Asian Experiences

Editors
Aoi MOCHIZUKI and
Muhammad Riza NURDIN

Asia-Japan Research Institute
Ritsumeikan University

AJI BOOKS

Mobility, Acquiring New Homes, and Transformation of Life: Asian Experiences

Editors
Aoi MOCHIZUKI
and
Muhammad Riza NURDIN

Asia-Japan Research Institute
Ritsumeikan University

ISBN 978-4-910550-10-7 (Online)
ISBN 978-4-910550-11-4 (Print)

Mobility, Acquiring New Homes, and Transformation of Life: Asian Experiences

AJI Editorial Office
OIC Research Office,
Ritsumeikan University Osaka Ibaraki Campus (OIC)
2-150 Iwakura-cho, Ibaraki,
Osaka 567-8570 JAPAN
Email: aji-eb@st.ritsumei.ac.jp

Note:
Authors' names in this publication are ordered according to their preference and their surnames are capitalized.

Contents

Editors' Preface

The world we are living in today is increasingly facing challenges and threats, such as problems of underdevelopment, exposure to natural disasters and climate change, violence and social conflict, forced displacement, and many more. This book is an attempt to address these important issues for Asian paths of civilization and development, with the support of the Asia-Japan Research Institute, Ritsumeikan University, from an academic perspective and beyond.

In Chapter One, Alpraditia Malik discusses the motivations and orientations regarding relocation to public housing among residents of slums in Tangerang City, Greater Jakarta, Indonesia. Slum settlement has been problematic in urban areas, including Jakarta, and the local government is trying to alleviate this problem through the provision of public housing. Unlike existing literature focusing on involuntary relocation, Malik's approach is to study the voluntary relocation of slum residents.

In Chapter Two, Jinhyee Lee presents her study on integration policy in Kazakhstan following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Specifically, she focuses on the responses of the Koryo Saram (Korean Diaspora) minority ethnic group in dealing with the integration.

Next, Aoi Mochizuki in Chapter Three investigates the social inclusion of Syrian refugees in different cultural spheres. In particular, she questions the functions of Arab belongingness in the lives of Syrian refugees in an Arab Islamic country (Jordan) and non-Arab Islamic countries (Germany and Sweden).

The last chapter by Muhammad Riza Nurdin explores the crucial role of local communities as the main actors in disaster evacuation and recovery, leading to zero victims when Mt. Kelud in East Java, Indonesia, erupted in 2014. Paradoxically, while the community perceive

themselves as a subject, they are considered by other external disaster management actors as an object, resulting in a lack of appreciation of the community's efforts.

We would like to mention that this book would not have been possible without the support of some key people. Our sincerest gratitude goes to Professor Yasushi Kosugi, the Director of AJI, for his continuous support for early-career scholars including all the contributors to this book. We are also grateful to Dr. Ammar Khashan, Dr. Ai Kawamura, Dr. Ayaka Kuroda, Dr. Emiko Sugana, Dr. Fitrio Ashardiono, and Dr. Muhammad Hakimi Mohd. Shafiai, for their supports in presenting these topics. Our heartfelt appreciation goes to Professor Anthony Brewer for his brilliant editorial support.

Finally, it is our sincere hope that the topics and ideas presented in this book will be beneficial to scholarly discussion and policymaking debates. We would be happy if this modest publication made a small contribution to the academic community and beyond, particularly to the vulnerable societies affected by the increasing challenges mentioned above, in Asia and elsewhere.

Aoi MOCHIZUKI
and
Muhammad Riza NURDIN

Contributors

1. Dr. Alpraditia MALIK

Chapter 1. Where Shall We Make Our Home? Motivations and Orientations for Slum Residents to Move to Public Housing in Tangerang City, Greater Jakarta

Degree: Ph.D. in Policy Science (Ritsumeikan University), 2021.
Affiliation: Open-Innovation and Collaboration Research Organization, Ritsumeikan University
Specialized field: Urban Architecture, Housing Policy
Publications:

1. Malik, A. 2024. Do Where People Interact Matters to Social Capital? Comparative Analysis of Middle-and High-Rise Public Housing. *Journal of Architectural Design and Urbanism*, 6(1), 51–62.
2. Malik, A. 2021. Willingness to Move to and from Rusunawa: Looking from the Perspective of both Prospective and Existing Residents of Rusunawa in Tangerang City, Greater Jakarta. *Asia-Japan Research Academic Bulletin*, 2, 1–16.
3. Malik, A. and YOSHIDA, T. 2021. A Pattern of Social Interaction of the High–Rise Public-Housing of Jatinegara Barat in Jakarta, Indonesia. *Urban and Regional Planning Review*, 8, 1–25.

Recent Research Interests: Social capital, social interaction, and trans-sociodemographic interaction of Kampung (low/middle-income settlements) and public housing inhabitants and its relation to the built environment.

2. Dr. Jinhye LEE

Chapter 2. From Government Structured Integration to Inter-Ethnic Coexistence in Kazakhstan: Maintaining the Koryo Saram Community beyond Historical Challenges toward a Multi-layered Identity

Degree: Ph.D. in Area Studies (Kyoto University), 2019.

Affiliation: Research Assistant Professor, Kinugasa Research Organization, Ritsumeikan University

Specialized field: Area Studies in Central Asia, South Korea, Japan

Publications:

1. Jinhye, Lee. 2022. *Futatsu no Ajia wo Ikiru: Gendai Kazafusutan ni okeru Minzoku Mondai to Kōraijin Koryo-Saramu Deiasupora no Bunka Henyo* (*Living in Two Asia: Ethnic Minorities in Modern Kazakhstan and Cultural Transformation of Koryo Saram Diaspora*). Kyoto: Nakanishiya Publishing. (In Japanese)
2. Jinhye, Lee. 2021. The Contemporary Status of the Ethnic Group in Kazakhstan and the Koryoin's Nation. *Seoul: Asia Review*, 11(1), 261–289, Seoul.
3. Jinhye, Lee. 2023. Why do Diaspora Re-Emigrate to their Historical "Homelands"? A Case Study of Koryo Saram's 'Return' from Post-Soviet Uzbekistan to South Korea. *Journal of the Asia-Japan Research Institute of Ritsumeikan University*, 5, 51–65, Osaka.

Recent Research Interests: Diaspora, Ethnic Minority, Return Migration, Multicultural Symbiosis

3. Dr. Aoi MOCHIZUKI

Chapter 3. Social Inclusion of Syrian Refugees and Reclaiming Their Arab Belongingness: The Cases of Jordan, Germany, and Sweden

Degree: Ph.D. in Area Studies (Kyoto University), 2022.
Affiliation: Lecturer, Komatsu University, Faculty of Intercultural Communication
Specialized field: Middle East Area studies, Refugee Studies
Publications:

1. Mochizuki, Aoi. 2023. *Gurōbaru Kadai toshiteno Nanmin Saiteijyū: Ikoku ni Watatta Siria Nanmin no Kizoku to Seizon Kiban kara Kangaeru* (Refugee Resettlement as a Global Issue: Considering from Belongingness and Livelihoods of Syrian Refugees in Foreign Countries). Kyoto: Nakanishiya Shuppan. (In Japanese)
2. Mochizuki, Aoi. 2021. Ōshū Nanmin Kiki Ikō no Kokumin Kokka Taisei no Rejiriensu: Seiō Shokoku ni okeru Siria Nanmin ni Taisuru Imin-Nanmin Seisaku no Yuragi (Resilience of Nation-State Systems after the European Refugee Crisis: Fluctuations in Immigration and Refugee Policies for Syrian Refugees in Western European Countries). *Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies*, 14, 228–244. (In Japanese)

Recent Research Interests: Social inclusion of refugees in the Middle East and Europe, issues related to Syrian refugees' belongingness and the process of reconstructing their livelihoods, and challenges and prospects for contemporary multicultural coexistence.

4. Dr. Muhammad Riza NURDIN

Chapter 4. Subjectification vs. Objectification of the Local Community in Post-Disaster Indonesia: The Case of the 2014 Mt. Kelud Eruption

Degree: Ph.D. in Southeast Asian Social Inquiry (University of New South Wales), 2018.
Affiliation: Visiting Researcher, Ritsumeikan Asia-Japan Research Organization, Ritsumeikan University
Specialized field: Southeast Asian Studies, Indonesian Studies, Development Anthropology, Islamic Studies
Publications:

1. Nurdin, M.R. 2024. Islamic Faith-based Organisations and Their Role in Building Social Capital for Post-disaster Recovery in Indonesia. *Disasters*, 48(S1), e12635.
2. Hirono M. and Nurdin M.R. 2024. Local Knowledge as the Basis of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. *Disasters*, 48(S1), e12634.
3. Nurdin, M.R. 2023. *Islamic Civil Society Organizations and Their Role in Forming Social Capital in Disaster-Hit Communities in Southeast Asia: The Cases of Aceh and East Java, Indonesia.* Osaka: Asia-Japan Research Institute, Ritsumeikan University.
4. Tan, D., Le M., Satur. L. and Nurdin, M.R. 2023. Connectivity and Vaccine Diplomacy in Southeast Asia During the Covid-19 Pandemic. In: *Dialogues on Connectivity between Europe and Asia: The Next Gen EU-ASEAN Think-Tank Dialogue* (pp. 131–154). Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

5. Nurdin, M.R. 2022. Examining the Effectiveness of Government Agencies in Disaster Recovery: Evidence from Indonesia. *Journal of the Asia-Japan Research Institute of Ritsumeikan University*, 4, 146–157.

Recent Research Interests: Disaster management, forced migration, humanitarianism, Islam.

Chapter 1
Where Shall We Make Our Home? Motivations and Orientations for Slum Residents to Move to Public Housing in Tangerang City, Greater Jakarta

Alpraditia MALIK

1. Introduction

(1) Research Background

The emergence of slum settlements is one of the common negative impacts of rapid urbanization. The local governments are trying to alleviate slums to improve the city and also to provide a better life or better housing for the slum residents. Based on the studies by Huang et al. (2020), the best practice of slum alleviation is to upgrade the original location rather than relocating the residents to completely new locations or housing types.

