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  2. Factors Restraining Security Dilemma Contagion in the Indo-Pacific (with some caveats)

Factors Restraining Security Dilemma Contagion in the Indo-Pacific (with some caveats)

Erwin Tan (Associate Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

Introduction

 

Previously, I adopted a Devil’s Advocate perspective in contemplating security dilemma contagion in the forthcoming Biden Administration. Inasmuch as this analysis was derived from my study of the July Crisis of 1914 and international relations in the contemporary Indo-Pacific, a number of factors separate the two cases. Whilst one escalated into World War One, there are grounds to argue – with caveats – that such an outcome in the Indo-Pacific can, through prudent diplomacy, be averted.

 

Mitigating Factors

 

Whilst the July Crisis marked one instance of security dilemma contagion escalating into war, my 2019 article, ‘Mapping Out the Possible Outcomes of the Security Dilemma’, noted that conflict is only one possible outcome of the security dilemma. Other outcomes, such as the prolonged US-Soviet standoff during the Cold War, are possible.

 

2.1 Common Interests between the US and China?

Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd characterised US-China rivalry as ‘Cold War 1.5’ – although reminiscent of the Cold War, the interdependent interests of Washington and Beijing are far more intertwined with each other. Whilst I am aware of the criticisms of Norman Angell’s arguments concerning Anglo-German economic interdependence in The Great Illusion in 1909 – in particular, World War One’s outbreak five years later – nuance should be shown in reading Angell’s analysis. Contrary to common misperception, Angell did not argue that economic interdependence made war impossible; rather, Angell’s argument was that, from an economic point of view, war between Britain and Germany was irrational. Moreover, it is worth recalling that the events that caused the July Crisis to escalate were centred on Serbia, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany, which had comparatively low levels of economic interdependence with one another to function as a brake against conflict.

 

In contrast, international relations in the Indo-Pacific are rather more complex, and would suffer far worse as a result of any conflict-driven disruption to investor confidence patterns, if the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is any indication of how closely intertwined the economies of the world are amidst global distribution of horizontally integrated supply chains. Furthermore, the global nature of challenges facing the international community is underscored by the urgency in countering climate change, a problem that no country can overcome unilaterally, yet posing global implications that range from rising sea levels to increased meteorological havoc, from displaced human populations to damaged agricultural cycles.

 

2.2: The Endurance of US Soft Power

A second factor that has militated against security dilemma contagion arising from wariness over the Trump Administration’s unilateralism stems from the durability of US soft power in the eyes of the international community. Although Trump’s term in office has damaged Washington’s international standing, it is notable that US allies in Europe and Asia were quick to offer congratulatory messages to Biden following his victory, pointing to goodwill held by longstanding US allies, and hence a starting point from which Biden can set about restoring trust between the US and its partners.

 

2.3 No Cult of the Offensive in the Indo-Pacific

Further dampening the impact of security dilemma contagion in the Indo-Pacific is a shared desire by all parties to avoid great power conflict. Comparison to the July Crisis is helpful. Stephen Van Evera highlighted the ‘Cult of the Offensive’, that convinced European General Staffs that wars could be decisively won by offensive military postures at the outbreak of hostilities. The Cult of the Offensive goaded European policymakers into a race to mobilise their armies first during the July Crisis, even though this prevented cooler heads from advocating de-escalation. Policymakers in 1914 did not have the benefit of hindsight in acknowledging the carnage that was to follow. In contrast, there is little evidence of a ‘Cult of the Offensive’ among Indo-Pacific policymakers. The carnage of the first half of the 20th century – events that culminated in the use of nuclear weapons – have underscored the folly of great power conflict. Given the possession of second-strike nuclear weapons by both the US and China (along with India, North Korea, Russia and Pakistan), few have any appetite for a 21st century rerun, with nuclear weapons, of the World Wars.

 

3. Some Caveats

 

Yet, the worst-case scenarios that may arise from security dilemma contagion necessitate the following caveats.

