North Korea: An Impregnable Bastion in the Path of the Coronavirus

Pyongyang's successful experience in countering the spread of coronavirus within the country, at least as of the end of April 2020, is unique in its own way and is of considerable interest. North Korea (DPRK), being almost at the epicenter of the epidemic while bordering its main centers and initial sources—China (PRC: 1300km of land border), South Korea (ROK)—has managed to avoid infection of its population to date. Despite the distractions of several media sources, including those from the ROK and the United States about the presence of ill North Korean authorities being disguised, both Russian diplomats in the DPRK and serious researchers in the West tend to trust official statements, concerning the absence of evidence of the disease infiltration  into the country. For example, on April 2 of this year, the World Health Organization (WHO) representatives in the DPRK confirmed the negative results of 709 people tested for COVID-19 the first time, as well as the absence of detected cases of the disease in the country as a whole.[1]

Of course, this phenomenon was achieved as a result of the implementation of extraordinary measures on the territory of the state. North Korean leadership declared preventing the spread of the coronavirus as a matter of "national survival" and quickly took unprecedented tough measures, including hermetically closing its borders and banning all types of transport links with the outside world. The North Korean authorities themselves call their actions "state anti-epidemic measures of the highest rank"[2].

Pyongyang is well aware of the scale of the threat and the high vulnerability of its country to infectious diseases caused by the economic difficulties that have arisen largely as a result of stifling economic sanctions. According to WHO experts, up to 43% of the population (about 11 million people) suffer from malnutrition; further, the public health system is critically underfunded (health care costs are among the lowest in the world—about $1 per person, per year)[3] and there is an acute shortage of medicines, modern medical equipment, diagnostic kits, etc. 　　

Therefore, "super-special quarantine measures" were introduced and described, among other things, in a detailed interview with the Russian Ambassador to the DPRK, Alexander Matsegora, to the TASS News Agency this year on February 20, wherein he states, "Russian diplomats in the DPRK are under quarantine, but not under siege."[4]

Pyongyang has imposed a quarantine and closed its borders since January 21 during which strict restrictions have been imposed on all foreigners in the country, as well as Koreans who may have been in contact with them.[5] In particular, the strict "period of medical supervision of diplomatic personnel" was extended from the (January last decade) to February 15, and then until March 3 because of "violations of restrictions imposed by individual diplomatic missions" during the originally established quarantine period (each such violation was punished with the 15-day extension). These rules required foreigners to remain permanently within their missions and allowed them to use only one food store and medical hospital in the capital while special North Korean representatives accompanied them in order to exclude intermediate stops of their transport.

In the corresponding circular of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, all representatives of the diplomatic corps were instructed to contact their North Korean colleagues on all working issues through a special mailbox installed in front of the entrance to the Foreign Ministry and "hold important meetings by phone"[6] . The circular also prohibited "any new personnel" from entering the country. For example, when two young Russian diplomats arrived at Pyongyang for rotation on March 9, they were subsequently placed under a 30-day quarantine at Jangsusan Hotel in Pyongsong, roughly 30 kilometers north of the DPRK capital. The two diplomats had been the only two passengers onboard a return flight from Vladivostok, which had earlier in the day flown about 80 foreigners—including many foreign diplomats and aid workers—out of the country.[7]

Taking into account such "draconian" measures implemented against the diplomatic corps, it is not difficult to imagine the scale of the strictures imposed on 9,950 North Korean citizens who had practical or theoretical contact with foreigners, as well as those who returned from other countries, most of them from China. According another source, the total number of citizens quarantined happened to be 24,969 people.[8] The specified quarantine continued for the above-mentioned categories of people for 30-40 days, though it was partially eased from March 3 of this year. North Korean media reported that, as of March 6, "among 380 foreigners who were isolated and under strict medical supervision," 221 were released from such a regime[9]. During this period, all schools were closed, public events were banned, and so on.

The set of protective state measures also included the following steps. All cargo arriving across the border and ports, as well as vessels and other vehicles delivering them are quarantined, isolated for 10 days, and then transferred to the appropriate departments, where they undergo total disinfection. These ships are also forbidden to emit water or pollutants. A "guide to the disinfection and handling of items coming from other countries" was published, which describes in detail the types and quantities of disinfectants, protective equipment, and special suits for personnel performing these actions.[10]

It should be emphasized that the leadership of the DPRK has not only introduced a system of protective measures, but also firmly controls their strict implementation. An expanded meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party on February 28, 2020, chaired by Kim Jong Un, was devoted to these issues. At the meeting, "anti-party actions, abuse of special power, and corruption" were some of the notes among the leading cadres of the higher party school that were severely criticized. As a result, two Vice-chairmen of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party, Lee Man Gon and Park Tae Dok, were dismissed from their posts and the party committee of the specified "base for training party personnel" was disbanded.