However, if the upgrade option is not feasible, it is necessary to use the second option, which is housing relocation. Currently, most studies on housing relocation focus on involuntary relocation, rather than trying to explore the motivations of the residents themselves. They try to measure the negative impacts on people who are involuntarily forced to relocate from slums to public housing.

Currently, in pure studies of housing, two aspects are frequently addressed: residential mobility and housing relocation. The difference is that in residential mobility, individuals usually move because they

are motivated by individual preferences. For example, they are getting married, they need a bigger house, or they need more rooms because they have children and so on, so all the motivation comes from individual preferences.

However, housing relocation refers to situations when the motivation to move is influenced by external factors. For example, in this particular case, they are influenced by the government's agenda, which is slum alleviation.

Based on the International Finance Corporation (IFC 2006), relocation can be considered involuntary if the occupants are forced to accept the land acquisition that results in relocation. This kind of forced relocation has several negative impacts such as the severance of social networks, loss of place attachment and job loss. However, not all housing relocations can be considered involuntary, because the United Nations (1997) describes that relocation can be considered as voluntary if there is a choice as to whether the individuals can choose to move or to stay. Also, when some compensation for the land acquisition is involved, relocation can also be considered as voluntary.

The most interesting study that the author found recently is by Kearns and Mason (2013), who said that the nature of relocation, whether it is forced or voluntary, is purely dependent on the resident's motive and perspective. For example, maybe on the surface, some people view this kind of relocation as forced by the government, but when we approached the residents, they said that they actually already have a motivation to move. So, in this way, we could not say this relocation had been forced by the government. In other words, it may appear to be forced, but if we delve deeper, we find that the residents already wanted to move. They also state that the housing locations will actually have positive impacts on the relocated residents.

(2) Research Objectives

My first objective here is driven by the fact that commonly, studies regarding voluntary relocation or residents' mobility were done outside the setting of slum alleviation. For example, they were studying the motivation to move but outside of the slum alleviation settings.

The second objective is that most studies on slum alleviation are usually related to involuntary relocations that try to measure the impacts of the government and study the policy of involuntary relocations. Therefore, there are only a limited number of studies about the motivation to move from the perspective of the residents of the slum alleviation area. In addition, Kearns and Mason (2013) already found that relocations are generally beneficial to the residents both physically and socially. However, they do not explain in their study why, even though forced relocations are imposed on the surface, the residents do not feel forced to relocate because they already wanted to do so. Moreover, in their study, they do not explain why the residents had an intention to move beforehand.

On the other hand, Clark et al. (2015) have already done a study to measure the motivations to stay or to move using place attachment. However, their study was not done in the setting of slum alleviation.

Consequently, in this study, I wanted to bridge both studies by adopting the models of Clark et al. using place attachment to measure the motivations of residents of slum alleviation to explore the factors that have not been explained by Kearns and Mason.

Therefore, my objective for this research is to understand the motivations and also the orientations of slum residents to move voluntarily to public housing.

(3) Theoretical Perspectives

Usually, an individual's reasons to move are influenced by their

housing satisfaction and place attachment. That is why I want to use the variables from housing satisfaction and place attachment to measure the motivation to move.

1) Place Attachment

Place attachment is the affective link that people establish with place settings, where they tend to remain and where they feel comfortable and safe (Hidalgo and Hernández 2001).

Also, place attachment is an important factor to be considered to understand people's decision to move (Low and Altman 1992). Generally, place attachment is divided into two main attributes. The first is Physical, such as accessibility to other locations, the availability of open spaces, security, facilities, building conditions and so on. The second is Social, such as the length of stay, number of friendships, home ownership or tenure, social interactions, and so on.

2) Housing Satisfaction

Galster (1985) was the first to conceptualize the actual-expectation gap theory. His idea is that housing satisfaction (HS) is represented by a number or level of how close or how far it is for each individual to reach their ideal housing. So, he said that the lower the housing satisfaction, the more individuals will consider moving to new housing in the case that those individuals could not improve their dwelling, for example, through physical renovation.

The attributes of housing satisfaction are similar to place attachment. Again, the first is Physical, for example, the floor area per person, and the second is also Social, like tenure and social interaction, and then neighborhood features like access to public transport and distance to facilities.

2. Research Methodology

I wanted to know the general reason or motivation for moving to public housing, so I interviewed prospective residents. The questions were: "Do you agree or are you willing to move to public housing?" Whatever their answer was, the next step was to ask them their motivations or the reasons. The interviews were focused on prospective residents who were presently residents of the slums. It was expected that they would be willing to move to public housing built by the government, and they were not being forced to move.

Next, I analyzed the results by using descriptive statistics, followed by statistical analysis using a simple Multi-Linear Regression. Then, to further test my findings, I interviewed residents who had already moved and had been living for several years in public housing, who were previously also slum residents, to find out their motivation to move and finally live in public housing.

Simply put, I wanted to know the slum residents' reasons and then study them from the descriptive statistics and test the variables using a statistical analysis to see their motivations. Then, I wanted to compare these results with the motivations of those who had already moved to public housing.

3. Locus of Research

My research survey was done in Tangerang city, which is one of the peripheral cities of Greater Jakarta. For this study, the questionnaire survey was done in three different Kampongs or neighborhoods, the smallest administrative units in Indonesia. These were classified as slum settlements with a total of 92 respondents that I had already surveyed. The orientation for these slum residents was that they were expected to

relocate to Rusunawa (public housing) by the local government.

Most of the slum settlements in Tangerang city do not have proper planning and are too dense with dwellings too close to each other. In addition, most of the homes in these settlements tend to be smaller than eight meters square and are poorly constructed of inadequate housing material. From the perspective of infrastructure, some of them have poor road connectivity, which makes them isolated from the city. Most of the settlements also have an inadequate system of drainage as well as poor access to clean water. Due to lack of sanitation, health has become one of the major concerns in these settlements. Based on some features (physical, social, and economic), the local government classifies slums into three different categories: "Low," Medium," and "High."

Figure 1. Low Level Slums. Source: Author

In the case of Tangerang city, most of the slum settlements are categorized as medium-level. The first option for this kind of slum settlement is, of course, to upgrade it by improving the physical conditions and the infrastructure. The second option is to provide affordable accommodation in the form of subsidized public housing, so

that the residents can improve their lives by moving there. I do not know the reason, but the government tends to use the second option and expects the residents to simply move from slum settlements to public housing. Figure 2 shows medium and high levels. The housing conditions are not as good as in a low-level slum. Most of the houses are built using non-permanent materials such as wood and bamboo and have inadequate roofing. Some do not have their own toilets or access to clean water and even have no flooring. These are the biggest differences between the medium-high and the low-level slums.

Based on the report by the Regional Planning Agency (RPA), many housing units need to be provided. In order to achieve this, the RPA has developed a type of public housing which in local terms is called Rusunawa.

Figure 2. Medium and High-level Slums. Source: Author

The government has already performed a basic survey of the low-income sector and also of the slum residents. From the questionnaire, the government determined that 68% were willing to move into public housing, but they did not ask them what their motivation was.

Figure 3 shows a blueprint of a typical Rusunawa. This housing unit is

24 meters square and is designed to be occupied by a household with four members. There are 24 units per floor and a total of 4 floors in one block.

Unit size	= 24 m^2
Number of unit per floor	= 24 unit
4-stories x 24 units	= 96 unit



Figure 3. Floorplan of a Typical Rusunawa. Source: Author

Currently, there are a total of three Rusunawas or public housing blocks in Tangerang city. Most of this kind of public housing has five floors.

Figure 4. A Typical Rusunawa. Source: Author

Figure 5. Rusunawa in Tangerang City. Source: Author

4. Findings and Discussion

The first findings are concerned with the basic reasons or motivations to move to public housing. Of the residents I surveyed, 43% were willing to move to public housing. They listed their motivations as looking for a more comfortable and better location and more appropriate accommodation. As most of them did not have their own toilets or easy access to clean water, they wanted to improve the quality of their housing by moving to public housing. However, 30% did not want to move because they already felt at home, and some of them also disliked the apartment, while the rest were still not sure and wanted to see and listen to the opinions of the other residents in the public housing first, and then decide whether to move or not.

To summarize, most of the residents were willing to move to Rusunawa because they wanted better housing, while those who disagreed stated that they already felt at home or were not sure. Interestingly, some residents agreed to move if their neighbors did so. Thus, we can

conclude that there are some social factors that could also influence their motivations to move, and this was confirmed by the next findings.

For the descriptive statistics and the statistical analysis, I used the variables in Table 1, starting from the basic household characteristics, like income, number of children, and so on. Then, I used the variables of place attachments. First are the physical variables, like the conditions of their housing structures, and then the subjective perception of the residents regarding their access to public transport, and so on. For example, I asked them to rate from 1(lowest) to 5(highest), "How do you rate the access to public transport from where you are living? Is it good or not?" I asked the same for the nearest hospital. Then, I asked for their subjective perceptions of their housing to find out whether they were aware or concerned about their living.

