Tell us about your research theme.
Narita : My research focuses on the history of Okinawa, once the Ryukyu Kingdom, and particularly on how East Asian countries have perceived it. Previous studies have explored how the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Republic of China (ROC) have engaged with Okinawa’s issues of sovereignty and military bases, tracing their involvement over the years. This has led to a reevaluation of the Okinawa reversion, traditionally seen as a territorial dispute between Japan and the U.S., from the perspectives of neighboring Asian countries. Recently, I have broadened, for further consideration, the scope of my investigation to include the roles of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which have had adversarial relationships with ROK and ROC.
Could you share what you have discovered so far?
Narita : Initially, both ROK and ROC, despite their differing stances, were opposed to Okinawa’s reversion to Japan in the 1940s and 1950s. In ROK, Syngman Rhee, who became the first President in 1948, emphasized the significance of U.S. military bases in Okinawa and opposed its return to Japan. This opposition stemmed from the use of Okinawa as a supply and sortie base during the Korean War, which subsequently highlighted the strategic importance of U.S. bases in Okinawa for ROK’s security.
The government of ROC, in the meantime, maintained that, as a member of the Allies during World War II, the final disposition of the Ryukyu issue should be decided in consultation with the Allied nations. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, ROC proposed joint administration of Okinawa by PRC and the U.S. After the war, following the move of ROC government to Taiwan in 1949, ROC viewed the U.S. military bases in Okinawa as crucial for security reasons and opposed its reversion to Japan, like ROK.
Conversely, PRC and DPRK, which were hostile to the U.S., claimed that the U.S.’ rule of Okinawa was “occupation” and supported its return to Japan. Especially after the mid-1950s, as it became apparent that the Okinawan people desired reversion to Japan, they expressed solidarity with the Okinawa reversion movements.
Have their attitudes changed since the 1960s?
Narita : In Okinawa, the Okinawan Prefecture Reversion Council was established in 1960, rallying the movement for return to Japan and it became clear that the Okinawan people were demanding the reversion to Japan. Against this backdrop, the situation in East Asia dramatically shifted with the U.S. escalating its involvement in the Vietnam War in 1965.
In ROK, while interest in Okinawa waned temporarily due to preoccupation with the Vietnam War, the situation on the Korean Peninsula became tense again due to the increased provocations by DPRK in response to the deployment of ROK’s troops in Vietnam. This led ROK to refocus on the significance of Okinawa. When the Japan-U.S. negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa began in 1969, the government of ROK, concerned about the potential impact on its national security, lobbied the governments of Japan and the U.S. to maintain the military base functions in Okinawa.
The government of ROC made similar requests to Japan and the U.S., asking for consultations with them, based on its longstanding position and the request from ROK. However, neither the Japanese nor the U.S. governments intended to reduce the base functions. In November 1969, when Prime Minister Eisaku Sato visited the U.S. and announced the “1972, nuclear-free, homeland level status” reversion of Okinawa in a joint statement with President Nixon, the governments of ROK and ROC were secretly informed their true intention.
As the U.S. intervened in the Vietnam War and utilized its military bases in Okinawa for supply and sorties, the government of PRC intensified its criticism of the U.S. When the joint statement of Sato-Johnson was issued in 1967, PRC criticized it for ignoring the Japanese people’s demand for “immediate, unconditional, and complete return.” PRC also criticized the 1969 agreement for Okinawa’s reversion as “a plot for a new aggressive military alliance with Japan as the pillar and the U.S. as its mastermind.” However, in 1971, PRC dramatically shifted its stance towards rapprochement with the U.S., gradually acknowledging the U.S.’ argument for the military presence in Asia as “a lid on the bottle” and softening its criticism.
Unlike PRC, DPRK maintained its position until the end. When Okinawa was reverted in 1972, Pyongyang’s newspapers condemned its deceitfulness. The Rodong Sinmun reported that the people of DPRK showed “firm militant solidarity” with the Japanese people, demanding the abolition of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the unconditional, complete return of Okinawa.
Could you tell us about your research plans going forward?
Narita : My previous research has focused on the progressive individuals in Okinawa who played a leading role in the movement against bases and for reversion. Currently, the scope of my interest has expanded to include how conservative forces were formed in post-war Okinawa and their relations with ROK and ROC, especially focusing on economic and trade relations. In ROC, the Sino-Ryukyuan Cultural Economic Association was established in 1958, initiating movements to deepen economic and cultural exchanges with Okinawa, for which Okinawan businesspeople reciprocated. This relationship continued even after the severance of Japan-ROC diplomatic relations in 1972. During the Japan-U.S. negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa in 1969, it was found that conservative individuals who opposed early reversion to Japan had formed a group, with the Sino-Ryukyuan Cultural Economic Association involved. In the latter half of the 1950s, the government of ROK also attempted to strengthen trade relations with Okinawa. As the next step, I plan to examine materials collected in Okinawa, ROK, and ROC to delve deeper into the trade relations between Okinawa and ROK, and eventually, broaden my research scope to include the regional changes up to the 1990s.