As it turned out later from indirect mentions in the media of the DPRK, the blame for these representatives of the party and state leadership was fueled by continuing contacts with Chinese partners in the economic sphere in the border zone, ignoring the requirements of quarantine for Korean participants in these operations. Kim Jong Un stressed at the meeting that "within the framework of the state anti-epidemic system, no privileged persons are allowed in any case" and instructed "the Cabinet of Ministers and the Central emergency anti-epidemic command to completely block all possible ways and cracks of penetration of the "coronavirus."[11] Illustration of the efficacy of the measures taken can serve as materials in South Korean media that convey "the rumors about the executed officials" did not stop smuggling operations with China, which before the emergence of the epidemic, Pyongyang condoned. There are also reports that China's authorities instructed local residents not to approach the border, so as not to be accidentally shot dead by North Korean border guards who are ordered to shoot to kill the Korean citizens trying to cross the border.[12]

To combat the threat of coronavirus, the media of the DPRK has been mobilized to the maximum extent possible, providing daily updates on government measures, advising the population on how to avoid infection, and whipping those citizens and officials who underestimate the threat of infection as well as those who do not fully comply with the prescribed requirements, in particular, neglecting the use of protective masks "even during meetings and working meetings" [13].

In the context of this analysis, it is necessary to highlight the reaction of the international community and the States concerned with the actions of the DPRK leadership. On the one hand, a number of international organizations, including UNICEF, WHO, the Red Cross, and a number of NGOs, e.g. "Doctors Without Borders," have responded to Pyongyang's requests for international assistance and have already begun to provide it, while achieving a partial exemption from sanctions for the supply of humanitarian and medical supplies, equipment, etc. Russia and China have also provided important assistance to North Korea in this area (Moscow, among other cities, supplied 1,500 kits for testing for coronavirus in February).[14]

On the other hand, there were loud voices among North Korea's opponents who did not hide the hope that Pyongyang would not cope with the challenge of the pandemic, which would lead to the fall of the regime itself. Even the headlines of many analytical materials on this topic are eloquent: "North Korea’s Coronavirus Quarantine: More Effective Than Sanctions," "North Korea’s coronavirus crackdown: the economic impact so far," "Can North Korea Cope With the Coronavirus?"[15]

Summing up the expectations of numerous Western experts, we can reduce them to two main options:

1) Pyongyang's quarantine measures will not save the state; the coronavirus will eventually enter North Korea and destroy it. The regime will not cope with the epidemic; as a result, it will lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the people and collapse.

2) Draconian measures implemented by Pyongyang to combat coronavirus and the long-imposed isolation from the outside world, primarily from China, could possibly prevent the epidemic, but dramatically worsen the economic situation, which would cause mass hunger, the split of the elite and the growing discontent of its individual groups, and the decrease in the level of wealth that all together will lead to serious destabilization of the political situation wherein the regime of Kim Jong Un could not cope.

As a result, by either being totally infected with the coronavirus or economically collapsing, politically sliding into chaos, North Korea will become a global threat to the region and the world. Such a challenge will require urgent and massive intervention from the international community, including in line with the concepts of "humanitarian intervention – the responsibility to protect."[16]

It is not surprising that on March 26, the United States again opposed another attempt by seven States, including Russia, to submit the issue of easing sanctions against the DPRK to the UN Security Council for consideration. This happened despite the call of UN Secretary, General Antonio Guterres, to lift sanctions against the DPRK, Iran, Venezuela, and other countries in the context of the pandemic, as they seriously limit the potential of these States to counter the dangerous epidemic.[17]

The U.S. in April began to offer and consider options for how best to provide humanitarian and medical assistance to North Korea, while not preventing the obtainment of specific exemptions from sanctions for the activities of a number of NGOs in this area, etc.[18] However, the negative position of Washington regarding the easing of the general sanctions regime remains concrete. Moreover, the same NGOs that are making efforts to deliver medical supplies to the DPRK point to huge technical difficulties caused, in particular, by the United States’ secondary sanctions.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the following. In the author’s opinion, the leadership of the DPRK understands, better than anyone else abroad, the serious vulnerability of the country to a dangerous infection. The coronavirus forced North Korea to choose the lesser of two evils and enforce an unprecedented level of severe quarantine and self-isolation. Pyongyang clearly understands the stark economic consequences of these measures. At the same time, the political leadership believes that it knows how to overcome extreme socioeconomic difficulties, but it is not sure that it will be able to cope with the epidemic if it enters the country. Therefore, the forced choice made by the DPRK in favor of extraordinary, harsh quarantine and other protective measures against the threat of coronavirus, which often causes misunderstanding and condemnation abroad, seems to me　reasonable and likely the only possible practical solution. Further, it must be recognized that the implementation of such a model of action may be possible only in the specific conditions of the political system of North Korea. However, Pyongyang used its own specific political system efficiently with comparative advantages at full scale.

Alexander Vorontsov：

Alexander Vorontsov Ph.D. (History) is currently the head of the Department for Korean and Mongolian Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russia Academy of Sciences and the MGIMO-University associate professor. He also holds post as Russian Military Science Academy Professor. He repeatedly takes part at the “track 1.5" and "track 2" conferences dealing with the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and East Asia. He was visiting professor at the Hanguk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul from 1998 to 2000; at the Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto, Japan in 2009, 2012 and 2020; at the Akita International University, Japan in 2015, member of faculty of Yonsei University International Summer School in Seoul in 2010;  visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies in Washington D.C. in 2005-2006, graduated from Asia Pacific-Center for Security Studies Executive Courses in Honolulu in 2005. Vorontsov served as second secretary in the Russian Federation’s Embassy in Pyongyang from 2000 to 2002. Vorontsov holds a Ph.D. in history from the Institute of Oriental Studies at the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. He was the member of the Russian part of the Russia-DPRK, Russia-ROK Intergovernmental Commission dealing with trade-economic and scientific-technical cooperation. Vorontsov has studied at Lomonosov Moscow State University and Pyongyang Kim Il Sung University.