Table 1. List of Physical and Social Variables

Household Characteristics	**Place Attachment (Physical-Objective)**	**Place Attachment (Physical-Subjective)**
• Age • Income • Number of children • Household size • Education level • Occupation • Sex	• Condition of their housing structure • *(Permanent or non-permanent)*	• Access to public transport • Housing location • Subjective perception of housing condition

Place Attachment (Social-Objective)	**Place Attachment (Social-Subjective)**	**Others**
• Length of stay • Homeownership	• Number of friends • Frequency of social interaction • Number of participation in community events • Security • Relationship with neighbors	• Housing satisfaction

Next, I asked about the social attributes such as their length of stay and their tenure, and whether they owned their house or were just renting it. Subsequently, I asked about the number of friends, as well as the frequency of their social interactions and participation in community events and so on. Lastly, I also asked them about their housing satisfaction. I asked them, "From 1 to 5, how do you feel?" "Are you already satisfied living in this kind of neighborhood?" (See Table 2)

Table 2. Social Interactions

	Low (n=30)		**Medium (n=42)**		**High (n=20)**	
	Means	St.dev	Means	St.dev	Means	St.dev
Social predictors						
Length of Stay	34.1	18.4	20.9	14.5	25.6	14.5
I feel secure living here	3.9	0.5	3.8	0.4	3.9	0.3
I have lots of friends here	3.9	1.2	3.7	1.2	2.6	0.5
I frequently interact with my neighbors	4.8	0.4	4.5	1.0	3.7	1.7
I frequently join community event	3.8	1.1	3.6	1.2	2.3	1.5
I have a good relationship with my neighbors	4.3	0.4	3.9	0.3	4.0	0.5
Homeownership						
Owners	80.0%		64.3%		60.0%	
Renters	20.0%		35.7%		40.0%	
Others						
Housing Satisfaction	4.3	0.7	4.4	0.9	4.6	0.8

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics by Slum Levels

	Low (n=30)		**Medium (n=42)**		**High (n=20)**	
	Means	St.dev	Means	St.dev	Means	St.dev
Housing Structure						
Permanent	80.0%		69.1%		55.0%	
Semi-permanent	20.0%		30.9%		45.0%	
Public transportation is pretty much accessible	4.5	0.7	3.7	0.8	4.0	0.0
The location of this neighborhood is strategic	4.2	0.5	3.8	0.4	3.5	1.1
I feel satisfied and comfortable with my housing condition	3.3	0.9	3.3	0.9	3.1	1.1
Agree to move to PH						
Yes	13.3%		52.4%		70.0%	
No	46.7%		23.8%		30.0%	
Maybe	40.0%		23.8%		0.0%	

You can see from these simple descriptive statistics by slum levels in Table 3 that the first column is the low-level slums, the middle one is the medium, and the right side is the highest. As can be seen, most respondents in the lower-level slums have higher lengths of stay compared to the other kampongs or villages. Under "homeownership," most respondents in the low-level slums own their house, or they think that they own it, because sometimes in Indonesia, or among slum residents in general, people think they own their house, but actually, the land ownership is still in dispute, or it is really owned by another party who lives somewhere else. So, among low-level slums, 80% think they are owners compared to the other villagers.

As can be seen in Figure 1, most houses in the low level of slums, around 80%, have permanent structures. Regarding their willingness to move to the public housing, only 13% of respondents in the low-level slums agreed, so 80% were still considering or did not want to move to public housing compared to the higher-level slums, where 70% of them were very happy to be able to move to public housing.

We can summaraise these findings as:

- Most residents in the lowest slum level owned their house and have overall better housing conditions.
- At the same time, they mostly do not want to move to the public housing.
- Regarding social interaction, the lower the slum level, the higher the quality of social interaction among the residents.

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics by Willingness to Move

	Yes	No	Maybe
Age (in years)	36.1	48.7	41.2
Income (in millions IDR)	3.2	2.6	2.7
Number of children	1.7	2.6	1.5
Male	54.8%	21.0%	24.2%
Female	20.0%	56.7%	23.3%
Elementary	33.3%	42.9%	23.8%
Junior High	53.3%	20.0%	26.7%
Senior High	50.0%	30.0%	20.0%
Formal	33.3%	46.7%	20.0%
Non-formal	61.8%	23.5%	40.0%
Housewives	37.5%	25.0%	37.5%
Semi-permanent	75.0%	14.3%	10.7%
Permanent	29.7%	40.6%	29.7%
Public transportation is accessible	4.0	4.1	4.1
This location is strategic	3.7	3.8	4.0
My house is in a satisfying condition	3.2	3.2	3.4
Owner	30.2%	41.3%	28.6%
Renter	72.4%	13.8%	13.8%
Length of stay (in years)	18.7	35.0	28.1
I feel secure living here	3.8	3.9	3.9
I have lots of friends here	3.0	3.8	4.2
I often interact with my neighbors	3.9	4.9	4.9
I frequently join community events	2.9	3.4	4.3
I have a good relationship with neighbors	4.0	4.1	4.0
Housing Satisfaction	4.2	4.7	4.4

As we can see in Table 4, men were more likely to agree to move than women. More than half of the male respondents were willing to move to public housings. From the perspective of occupations, respondents who worked in non-formal jobs were more likely to agree

to move to public housing than other occupations. Also, respondents who were living in semi-permanent housing were more likely to agree to move to public housing, and those who were tenants were more likely to agree to move than owners.

We can also see that people who have been staying longer do not want to move because they have become attached to their homes. Several types felt like this. For example, owners do not want to move even though the condition of their housing is not as good as the others, and because they think that they own their house they do not want to let it go and move to public housing.

We can summarize the findings as follows:

- Men are more likely to agree to move to public housing.
- Most residents with non-formal occupations are willing to move.
- Renters were more likely to agree to move to public housing.
- Some variables from the social attributes could also predict the residents' willingness to move.
    - The longer they stay, the higher their housing satisfaction.
    - Meanwhile, most residents who are willing to move have lower housing satisfaction.

From here, we can see that general reasons like their housing and social conditions could influence their motivation. And from the descriptive statistics, we can see that better housing and social aspects and other variables such as occupation, ownership, and others can influence their willingness to move.

Table 5. Statistical Analysis

Variables	Parameter estimates
Homeownership	-1.991***
Housing satisfaction	-0.786***
Housing structure	-1.479***
Floor area per person	0.134
Location	0.121
Feeling of safety	-0.890
Social Interaction	-1.209*

Table 5 is the author's model of binominal regressions. The dependent variable here is "can not decide whether to move" = zero or "willing to move" = one. From all the variables, this model yielded the best results or better R-square.

There are seven variables, homeownership, housing satisfaction, and so on, including social interactions. Three asterisks mean it is significant at 99%, which is the strongest significance. One asterisk depicts the lower significance because it is only significant at 90%. The significant variables are home ownership, housing satisfaction, and house structure. Social interaction is also significant, but the significance is only 90%. From here, it can be seen that the strongest motivation to move is home ownership. Owners will be less motivated to move compared to renters, and the significance is the strongest at 99%, followed by housing satisfaction and then the housing structure. This means that the higher the housing satisfaction they felt, the less likely they were to want to move to public housing. Also, people who live in permanent structures will be less motivated to move compared to those who are living in semi-permanent structures.

For my last analysis, I wanted to know the reasons why people had moved, so I interviewed residents who had already been living in public housing for at least five years. Previously, they were also slum dwellers, and they had voluntarily moved to public housing. These are the reasons why they moved:

Table 6. Reasons for Moving to Public Housing

Reasons	Count	%
Economy (cheaper rent cost)	35	22.01%
Location (closer to work)	34	21.38%
Better housing/utilities	33	20.75%
Personal	27	16.98%
Better structure	15	9.43%
Evicted	14	8.81%
Feeling of safety	1	0.63%

I asked 159 respondents from public housing why they had moved. In Table 6, we can see that economy was the main reason. Most of the residents in public housing were previously renters in the slum settlements. They moved to public housing because the monthly rent was cheaper than their old rental houses. The second reason for moving was related to physical attributes, such as wanting to live in a better location, have better housing or utilities, and live in a better structure. Interestingly, only one respondent moved to public housing for socially related reasons, because they felt their old social environment was not safe enough.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, I used several factors I received from different types of analyses, and I compared them with the motivations of those who had already moved.

We can say that better housing or attributes related to the physical aspects could be the best motivators for the residents to move to public housing, as the slum residents wanted to move because they wanted better housing, and the residents who had already moved to public housing had done so because they also wanted better housing.

Figure 6. Motivation to Move. Source: Author

On the other hand, the higher the frequency of social interactions, the less likely the residents were to move. In this case, those who did agree to move were willing to do so only if their neighbors also moved as well.

Therefore, my conclusion here is that physical attributes could be the main motivators for the residents to move. However, social attributes may, at certain points, also influence that motive.

This study tries to improve on the study by Kearns and Mason (2013) by showing what factors motivated the residents to voluntarily move to public housing. In their study, they found that most of the residents received positive impacts, especially better building conditions. This study found the same reasons why people are motivated to move to

public housing in the first place. This study also tries to improve on the study of Clark et al. (2015) by applying their study or their models in the settings of slum alleviation. Aligned with their findings, satisfaction and place attachments were also significant motivations to move.

However, their study did not include housing structure, as explained by Kamalipour et al. (2012) in their model, and my study found that the pursuit of better housing, which is a physical attribute, is the strongest motivator for moving.

In the next stage of my study, I want to investigate whether moving to public housing does actually have positive impacts on the residents, as found by Kearns and Mason (2013).

References

Clark, W., R. Duque-Calvache and I. Palomares-Linares. 2015. Place Attachment and the Decision to Stay in the Neighbourhood. *Population, Space and Place* 23(2), November 25, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2001>

Galster, G. C. 1985. Evaluating Indicators for Housing Policy: Residential Satisfaction vs Marginal Improvement Priorities. *Social Indicators Research* 16(4), 415–448.

Hidalgo, M. C. and B. Hernández. 2001. Place Attachment: Conceptual and Empirical Questions. *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 21(3), 273–281.

International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2006. *Annual Report 2006*.

Kamalipour, H., A. J. Yeganeh and M. Alalhesabi. 2012. Predictors of Place Attachment in Urban Residential Environments: A Residential Complex Case Study. *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences* 35, 459–467.

Kearns, A. and P. Mason. 2013. Defining and Measuring Displacement: Is Relocation from Restructured Neighbourhoods Always Unwelcome and Disruptive? *Housing Studies* 28(2), 177–204.

Low, S. M. and I. Altman. 1992. Place Attachment: A Conceptual Inquiry. In Irwin Altman and Setha M. Low (eds.), *Place Attachment*. Boston, MA.: Springer, 1–12.