 

3.1 Durability of US Soft Power?

Whilst Biden’s victory over Trump has brought welcome relief to US allies in expectation of policy moderation and multilateralism in the forthcoming Administration, one should not overestimate the significance of Biden’s victory. In spite of four years of scandals and a failure to adopt a coherent strategy against COVID-19, some 40% of Americans supported Trump in 2020. Had it not been for the death toll and economic impact of COVID-19, Trump might have won re-election. Whilst Trump has been defeated, the Republican Party may see a continuation of Trumpist policies based on populism, jingoism and / or isolationism as a route to regain control of White House in 2024. Were such a scenario to occur, the resulting international uncertainty over US diplomatic credibility could see renewed security dilemma contagion.

 

Secondary States’ Efforts to Maintain Credible Defence Capabilities

A further concern facing US allies arises from their dependence on Washington’s nuclear umbrella. This is particularly the case for the ROK, Japan and Taiwan, given their falling birth-rates, portending declining levels of available military manpower. Under such circumstances – and particularly if they doubt the reliability of the US security commitment – it is possible to imagine any of them contemplating development of an independent nuclear arsenal, both to avoid excessive reliance on the US, as well as ensuring their own security. Needless to say, the prospect of any of these three countries choosing an independent nuclear program is one that, at best, would trigger a nuclear arms race; at worst, such a development (particularly in Taiwan or Japan) could anger China into armed conflict.

 

Economic interdependence

Whilst economic interdependence is a disincentive against conflict, it should not be mistaken for a panacea that prevents conflict. As I note in ‘Norman Angell and the logic of economic interdependence revisited’, economic interdependence may be trumped by other factors, such as nationalism and the ‘Cult of the Offensive’. Moreover, the impact of COVID-19 has added growing momentum to Washington’s economic decoupling from China, alongside efforts by Australia, India and Japan to promote supply chain resilience. Such developments have a certain rationale, underscored by increasing wariness of numerous states of their vulnerability to Chinese influence operations. Yet, one risk of economic decoupling is that it reduces disincentives against conflict, thence increasing the possibility of miscalculation in a crisis.

 

No ‘Cult of the Offensive’ in the Indo-Pacific?

Finally, whilst there is no current evidence to suggest a ‘Cult of the Offensive’ between the US and China, the Information-based RMA is being exploited by both the US and China, as well as secondary Indo-Pacific states. In transforming warfighting with new generations of technology, armaments and doctrines, it risks military officers becoming enamored with new geostrategic possibilities – including the possibility of a new ‘Cult of the Offensive’. It remains unclear if the introduction of Artificial Intelligence, stealth platforms, anti-satellite weapons, and hypersonic missiles will lead to a security dilemma that will be offense-dominant or defense-dominant. Notably, the emergence of such grey zone tactics as cyberwarfare, hacking, and influence operations may, by blurring the line between offense and defense, increase the possibility of miscalculation in the heat of crisis.

 

4. Policy prescriptions

 

Whilst the policy options open to secondary states in the Indo-Pacific are limited due to the ‘Tyranny of Geography’ arising from their proximity to the littoral regions of the western Pacific and the intensity of Sino-US rivalry, there are a number of avenues that offer some room for manoeuvre in mitigating security dilemma contagion in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, there are a number of opportunities that, if appropriately utilised by the Biden Administration, can help mitigate the possibility of security dilemma contagion in the Indo-Pacific. 

 

4.1 Consolidating the US Role in the Rules-Based Order?

Whilst Trump’s damage to US soft power is severe, a concerted effort by Biden to rebuild US soft power would assuage regional allies’ fears of alliance abandonment and entrapment. The Biden Administration has an opportunity to re-establish the credibility of US soft power due to growing international wariness over China’s rise. Apart from China’s attempts to cover up the severity of the COVID-19 virus, Beijing’s behaviour elsewhere - its tariff-based bullying of Australia, repression of Uighur people, suppression of democracy in Hong Kong, and threats against Taiwan – have aroused international concerns that a Chinese-led world order may not be a benign one. It is notable that 2020 has seen increasing regional and international blowback against China’s assertive behaviour.

