【Symposium Report】Security Governance in Mindanao: Military, Police, Armed Groups, and Outsides

Community Security Management in Conflict Environments: Focus on Mindanao

By Jennifer Santiago Oreta

(Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University)

Dr. Jennifer Santiago Oreta started her presentation with a discussion on the current security situation in Mindanao in which the appearance of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)’s splinters has further jeopardized the stability in the area. The Philippines government employed peace negotiation method to solve communist insurgency and secessionist movement. For terrorist groups in Mindanao, however, the authority opted for combination of law enforcement approach and peace process. This combination produced a political confusion as a heavy-handed approach against terrorist groups can potentially undermine the peace process. In addition, most of the groups have pledged allegiance to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) though no evidence of them sending fighters to Syria. Those Mindanao-based terrorist groups hoped the allegiance can project a fearsome image and enhance their outreach to the people. The Marawi crisis in 2017 was an attempt of those Mindanao extremists to form an ISIS chapter in the province. An ISIS chapter requires an alliance, a leader, and a territory. Marawi was targeted to be the territory requirement to form an ISIS chapter.

The Philippines government relied heavily on its military in combating those terrorists. The Philippines National Police (PNP) initially was the backbone of internal security operations, including counterterrorism, after the duty transfer from the Armed Forces of Philippines (AFP) in 1990. The incapability of the PNP however forced it to hand back the role to the AFP. Dr. Oreta pointed at that when the PNP received the responsibility, the military only transferred the formal authority without capacity building or the proper instruments. The laws on security management in the Philippines also did little to alleviate the security instability in Mindanao. Rather than helping to solve the issue, those laws created some loopholes for the appearance of more armed groups. For instance, the Indegenous People’s Rights Act (1997) gave a leeway for the formation of the so-called ‘warrior’, guards for some sacred cultural sites who have the rights to carry a gun.

In the end of her conclusion, Dr. Oreta noted 10 parallel issues that intersect: 1) Peace process with the MILF and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); 2) Swinging pendulum of peace-and-armed conflict with CPP-NPA-NDF; 3) Inconsistent policy: “No Deal” with terrorist but some local units have “ad-hoc” program for surrenderees; 4) Policy and Operations “mismatch”: Terrorism is law enforcement problem, but AFP goes after terrorist groups; 5) Operational Issues remain: No separate detention facility for charged member of terror groups, making jail as a recruitment ground; 6) No mechanism to check suspicion that Madrasah is being used as ‘indoctrination’ and recruitment ground; 7) No concrete evidence on the breadth and depth of radicalization happening through social media; 8) Half-hearted Reintegration program for former rebels; 9) Transitional justice in post-agreement scenario not seriously pursued; 10) No national action strategy and plan on preventing and counter terrorist / armed militants. She also identified three challenges: 1) Low level of understanding and appreciation of the civilian bureaucracy with regard peace, security, and terrorism; 2) Poor infrastructures leave areas in relative isolation, creating safe havens and recruitment hubs for terrorist groups; 3) Local government units have little capacity to combat armed militants.

Under Pressure: Policing during the 2017 Marawi City Crisis

By Rosalie Arcala Hall

(Professor, the Division of Social Sciences, University of the Philippines Visayas)

Prof. Rosalie Arcala Hall began her presentation by explaining reasons of why Marawi was chosen by the extremists to become their ISIS chapter’s territory. Marawi has a strong reputation as a commercial hub and center for illicit economic activities, particularly drug trade and a place to sell stolen cars. Interestingly, Marawi citizens tended to save their wealth in the form of liquid assets, such as cash money and gold, which they stored in their house. This situation contributed to the reluctance of Marawi people to be evacuated from the area. In addition, Marawi has been a place for presence of various non-state armed groups, ranging from MILF members to local politicians’ private armed groups. The law enforcement agencies in Marawi, and also Mindanao, are relatively dull. In doing her research, Prof. Hall did some interviews with some police figures, city mayors, and NGO leaders in Marawi.

She the continued her presentation by explaining the liberal model of security governance in which the military handles external defence while the national police focuses on internal security. The police in Marawi however experienced the so-called militarization whereby the security apparatus starting to adopt militaristic approaches, including the style of the uniform. Bad performance, entanglement with local politicians, patronage-based recruitment, corrupt behaviors, and poor coordination with military are notable issues of the national police in Marawi. Prof. Hall argued that frequent police rotation (every 2 years) and redeployment in Mindanao / Bangsa Moro area as a form of punishment became the culprits of the miserable situation. Moreover, the PNP has limited local Muslim staffs to be deployed in Marawi and Mindanao. One of the solutions for this issue is by forming the so-called ‘Hijab troopers’, Non-Muslim policewoman wearing hijab who are deployed in the checkpoints.

In her conclusion, Prof. Hall argued that the militarization has strengthened the constabulary component while local police focused to handle returning residents and evacuees. She also noted the needs to produce a stronger anti-terrorism legal framework and form a Join Task Force coordination platform for building the police’s internal security role capacity. Prof. Hall pointed the introduction of Martial Law in Marawi as legal pretext for coercive measures. In addition, she believed it is necessary to have exclusive civilian coordination platforms that dealing with humanitarian operations.

Question and Answer Session

During the question and answer session, several participants asked some enquiries to the two speakers. One spectator pointed at the lack of participation of local populations in managing the security governance in Mindanao. The two speakers admitted that the Mindanao citizens` participation in the province`s security governance is still relatively low. They argued there are some gaps, particularly cultural, of understanding between the locals and the central authority. One participant asked about the reason for the concentration of armed conflicts in the southern part of the Philippines rather than in the north. Both of Prof. Oreta and Prof. Hall believed the combination of a structural error and colonial legacy fostered the brouhaha in Mindanao. The last question during the seminar questioned the factors behind the continued violence in Mindanao. According to the speakers, various failures of central government programs, such as Bangun Marawi, have contributed significantly to prolong the conflict in the southern Philippines.

Written by Adhi Priamarizki  (Doctor Student at Graduate School of International Relations)