UN (United Nations). 1997. Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis Deng, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/39. Addendum. Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms, Part II: Legal Aspects Relating to the Protection against Arbitrary Displacement, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.1, 11. February 1998, IV.

Chapter 2
From Government Structured Integration to Inter-Ethnic Coexistence in Kazakhstan: Maintaining the Koryo Saram Community beyond Historical Challenges toward a Multi-Layered Identity

Jinhye LEE

1. Introduction

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, five Central Asian countries achieved the status of independent republics, each inheriting the Soviet legacy. As independent states, each country began to integrate in its own way. In this context, independent Kazakhstan has pursued two goals in the process of integration: ethnocentrism and the integration of its multiethnic citizens.

I have noticed three aspects in the research on the response to integration policy in Central Asia. Firstly, there is a study on the aspect of the national identity of Central Asia after the Soviet dissolution. The identity of the state and citizens has been formed and maintained on the premise of authoritarianism, thereby promoting national solidarity and stability. This study used films, projects, and elections as the main analysis tools under the supervision and support of the government. Thus, this study may have been limited in grasping the more diverse opinions of citizens on social repercussions.

The second aspect concerns ethnic tensions arising from the land

distribution. It tends to perceive the policy as emblematic of elitism rather than specific nationalism, as land ownership remains concentrated among the elite, rather than being distributed to a specific ethnicity. It further emphasized that the land reform in this country was not determined by ethnic consideration and did not worsen ethnic relations. It employs a hierarchical classification of land ownership, and there is a limitation in specifically grasping the reaction of each ethnic group to the land distribution.

Figure 1. Kazakhstan's Neighbors
Source: www.uzngos.uzsci.net

Thirdly, there is the aspect of citizens' social perceptions and repercussions of national integration by analyzing the factors that determine citizenship and ethnic identity. The higher the citizens' confidence in state agencies, the stronger the support for the two identities. This correlation can be said to have significantly influenced citizens' responses to national integration. The civic identity was assumed to belong to all citizens of Kazakhstan, and ethnic identity was

analyzed only by assuming the Kazakh people's identity. This study does not refer to any ethnic classification within Kazakhstan, and it is also difficult to grasp the specific ethnic response to government policy.

Thus, there are limitations in the current data, as it does not fully reflect the various compositions and demographics, and the most relevant to us is the full ethnic composition of the country. I want to consider how each minority group is responding/reacting to integration, with a particular focus on Koryo Saram, a minority in Kazakhstan.

2.Who are Koryo Saram?

Koryo Saram refers to the Korean Diaspora living in the former Soviet Union, and it is their self-identification. They are just called Koreans in English. But why do we call them the Koryo Saram? It was their self-perception in their community throughout the Japanese colonial period, the Korean War and division in Korea, and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Figure 2. Migration Routes of Koryo Saram
Source: https://www.toandfromtheairport.com

Figure 2 shows the routes of their migration. Koryo Saram migrated to Primorsky Krai from the Joseon Peninsula in 1863 during the Joseon era, and in 1937, they were forced to migrate to Central Asia under the oppressive regime of Stalin, and then they also migrated to other areas. After the Soviet Union collapsed and the former Soviet Union states gained independence, they were forced to adapt and assimilate into the new political and social systems as a minority in a multi-ethnic state. Currently, in Kazakhstan, there are many sub-categories of Koryo Saram for those minorities and their migrations.

The Koryo Saram community includes those who were settled there by forced migration under Stalin, and then lived there and led relatively stable lives. It also includes Koryo Saram who immigrated from the Far East of Russia or the post-Soviet states for economic activities after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

They are recognized as different entities, and each group has its own name. In other words, they have different identities. It depends on the area of residence or origin of Koryo Saram and is closely related to the history of migration they have experienced. It can be described as a concept that survived throughout the Soviet period and as a newly formed concept after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, both of which coexist in their community.



Figure 3. Koryo Saram's Sub Identities
Source: Recreated using (Lee 2022, 81)

3. Kazakhstan's Integration Policy

In 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the five Central Asian countries achieved the status of independent republics. Independent Kazakhstan is simultaneously pursuing two goals: ethnocentrism and the integration of its multi-ethnic citizens. The integration of Kazakhstan is mainly proceeding in two directions. The first is to secure a public domain led by the government based on the Kazakhification of the population, with the adoption of Kazakh history, language and culture. At the same time, it presupposes this as a commonly shared value of the citizenship of Kazakhstan. The second, based on that, it is to guarantee the autonomy of each cultural identity.

Table 1 shows the perception of their mother tongue of the ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. According to statistics from the Kazakhstan government, when asked what they think is their own native language

only 36% of Koryo Saram said it is the language of their historical homeland. 64% of them said it is different from the language of their historical homeland.

Table 1. Perception of Their Mother Tongue of the Ethnic Groups in Kazakhstan.

		What's your mother tongue?	
		The language of one's historical motherland	It is different from the language of the motherland
Total (%)	16,009,597 (100)	14,965,571 (93.5)	1,044,026 (6.5)
Kazakh	100,969,763 (100)	9,982,276 (98.8)	114,487 (1.1)
Russian	3,793,764 (100)	3,748,325 (98.8)	45,439 (1.2)
Uzbek	456,997 (100)	435,833 (95.4)	21,164 (4.6)
Ukrainian	333,031 (100)	52,549 (15.8)	280,482 (84.2)
Uighur	224,713 (100)	190,956 (85.0)	33,757 (15.0)
Tatar	204,229 (100)	104,234 (51.0)	99,995 (49.0)
German	178409 (100)	30,413 (17.0)	147,996 (83.0)
Koryo Saram	100,385 (100)	36,108 (36.0)	64,277 (64.0)
Turk	97,015 (100)	900,065 (92.8)	6,950 (7.2)

Source: Recreated using (Қазақстан Республикасы Статистика агенттігі 2011, 11–25)

Table 2. Russian Language Level of the Ethnic Groups in Kazakhstan.

	Able to converse			Able to read			Able to write		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
Total %	94.4	96.7	91.4	88.2	92.9	82.2	84.8	90.2	77.9
Kazakh	92.0	95.4	88.8	83.5	89.7	77.4	79.1	85.9	72.4
Russian	98.4	98.4	98.6	97.7	97.7	97.6	96.7	96.8	96.6
Uzbek	92.9	95.3	91.3	78.6	82.1	76.1	68.3	73.4	64.7
Ukrainian	98.9	98.7	99.2	98.0	97.8	98.1	97.1	96.9	97.4
Uighur	95.8	96.4	95.3	88.2	91.1	86.0	81.8	85.4	79.0
Tatar	98.4	98.5	98.2	96.4	96.9	95.0	94.7	95.2	93.1
German	99.0	98.9	99.1	97.8	98.1	97.4	96.9	97.1	96.6
Koryo Saram	98.0	98.0	98.0	96.9	96.9	96.8	95.5	95.5	95.7
Turk	96.1	92.5	97.5	87.8	79.8	90.9	83.6	75.1	87.0

Source: Recreated using (Қазақстан Республикасы Статистика агенттігі 2011, 314–321)

Table 2 indicates the Russian language level of ethnic groups. 98% of Koryo Saram are able to speak Russian, and 96.9 % of them said they could read it. Also, approximately 95.5% of the Koryo Saram said they could write in Russian.

Table 3. Kazakh Language Level of the Ethnic Groups in Kazakhstan.

	Able to converse			Able to read			Able to write		
Total (urban, rural)%	74.0	67.7	82.0	64.8	57.3	74.5	62.0	54.3	71.8
Kazakh	98.3	97.9	98.8	95.4	94.7	94.2	93.2	92.1	94.2
Russian	25.3	25.6	24.6	8.8	8.8	6.5	6.3	6.2	6.5
Uzbek	95.5	94.0	96.6	74.2	70.5	63.6	61.7	59.0	63.6
Ukrainian	21.5	23.7	18.5	7.2	8.6	5.0	5.2	5.3	5.0
Uighur	93.7	89.9	96.7	70.5	64.3	66.0	60.8	54.1	66.0
Tatar	72.6	71.4	76.1	40.0	38.0	46.1	33.7	31.5	40.4
German	24.7	26.9	22.5	10.5	11.0	7.7	7.9	8.1	7.7
Koryo Saram	43.4	42.7	47.5	14.1	14.0	11.8	10.5	10.2	11.8
Turk	91.0	85.1	93.2	51.3	46.0	45.3	43.4	38.5	45.3

Source: Recreated using (Қазақстан Республикасы Статистика агенттігі 2011, 314–321)

Table 3 shows the Kazakh language level of ethnic groups. 43.% of Koryo Saram were able to speak Kazakh, among them, only 14.1% of them said they could read it. Also, 10.5% of Koryo Saram said they could write in Kazakh.

4. Fieldwork (2015–2018)

Through my fieldwork, I observed how each minority group responded to integration. How did Koryo Saram change after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and after each republic gained independence? To examine their response to inter-ethnic coexistence, we must first focus on the activities of major organizations leading

Kazakhstan's Koryo Saram society, which was centered in Almaty, Kazakhstan (Figure 4). Through an interview survey with officials from the Koryo Saram's organizations, I examine their current status under the multiethnic policy.