 

Biden’s call to ‘lead by the power of our example’ offers a good starting point for policy. A White House that is able to decisively address global issues such as climate change, cybersecurity and Chinese assertiveness would be in a strong position to regain the position of world leadership that had been abdicated by Trump. In so assuaging regional fears of alliance abandonment and entrapment, a more multilateral US role would go a long way in dampening the possibility that regional states may have to resort to self-help – including independent nuclear arsenals - in ensuring their own security.

 

4.2 Promoting ROK-Japanese Reconciliation

Inasmuch as the ROK and Japan are Washington’s most important allies in Northeast Asia, the recent increase in their mutual antagonism has proven to be a hot potato that Trump was reluctant to address. US efforts to facilitate some form of rapprochement between the ROK and Japan would not only be instrumental in underscoring the centrality of the US in the diplomatic and security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region, but also counter the possibility of efforts by Beijing to sow and exploit discord amongst US allies in the region.

 

4.3 Economic Decoupling alongside Cooperation on Common Interests?

Insofar as economic decoupling is necessary to counter Beijing’s willingness to coercively leverage its economic influence against others, such measures should not compromise are areas of genuinely-shared global concern between Beijing, Washington and secondary Indo-Pacific states, areas over which cooperation can be undertaken without undermining the rules-based order that the US built in the post-1945 period. Issues such as global distribution of a vaccine for COVID-19 and efforts to promote an environmentally sustainable economic recovery from the pandemic speak to the shared interests of humanity as a whole, over which the intrusion of geopolitical rivalry is detrimental to all. Moreover, given the urgency of fighting climate change through areas such as investment in green technology, it may even be argued that a whole-hearted US effort in fighting climate change will place Washington in a stronger position to further consolidate the post-1945 rules-based order, in contrast to the power vacuum of international influence created by Trump’s unbridled unilateralism and neo-isolationist tendencies.

 

4.4 Toning Down the Rhetoric … and Keeping it Down

Inasmuch as belligerent rhetoric may have the effect of raising tempers to the extent that efforts at diplomatic compromises are undermined, the oftentimes ego-driven foreign policy undertaken by Trump is a good illustration of the pitfalls arising from diplomacy by jingoistic bluster. It should be recalled that that ROK and Japanese public opinion increasingly favoured independent nuclear arsenals following Trump’s threats to unleash ‘fire and fury’ on North Korea during the second half of 2017.

 

Whilst Trump’s departure from office is a good opportunity for Biden to adopt the more measured tones that characterise standard diplomatic practice, it is equally incumbent on Beijing to show diplomatic restraint insofar as its own, increasing habit of rhetorical belligerence is concerned. This is particularly relevant given the prominence of the so-called ‘Wolf Warrior’ generation of younger Chinese diplomats who engage in Trump-like bluster and doctored images to promote unabashed nationalism. It is necessary for the Biden Administration to, over time and through setting a good international example, reclaim the moral high ground that separates the rules-based international order from any Chinese coercive attempt to unilaterally rewrite these rules in its favour.

Er-Win Tan, ‘Mapping Out the Possible Outcomes of the Security Dilemma in International Politics’, Asian International Studies Review, Vol. 20, No. 1.

Tan, Kim Seung Jin Kim and Kim Gi-Seung, ‘Kim Norman Angell and the logic of economic Interdependence revisited: 1914, 2014’, Asia-Europe Journal, 13, 479–500 (2015)

Stephen Van Evera, ‘The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War’, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1984).

Offense-dominance describes a situation where offensive military doctrines are advantageous over defensive ones, hence an incentive to strike first in a crisis. Conversely, in defensed-dominant situations that favour defensive military postures, there is less incentive to initiate conflict.

In ‘Mapping Out the Possible Outcomes of the Security Dilemma’, I noted that a prolonged period of stability in the security dilemma can change, with little notice, into a situation that hovers on the brink of conflict. Although the US-Soviet Cold War was marked by a prolonged period of stability amidst Mutually Assured Destruction, two notable periods – the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1983 Able Archer War Scare–brought the Cold War close to a nuclear exchange.

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