Figure 4. Almaty Korean Cultural Center. Source: Author

Table 4. Interview Subject Data

Name of the Organization	Name of Interviewee (designation)		Sex	Age	Date
Almaty Cultural Center	A.	Executive of the Assembly, Vice Chairman of Korean Cultural Center, Professor	M	60s	Nov. 11, 2016; Aug. 10, 2018
Korean Association	B.	Vice chairman, Vice Chairman of the Cultural Center	M	20s	Dec. 14, 2015
	C.	Chairman	M	40s	Aug. 10, 2018
Korean Youth Association	D.	Chairman	M	20s	Dec. 14, 2015
Koryo Ilbo (Korean Newspaper)	E.	Chief editor	M	40s	Dec. 14, 2015; Aug. 10, 2018
	F.	Vice editor	F	70s	Dec. 3, 2015; Aug. 10, 2018
Korean Theater	G.	Director, Vice Chairman of the Assembly	F	60s	Dec. 24, 2015
	H.	A singer who belongs to theater	F	50s	Dec. 24, 2015
Korean Radio Station	I.	Director	F	50s	Dec. 11, 2015; Aug. 10, 2018
Korean Television Station	J.	Director	F	60s	Dec. 18, 2015; Aug. 10, 2018
Korean Weekend School	K.	Director	F	70s	Dec. 23, 2015

City and State	Name of Interviewee (designation)		Sex	Age	Occupation	Date
Ansan, Korea	L.	Former chief editor of Koryo Ilbo, permanent returnees to Korea	M	60s	Unemployed	Jun. 6, 2018
Seoul, Korea	M.	Professor, Kazakh National University	M	60s	Professor	Jun. 7, 2018

The details are shown in Table 4. The fieldwork survey was conducted three times in Almaty, Kazakhstan, once in Ansan, Korea, and once in Seoul; the interviews were mainly conducted with officials and individuals of the organization.

Officials from Kazakhstan's Koryo Saram were asked the following questions: a) Is it true that there are great concerns about potential factors for ethnic disputes in Kazakhstan, a multiethnic, multicultural, and multi-religious country after the dissolution of the Soviet Union? b) Why do you think Kazakhstan has promoted integration relatively well since its independence? Most of the respondents answered in association with the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan (APK), recognized their position as an ethnic minority, and considered the identity of the Koryo Saram as citizens of Kazakhstan. The answers could be summarized into four categories: the role of the Assembly, a change in the perception of ethnicity in conjunction with the change of its name, the relationship between the Assembly and the Koryo Saram's organizations, and the direction of its organizations.

(1) The Role of APK

First, regarding the role of the Assembly, the Kazakhstan government has emphasized multiethnic coexistence to integrate non-Kazakh people. Rather than unilaterally pushing for multiethnic integration centered on Kazakhs, they have emphasized strategies to ensure multiethnic culture. In addition, interviewees mentioned the president's discrimination-free policy and its excellence in governance and stressed that the Assembly is the center of Kazakhstan's integration policy. They answered that its existence greatly contributes to the integration of a multiethnic citizenry. Also, they indicated that the Assembly aims to eliminate possible multiethnic, multicultural, and multi-religious disputes.

(2) Change in the APK's Name

Second, the Assembly was named the "Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan" until 2007 but was renamed the "Assembly of People of Kazakhstan" in 2008. After its name was changed, *narod* (people) was changed from its plural form to singular. It did not include Kazakhs until 2007, but it was changed to include Kazakhs following social concerns of discrimination against non-Kazakhs. The Assembly was a device that implied a distinction between Kazakh and non-Kazakh, but the distinction disappeared after the 2008 name change to imply "one citizenry (nation)."

Moreover, the term minority is not officially used in Kazakhstan because there is a nuance of discrimination in the word. The meaning of the word *narod* is more important than the concept of minority in Kazakhstan.

The important issues for Kazakhstan's people are not about "minority" or "majority," but "the status of ethnic identity" and "the status of civic identity." It was pointed out that the relationship between the two identities is closely related to the role of the Assembly.

(3) The Relationship between the APK and the Koryo Saram's Organizations

The Kazakhstan government provides economic support to each ethnic organization belonging to the Assembly which allows each ethnic group to enjoy the benefits. This relationship, however, may make it difficult for ethnic organizations to become completely independent of the government and voice their own political position. Through our fieldwork, we found that most of the representatives of major organizations of Kazakhstan's Koryo Saram are executives of the Assembly and are obliged to act according to the guidelines of the

Assembly once they join. Thus, despite the inter-ethnic competition and practical benefits, their activities are bound to be limited. However, the Koryo Saram actively compete among their organizations for entry into the Assembly.

(4) The Direction of its Organizations

Koryo Saram's organizations under the jurisdiction of the Assembly are divided by "fields." Each organization oversees different fields, focusing on one common ideology.

This common ideology means that each ethnic group supports integration into one Kazakhstan citizenry while preserving its respective culture within a limited scope demarcated by the government. More importantly, these individual cultures are all recognized as part of Kazakhstan's culture. They agree that all ethnic groups share and respect not only their own culture but also each other's ethnic culture, which makes coexistence possible.

In fact, representatives of the Koryo Saram's organization were supporting the activities of the APK. At the entrance of the Koryo Saram Association, an explanation of the APK's activities and organizations was prominently displayed on the wall. The Koryo Ilbo, Koryo Saram's newspaper, and the Korean Youth Association are subordinated to the Association. Moreover, their media belongs to the state-run television channel and is operated by the government. Koryo Ilbo was reorganized as the voice of the Korean Association in 2000.

The Korean Theater was located on the outskirts of Almaty from 1968 to 2018. However, after the theater director became the vice president of the APK, the theater moved to the main street in 2018. Is it possible to say that this has nothing to do with the relationship between the APK and the Koryo Saram-related organization mentioned above?

5. Structure of Koryo Saram's Organizations

All the ethnic groups are competing for the recommendation and approval of the APK, as the official procedure of the admission is not disclosed, and most of its members are composed of the APK.

Koryo Saram are actively participating for representation in the APK. Calling attention to the organization's rich history of political and cultural participation, the respondents emphasized the strong relationship between the two sides and the role of Koryo Saram in the cultural exchange between Kazakhstan and Korea. Koryo Saram have solidified their position as an ethnic minority, and they maintain their own identity in cooperation with the government.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to outline the results and limitations of this study. We began by asking how each minority group reacted to integration. Three aspects were identified: Firstly, Kazakhstan's Koryo Saram are themselves actively involved in the political realization of their identity. This has been realized through the Assembly and its various ethnic organizations. Secondly, Koryo Saram have formed and maintained their own identity through the protections conferred by the government. Finally, these protections have, in turn, allowed Koryo Saram to strengthen their status as an "equal ethnicity" in Kazakhstan.

The limitations of the study are as follows: Most of the Koryo Saram's organizations fall under the provisions of the Assembly; in some cases, they are overseen by multiple executives of two or more organizations. They cannot secure independence in their activities, and there are practical restrictions. In future research, it will be necessary to broaden the perspective for a deeper analysis of the social integration

of Koryo Saram. Moreover, future research should also expand the research subjects to the general public rather than only elite groups, and to some NGOs rather than ethnic organizations that have relationships with the government.

References

Hierman, B. and Nekbakhtshoev, N. 2014. Whose Land is It? Land Reform, Minorities, and the Titular "Nation" in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. *Nationalities Papers* 42(2), 336–354.

Isaacs, R. and A. Polese. 2015. Between "Imagined" and "Real" Nation-building: Identities and Nationhood in Post-Soviet Central Asia. *Nationalities Papers* 43(3), 371–382.

Landau, J. M. and B. Kellner-Heinklee. 2012. *Language Politics in Contemporary Central Asia: National and Ethnic Identity and the Soviet Legacy*. London and New York I.B.TAURIS.

Lee, Jinhye. 2021. An Introduction to Study of Korean Diaspora in Central Asia: Focused on the Problem of Nomenclature and Sub-identity, *Korean Studies* 9,104–117.

Sharipova, D., A. Burkanov and A. Alpeissova. 2017. The Determinants of Civic and Ethnic Nationalisms in Kazakhstan: Evidence from the Grass-Roots Level. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 23(2), 203–226.

Ким, Бен Хак (Kim, Ben Hak). 2013. Корё ильбо 90 лет (*Koryo Ilbo 90 Years*). Корё ильбо. (in Kazakh)

Қазақстан Республикасы Статистика агенттігі (Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Statistics). 2011. Қазақстан Республикасындағы ұлттық құрам, діни наным және тілдерді меңгеру (*Kazakhstan National Composition, Religious Beliefs and Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan Mastery*). Астана: Қазақстан Республикасы Статистика агенттігі. (in Kazakh)

Ikeda, Y. 2012. Teikoku, Kokumin-kokka, soshite Kyōwasei no Teikoku (Empires, Nation-States and Republican Empires). *Quadrante: Shibungi: Chiiki, Bunka, Ichi no tame no Sōgō Zasshi (Quadrante: Areas, Cultures and Positions)* 14, 81–99. (In Japanese)

Lee, Jinhye. 2022. *Futatsu no Ajia wo Ikiru: Gendai Kazafusutan ni okeru Minzoku Mondai to Koryo-Saramu Deiasupora no Bunkahen'yō (Living in Two Asias: Ethnic Problems and Acculturation in the Koryo Saram Diaspora in Contemporary Kazakhstan)*. Nakanishiya Shuppan. (In Japanese)

Nakanishi, K. 2011. *Chūō Ajia Kuruguzusutan: Kyū Soren Shin Dokuritsu Kokka no Kensetsu to Kokumin Tōgō (Nation-building in Kyrgyzstan)*. Akashi Shoten. (In Japanese)

Shiokawa, N. 2004. *Taminzoku Kokka Soren no Kōbō I: Minzoku to Gengo (The Rise and Fall of the Multi-ethnic Soviet Union I: Ethnicity and Language)*. Iwanami Shoten. (In Japanese)

Shiramiz, S. 2004. *Esunikku Media Kenkyū: Ekkyō/Tabunnka/Aidenteitei (A Study of Ethnic Media: Cross-border, Multi-culturalism, and Identity)*. Akashi Shoten. (In Japanese)

Uyama, T. and M. Hiwatari. (eds.). 2018. *Gendai Chūō Ajia: Seiji, Keizai, Shakai (Contemporary Central Asia : Politics, Economy, and Society).* Nippon Hyoron Sha. (In Japanese)

Chapter 3
Social Inclusion of Syrian Refugees and Reclaiming Their Arab Belongingness: The Cases of Jordan, Germany, and Sweden

Aoi MOCHIZUKI

In 2011, the so-called Syrian Civil War broke out. So far, at least 35,000 people have been killed because of this war. More than 10 million people have been displaced from their homes and more than 6.8 million have fled to other countries as asylum seekers and refugees.

The main host countries for Syrian refugees are in the area neighboring Syria. Turkey is the biggest host country with 3.7 million Syrian refugees. More than 800,000 people have fled into Lebanon. Jordan hosts the third largest number of refugees. These countries sometimes become the gateway to accessing Northern Europe.



Figure1. Trend of registered Syrian refugees in Syria's neighboring countries.
Source: UNHCR (https://data2.unhcr.org)

Figure 1 shows how the number of Syrian Refugees has increased. The number of refugees accelerated around 2013 and gradually increased until 2019. At first, they went to countries neighboring Syria, but some people sought safer places and opportunities for employment. Therefore, in 2015 and 2016, many people took boats to Europe, and it took on the characteristics of a serious international issue.

Even to this day, the social inclusion of Syrian Refugees is the main issue in the host countries, but the refugees' situations vary greatly depending on the host societies. I will focus here on the refugees' cultural belongingness, such as their being Arabs, but we cannot overlook the fact that their religious belongingness also plays an important role in their displaced lives. It is necessary to conduct a comparative analysis to find solutions that help the refugee crisis. This chapter focuses on the three main host countries of Syrian refugees: Jordan in the Middle East and Germany and Sweden in Europe. In Jordan, most Syrian refugees can live without any cultural barriers because the majority of Syrians and Jordanians have similar backgrounds as Arabs and Muslims. However, in Europe, they might realize that they are the other in the host societies. How would these differences affect the refugees' lives?

The purpose of this study is to examine Syrian refugees' belongingness. I will attempt to make a regional comparison of how Syrian refugees have rebuilt their livelihoods in their host society, comparing the Arab Islamic areas and non-Arab Islamic areas. My research question is about how Arab belongingness functions in the lives of Syrian refugees.

Valentine et al. compared the identity formation of Somali refugees in the UK and Denmark. They reveal that the presence or absence and size of the immigrant community in the host society influence refugees' choices of identity (Valentine et al. 2009). Adachi, a Japanese

sociologist, also pointed out that cultural communities ensure one's identity (Adachi 2020).

1. Social Inclusion of Syrian Refugees in Jordan

Based on these discussions, I will move on to refugees' social inclusion and talk about the case of Jordan. Jordan is a small country neighboring Syria, but now more than 670,000 Syrian people live there. I conducted my fieldwork in Amman for three months in 2017 and 2018. I mainly interviewed Syrian refugees who lived in a district in east Amman. In Jordan, about 80% of Syrian refugees live in urban areas.



Figure 2. Refugee Host Country Jordan
Source: Author

Like other Arab countries, Jordan has not ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. At the beginning of the refugee problem, Syrian people were de facto refugees, while the Jordanian government only treated them as guests. However, after the Arab League suspended Syria's membership, the Jordanian government began to accept Syrians as refugees. The UNHCR, which is the UN organization that assists refugees, carried out refugee registration on behalf of the Jordanian government.

Figure 3: Research Area
Source: Taken by author (July 2018)

The major flow of refugees over the last 10 years has seriously affected Jordanian society. For example, its population is reaching the limits of its infrastructure and education system, and people have suffered from rent and price inflation. Sometimes there are inter-religious conflicts in the communities. Syria and Jordan once formed the same region called Greater Syria, and these two countries have similar languages, cultures, and religions. I was impressed that these similarities

often become the reason refugees choose Jordan as a destination. A family I met in Amman told me they had a chance to resettle in the United States due to the support of the UNHCR, but they refused this offer because the U.S. is not an Islamic country. This case shows that for some Syrian refugees, it is important that the host society be Islamic because living in an Islamic society makes them feel safe.

Cultural and religious solidarity serves as a safety net for Syrian refugees' lives. According to El-Abed (2014), there are three rationales for unconditional hospitality in Jordan. The first is Bedouin, the second is Arab, and the last is Islam. In this chapter, the latter two are the keys to the social inclusion of Syrian refugees. For example, *Karam* is one of the Islamic virtues. It means "generosity," and it becomes the basis for refugee support.

Religious belongingness with Islam is the basis of the local and informal support in a particular district. For example, a community center regularly distributes bread to poor people, including refugees in the area, and on Eid Day in 2017, local elders worked with a Japanese NGO to collect money and prepare eight sheep. They then distributed the meat to Syrian refugees. The lamb dish in Figure 4 was made from that meat.

Figure 4. Eid Meal Provided for the Poor
Source: Taken by author (January 2017)

The community elder, called a Shaikh in Arabic, engages in assisting refugees and poor people in the area. He knows more than 1,000 residents' names and faiths, and he talks with people about their daily lives. Not only that, but he also tells Islamic stories from the Quran and Hadith. He is an elder who has a rich knowledge of Islam, so he is highly regarded by refugees in this area.

In Jordan, the guarantee of legal refugee status is uncertain. However, the Quranic schools sometimes act as safety nets for children who cannot go to public or private schools for financial reasons. I met two girls who go to a Quranic school because their parents cannot pay their transportation costs to attend public schools. The lack of a normal education is still a big problem, but the Quranic schools are at least places where children are not isolated from society. Additionally, faith can stabilize refugees' spirits during unstable times in the host society. I asked some people, "What do you think of being a refugee?" They answered that they felt their tragedy was their own *qadar*. Qadar is the belief in Islam that one's destiny is predetermined by Allah. In these ways, Islam plays an important role in the context of refugee assistance in the case of Amman. This support is provided within the context of assistance to poor households in the region rather than the refugee support framework.

Likewise, the aspect of being an Arab helps the social inclusion of Syrian refugees. The important point is that there are no linguistic barriers between Syrians and Jordanians, who speak a very similar Arabic dialect. When I attended a Quran study group with Syrian women, there were participants from four Arab countries, and they communicated without any problems. The absence of linguistic barriers is a steppingstone to integration into Jordanian society in terms of employment, education and so on. In addition, sometimes relatives who live across the border help refugees. Refugees tend to gather and live

with relatives or friends from the same hometown and help each other.

2. Social Inclusion in Different Cultural Sphere: Germany and Sweden

(1) A Summary of the "European Refugee Crisis"

Next, I would like to talk about the situation in non-Arab Islamic countries such as Germany and Sweden, which have accepted Syrian refugees since the early stages of the Syrian civil war.

Around 2015, a large number of asylum seekers, including Syrian refugees, traveled to Europe by land and sea to seek refugee status in Northern European countries. This phenomenon has been named the European Refugee Crisis. For European countries, this refugee crisis raised the question of who they were willing to accept. As a result, the evacuation of Syrian refugees was deemed highly politicized, and they received refugee status at a high rate in 2015. Germany and Sweden especially demonstrated initiatives for accepting Syrian Refugees.



Figure 5. Number of certifications of Syrian refugees in Germany and Sweden
Source: Migrationsverket and BAMF

Figure 5 shows the number of certifications of Syrian refugees in both countries. In September 2011, the Swedish government declared it would accept all Syrian asylum applicants, which became a pull factor so that refugees aimed for Sweden as their final destination. In addition, in Germany, the acceptance program for Syrian refugees in Syrian-neighboring countries was started in March 2013, and 15 German states launched unique refugee support programs. However, such permissive acceptance reached its limit after large numbers of refugees and migrants flowed in during 2015. In Germany, refugees are considered workers and are required to attend job training and language schools. If they refuse these duties, then they receive fewer welfare benefits. Germany continues to accept refugees in a limited way but demands that Syrian refugees integrate into society as workers. On the other hand, Sweden reintroduced border inspections to reduce the movement of people. As in other European countries, in Germany and Sweden, opposition parties arose to reject immigrants such as the Swedish Democrats and the Alternative Party for Germany. In this way, the refugee crisis transformed both countries' tolerant refugee policies into more harsh ones.

From my fieldwork in Stockholm and Berlin for about one month in 2019, it became clear that refugees' cultural belongingness was used in various situations of social inclusion in Europe.

(2) Arab Belongingness in Europe

Figure 6 shows the so-called "Arabic Street" in Berlin. It was easy to find Arabic cafés, restaurants, and supermarkets on this street.

Figure 6. "Arab Street," Berlin
Source: Taken by author (October 2019)

Figure 7. "Arab Street," Stockholm
Source: Taken by author (October 2019)

Figure 7 was taken in a suburb of Stockholm. In Sweden, there is a strong tendency toward residential segregation, and unlike Berlin, immigrant strongholds are located in the suburbs.

1) Religion

As in the case of Jordan, religion functions as one of the doors to accepting refugees into the host society. The mosques play a big part in supporting refugees in Stockholm and Berlin.

Figure 8. Flier for Goda Grannar (Good neighbors)
Source: Taken by author (June 2020)

Figure 9. Stockholm Mosque
Source: Taken by author (October 2019)

The Stockholm Mosque has collaborated with Islamic Relief and the Katarina Church to implement a refugee support project called "Goda Granner," which means good neighbors in Swedish. They provided refugees with temporary beds and food and permitted Islamic worship in the church. Currently, they provide language training and consultation services for refugees and asylum seekers.

Figure 10. A Mosque in Berlin
Source: Taken by author (October 2019)

Figure 10 shows a mosque in the Neuköllen district in Berlin that exercised initiatives for social integration during the refugee crisis. This mosque has held various activities such as a refugee festival, inviting refugees to meals, and meetings at the mosque for dialogue among residents and newcomers. From my interview surveys, I found that in other mosques, imams or mosque officers occasionally provide a voluntary charity called *Sadaqa*, which includes food, daily supplies, and showers. Some of them helped refugees as interpreters or by giving information about refugee assistance. It can be said that Islamic solidarity in the host societies helps and promotes the social inclusion of

Syrian refugees.

2) Language

Next, I would like to describe social inclusion from a linguistic perspective. In public libraries in Stockholm and Berlin, services are available in multiple languages, including Arabic, Kurdish and Armenian. In particular, Stockholm posts notices in various languages including English and Arabic, and Swedish-speaking cafes provide information about refugee support and job assistance in Arabic and other languages too. Here, libraries function as places for information sharing in the local community including migrants and refugees.

Figure 11. Public Library in Stockholm
Source: Taken by author (2019)

Figure 11 shows a public library in Stockholm. There is a bookshelf

dedicated to Arabic works, and the information boards are also written in Arabic. As you can see, Arabic has a high presence in Stockholm.

In Berlin, Syrian refugees have started an interesting activity: an Arabic library called Baynatna run by Syrian refugees next to the Berlin City Library (Fig. 12). All books were donated, and the categories of books are diverse. This is an attempt to reconstruct their cultural base in the host society. Baynatna sometimes co-sponsors events with the Berlin City Library, and it is a bridge between Arabic and German speakers.

Figure 12. Baynatna Arabic Library, Berlin.
Source: Taken by author (2019)

3) Refugeeness

Finally, I will talk about the aspect of using refugeeness in the situation of social inclusion. For example, "Multaka" is a service to guide visitors to museums in Berlin by Syrian and Iraqi refugees and

is based on refugees' cultural belongingness. When I joined a tour of Islamic art, the male guide explained about the art on one floor in Arabic. In addition, the concept of refugee entrepreneurship has been attracting attention recently as a model of refugees' economic integration. It seems that the entrepreneurship of refugees promotes their independence. In the case of Berlin, refugees can receive support from the German government and the EU to start their new businesses.

3. Conclusion

I would like to conclude by returning to my first question concerning how Arab belongingness functions in the lives of Syrian refugees. Through my investigation of the process of the social inclusion of Syrian refugees, it became clear that the refugees' cultural belongingness plays a complementary role in supporting their livelihoods. In Jordan, where legal guarantees for refugees are lacking, cultural belongingness ensures the survival base of Syrian refugees. In Europe, some projects focusing on refugees' cultural belongingness have been attracting rising attention as an important consideration for refugees' social inclusion.

References

Adachi, Satoshi. 2020. *Saikiteki Kindai no Aidenteitei Ron: Posuto 9.11 Jidai ni okeru Igirisu no Imin Dainisedai Musurimu (Muslim and British post-9/11: Identities in Reflexive Modernity)*. Koyo Shobo.

BAMF. 2020. *Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2019: Asyl*. Nürnberg: BAMF.

El-Abed, Oroub. 2014. The Discourse of Guesthood: Forced Migration in Jordan. In Anita H. Fábos and Riina Isotalo (eds.), *Managing Muslim Mobilities: Between Spiritual Geographies and The Global Security Regime*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 81–100.

Embiricos, Alexandra. 2020. From Refugee to Entrepreneur? Challenges to Refugee Self-Reliance in Berlin, Germany. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 33 (1), 245–267.

Freudenburg, Julia. 2019. "FlüchtlingMagazin" (Refugee Magazine): A Syrian Social Business in Hamburg, Germany. In Sibylle Heilbrunn et al., *Refugee Entrepreneurship: A Case-based Topography*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 83–100.

Heilbrunn, Sibylle. et al. 2019. *Refugee Entrepreneurship: A Case-based Topography*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Shimizu, Ken. 2019. Suwēden ni okeru Imin/Nanmin no Hōsetsu to Haijo: Suwēden Minshutō no Chūdō Seitō-ka wo Megutte (Inclusion and Exclusion of Immigrants/Refugees in Sweden: Regarding the Transformation of the Sweden Democrats into a Centrist Party). In Takashi Miyajima and Sato Shigeki (eds.), *Hōsetsu/Kyōsei no Seiji ka, Haijo no Seiji ka: Imin/Nanmin to Mukiau Yōroppa (Politics of Inclusion /Coexistence or Politics of Exclusion: Europe Confronting Immigrants and Refugees)*. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 83–110.

Valentine, Gill, Deborah Sporton and Katrine Bang Nielsen. 2009. Identities and Belonging: A Study of Somali Refugee and Asylum Seekers Living in the UK and Denmark. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 27(2), 234–250.

Online

Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) <https://www.migrationsverket.se>

Chapter 4
Subjectification vs. Objectification of the Local Community in Post-Disaster Indonesia: The Case of the 2014 Mt. Kelud Eruption

Muhammad Riza NURDIN

1. Introduction

In my current research, I am investigating the dynamics of disaster recovery in Indonesia, and in this chapter, I will focus on the case of the 2014 Mt. Kelud eruption. We will be looking at the function of the local community, and particularly in disaster risk reduction or disaster management, which means their alignment with the global framework.

In the last three decades there have been three global frameworks. First was the 1998 Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World (IDNDR 1994), and then the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 (UNISDR 2005), and the last one that is still ongoing at this time is the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (UNDRR 2015). All of these frameworks actually highlight the importance of the local community in disaster management. In fact, each framework mentioned the importance of community for both practitioners and academia, and they believe that the local community is very important in risk reduction, because they are the most effective, they can play a leading role, and particularly because in many cases, the assistance from external parties, such as the government and civil society can be quite late in arriving.

It can be said that local communities have a very high potential to

be the main actors in reducing fatalities and saving lives, but this raises the question of whether this proposal has genuine potential.

To support this opinion, I plan to highlight a case study from Indonesia. Similar to the global framework, Indonesia also has a disaster management framework called the Indonesian Disaster Management Law No. 24/2007. However, compared to the global framework, I found that in this Indonesian law there was a lack of acknowledgement of the role of the local community and more emphasis on institutional development. The emphasis is on the government agencies, the National Agency for Disaster Management and the local or district level disaster management agency. One section in the law states that the government and regional governments shall be responsible for sustained management and protection of the community against disaster impact.

This implies that the potential disaster-hit community is incapable and has to be protected, but in some cases the community can protect itself better than external parties. One section of the law states that everybody has an obligation to carry out disaster management activities, which could imply committee members or others, but the local community is not explicitly mentioned in the local framework for disaster risk reduction.

Figure 1. Location of Mt. Kelud. (Map by the author)

It is well-known that Indonesia is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world, similar to Japan, the Philippines, and other countries located within the Ring of Fire. The subject of my case study is Mt. Kelud in Java, one of the deadliest volcanoes which has erupted over 30 times in recent centuries.

The latest eruption was in February 2014. But it is worth mentioning that in 1918, the death toll was more than 5000, and in the sixteenth century, the casualties were about 10,000.

In my research, I intend to show that the local community actually has the capacity to minimize the risk of being victims of potential disasters or the hazards in their area.

The Indonesian government has classified four types of warning for chronic eruption: normal, aware, ready, and danger, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Disaster Preparedness Levels

Status	Normal	Aware	Ready	Danger
03/02/2014				
04/02/2014				
05/02/2014				
06/02/2014				
07/02/2014				
08/02/2014				
09/02/2014				
10/02/2014				
11/02/2014				
12/02/2014				
13/02/2014				Danger: 21.15 Eruption: 22.46

Source: PVMBG 2014, cited in Sudharmanto 2021

The "Normal" category is for when the volcano is inactive, or considered as not dangerous, but usually in Indonesia, the most common category is "Aware," which means that inhabitants have to be very careful.

In Table 1, you can see that from February 3 until February 9, 2015, the status was "Aware," which meant that people had to be prepared for the next phase, which is "Ready." At this stage they had about a week to prepare. When the volcanic activity increased continuously for three days, the government raised the status to "Ready," which meant that they had to be ready for evacuation. Then, after three days, on February 13, 2014, the government increased the level to the highest warning, "Danger," which meant that all precautions should be put into effect immediately. However, in many cases in Indonesia, if a "Danger" level warning is issued, it takes about twenty-four hours to respond. In other words, it takes one day and one night for the Emergency Committee to fully activate themselves and thus for the government to assist the community with the evacuation. Unfortunately, Mt. Kelud volcano erupted less than two hours after the "Danger" warning was declared. This case most certainly raises serious questions about the government's capacity in disaster mitigation for the community.

When the "Danger" level is reached, within one and a half hours, all those who live in the most vulnerable zones within five to seven kilometers of the center have to be evacuated. Around Mt. Kelud they had started to evacuate immediately, but surprisingly, even with only this short notice there were no victims due to the evacuation. Even though the government reported that four people were killed, these casualties were caused by the eruption itself, not the evacuation process, which was carried out with zero casualties. Why did these casualties occur? What are the capacities of the local community, and what did the government actually do in terms of disaster response?

The main finding of my research is that the community themselves

were the main actors in the evacuation, but when outside actors provided emergency intervention, then the community was treated as an object. Also, when the community's evacuation process was effective, it was claimed to be successful because of the military and the police. In other words, because of the role of the government, the community was objectified.

In an interview with an activist from Jakarta on May 4, 2015, he said:

"…the truth is that the community were the subjects [actors], but when other parties provided emergency intervention, then the community was objectified. Also, when the community evacuation process was successful, it was [claimed] because of the military-police [government]. The community was the object. As far as I know, the success was due to the community themselves. They had their own initiatives and evacuation plans, and performed self-evacuation before the state system implemented their evacuation mechanism……. The [evacuation] system was not contradictory; the government was late, but it was claimed [as a successful evacuation]."

In this case, the success of the evacuation was due to the community themselves because they had their own initiative, made their evacuation plan, and evacuated before the State's system could be put into operation.

The activist actually criticized the government for two things. Firstly, they claimed success because of their own role in evacuating inhabitants living near the crater, and secondly, because they had made the local community an object.

2. Subjectification vs. Objectification

To clarify, subjectification is possible when someone becomes the subject or actor in a scenario, while objectification refers to when a

person or people are acted upon by others. In this case, the community was treated as the object. For example, in philosophy, particularly regarding gender, objectifying women undermines their agency, treating them as passive objects rather than individuals with distinctive capabilities. (Papadaki 2010).

In the community development approach, objectification and subjectification can have both positive and negative aspects, but in the context of my case study, objectification is negative, and subjectification is positive.

Regarding subjectification, we can say that in this study the members of the community perceived themselves as the subject because they were the actors and considered this as one of the reasons for having zero victims during the evacuation procedure.

There is also a theory that if you have become the subject, not only your own actions as an individual but also your interaction with others is very important (Heller 1996). In this case study, the key to success was the established networks within the community. Thus, the collective action of the local community and how the local community used the information flow were important factors for having zero victims.

The Jangkar Kelud community established its Disaster Risk Reduction Committee base in 2008, just one year after the mountain erupted for the seventh time. They agreed that they needed to strengthen their local capacity in order to network with each other and with another community-based Disaster Risk Reduction organization in Jogja near Mt. Merapi, one of the deadliest volcanoes in Indonesia, so that they could exchange their knowledge and experience. This organization, the Pasak Merapi Jogja, visited the Jangkar Kelud disaster risk reduction community in 2008 to train them on how to do community-based activities and answer technical questions. Then, in return, in 2010, when Mt. Merapi erupted in Jogja, the Jangkar Kelud community volunteer team went to Jogya to help them.

This is what we can call learning by doing.

Then Mount Kelud erupted in 2014. At that time there were 2,473 volunteers associated with the Jangkar Kelud organization, and they played a crucial role in the evacuation of more than 86,000 residents from the three villages within the craters of Mt. Kelud. In this case they actually worked closely with the government.

The PVMBG runs the monitoring post of the Kelud, so this belongs to the government. They are conducting simulation drills in the villages of Jangkar. One of the challenging times to organize disaster response is in the evening. This collective action in the form of real evacuation drills and simulations is an example of subjectification.



Figure 2. Subjectification: Information Flow
Source: Sudharmanto 2021, modified by author

Figure 2 shows the flow of information. The monitoring post near the mountain belongs to the government. In the flow on the left side, if there is any seismic activity, they report it to the government first. And then from the central government in Jakarta it has to go to the Provincial Office of East Java in Surabaya, then the regency government, then the sub-district leaders, then the village leaders, then the sub-village leaders and finally to the community members. The right side shows the community-based initiatives. They are the key actors because they can simplify the information flow and make it faster. In fact, some of the members of the Jangkar council work at the Kelud Monitoring Post, so they have access to the network and can pass information directly to the village leaders, who broadcast it on the Jangkar Kelud community radio. They can also contact the community members directly.

If we compare how the flow of information is managed in Figure 3, either by government or the community, it really makes sense to use the community-based flow on the right side, and this is what played a crucial role that led to zero victims. The government claimed the success, and barely recognized the part played by the community, or gave them any credit for their disaster preparation activities. They published a book titled *A Community Experience in Managing Mount Kelud Eruption: Story from the East*, describing how community collaboration and disaster management is actually not a new concept, but has been proven as a best practice, particularly by this case study.

However, this is not always the case, and there are some examples of what I call objectification where the community becomes the local object. I found this information on the Internet. In an example from Detik News, the title says that the performance of the government in managing the disaster is worthy of appreciation. If you read this news, it seems as if the central government coordinated well with the local government, and the local community affected by the volcanic eruption

also cooperated well. It is made to appear that it was the government who managed the evacuation, when in fact it was the other way round. It was the Jangkar Kelud Disaster Risk Reduction Committee who understood and practiced the evacuation process and initiated it by themselves. The following are reports taken from various news media:

- "The seismic activity of Mt. Kelud increased tonight until it sent out a cloud of hot volcanic ash. 200,000 people who live within a radius of 10km from the crater started to be evacuated tonight." (DetikNews, February 13, 2014)
- "The Regency government of Kediri, East Java, had evacuated all of their people who lived within the radius of 10 kilometer from the Mt. Kelud crater, which erupted on Thursday (13/02) night." (Republika, February 14, 2014).
- "The President of the Republic of Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono appreciates steps conducted by the local government in the emergency response to Mt. Kelud volcanic eruptions, East Java." (Kompas.com, February 17, 2014)

The reports put emphasis on the community as the object that needed to be evacuated and ignored the significant efforts of the community itself. In addition, the Indonesian president praised the local government's response to the impact of the Kelud eruption, and the activity of the Kediri Regency Committee in minimizing the impact of the eruption was stressed. These media reports make it seem as if the government is working hard to save 200,000 people. Here we can see again that the emphasis is on the community as the object that needs to be assisted and even though government assistance, if there was any, came too late, the government was portrayed as the savior of the people. There was little or no recognition by the media of the role of the

community in saving their own lives.

However, if you ask the people of Kelud, the negative views of the government and its objectification of the community are revealed. One newspaper reported.

- The people in Kelud trust in nature more than the government (SindoNews, 13/02/2014).
- People believe the signs from nature more than the government.
- Options for evacuation sites were not realistic (open space, not safe).

It was reported that some of the contingency plans drawn up by the government were not realistic. For example, evacuation sites prepared by the government, such as utilizing open spaces, are very dangerous, because the hot ashes will fall directly on them. They also designated the school, although the roof was unsafe. The local people were aware of all these facts, and consequently put more trust in the signs of nature that they could see directly with their own eyes, much better than the government itself.

3. Lack of Appreciation of the Local Community

I observed that these misjudgments by the government have given rise to the discussion on how the government objectified the local community in the case of the volcanic eruption.

- The first issue is its use of a top-down approach, where the information flow goes from the central government to the provincial government, then the district, then the sub-ministry, then the village leaders, then the sub-leaders, and then to aid recipients subjects the local people to objectification.
- The second issue is that shifting responsibility from the

community's action as an affiliate partner to aid recipients subjects the local people are subjected to objectification. Instead of their views on local matters being listened to and appreciated, they are overlooked and excluded from the plans.

- The third issue is that instead of their local knowledge, skills and networking ability being appreciated and heard, they are treated as helpless individuals in need of assistance from outside agencies.

However, in conclusion, getting the central authorities to recognize the beneficial roles of the local community is easier said than done.

The capacity of local communities is highlighted in the global framework of disaster risk reduction, but its appreciation is lacking in the Indonesian disaster management framework. The Indonesian government focuses more on government capacity and treats the local community as weak, which explains the existence of objectification.

The case of the Mt. Kelud eruption confirms the argument above, with much praise for the government's efforts but little recognition of the local community and non-state actors.

For better disaster management, the local community needs to be treated as equals (subjectification) and included in the policy making process. Each actor/agency has its own role in saving lives and building resilience to cope with disasters or hazards.

I hope that it is clear from this brief chapter that the objectification of local communities in Indonesia in the case of making contingencies plans definitely exists, and it has not only had a negative effect on safety but has resulted in a loss of trust in the government, as well as ignoring valuable input that could improve hazard management.

The intention of my research is to improve disaster preparedness and planning and ultimately save lives by drawing attention to the need

to make the local community the subject of local policymaking, not the object, and to modernize the outdated top-down system of governance to bring Indonesia more into line with the global trend.

References

Arif, Solichan. (2014, February 13). Warga di Kelud lebih percaya alam daripada pemerintah [People in Kelud Believe in Nature More than the Government]. *SindoNews*. <https://daerah.sindonews.com/berita/835442/23/warga-di-kelud-lebih-percaya-alam-daripada-pemerintah> (Accessed: October 30, 2023).

Aritonang, Deytri Robekka. (2014, February 17). Presiden Puji Langkah Pemda Tangani Dampak Erupsi Kelud [The President Appreciates Steps by the Local Government Dealing with the Impact of Kelud Eruptions]. *Kompas.Com*. <https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2014/02/17/1944480/Presiden.Puji.Langkah.Pemda.Tangani.Dampak.Erupsi.Kelud> (Accessed: October 30, 2023).

Calogero R. M. 2012. Objectification Theory, Self-Objectification, and Body Image. In: Thomas F. Cash (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Body Image and Human Appearance*, Vol 2. San Diego: Academic Press, 574–580.

DetikNews. (2014, February 13). Efforts to Evacuate 200 thousand People from Mt. Kelud to be Done Tonight. *DetikNews*. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-2496739/upaya-evakuasi-200-ribu-warga-gunung-kelud-dilakukan-malam-ini> (Accessed: October 30, 2023).

Heller, K. J. 1996. Power, Subjectification and Resistance in Foucault. *SubStance*, 25(1), 78–110. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3685230>

International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). 1994. Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World:

Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation. Available at <https://www.preventionweb.net/files/8241_doc6841contenido1.pdf> (Accessed: October 30, 2023).

Papadaki, L. 2010. What is Objectification? *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, 7(1), 16–36. <https://doi.org/10.1163/174046809X12544019606067>

Sudharmanto, Catur. 2021. The Secret Behind Zero Victims: Mt. Kelud Volcanic Eruptions in 2014. Paper presented at Learning Resilience from People of Mt. Kelud online seminar. 21st February. Surabaya: Masyarakat Tangguh Indonesia.

United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). 2005. Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters. <https://www.undrr.org/publication/hyogo-framework-action-2005-2015-building-resilience-nations-and-communities-disasters> (Accessed: October 30, 2023).

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). 2015. Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. <https://www.undrr.org/implementing-sendai-framework/what-sendai-framework> (Accessed: 30 October 2023).

Zuhri, Damanhuri. (2014, February 14). Pemkab Kediri Evakuasi Warga dari Letusan Gunung Kelud [The Kediri Government Evacuates People from Mt. Kelud Eruptions]. *Republika*. <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/n0yd6s/pemkab-kediri-evakuasi-warga-dari-letusan-gunung-kelud> (Accessed: October 30, 2023).

ONLINE ISBN 978-4-910550-10-7
PRINT ISBN 978-4-910550-11-4

Asia-Japan Research Institute, Ritsumeikan University